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Abstract 
 
Despite the fact that there is considerable literature in the English-language on East Asian 
history in the nineteenth century, there are very few works that focus on the international 
politics of the region in the thirty-five years or so between the end of the Arrow War and 
the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War in July 1894.  As a result, the history of East 
Asia in this period is often understood as a period of brief moratorium for the Qing 
dynasty of China before it finally fell prey to Western and Japanese imperialism at the 
turn of the century. 
 
In reality, the Qing was neither as passive nor as powerless as is often believed.  On the 
contrary, the Chinese were successful in re-emerging as the most influential regional 
power in East Asia by the 1880s by making a conscious effort to reassert their influence 
in East Asia not only through domestic self-strengthening, but also by drawing on the 
traditional network between the Qing Empire and its neighbouring vassal kingdoms.  
This point has already been raised by some historians who have focused on Chinese 
policy towards Korea – a country which became the focus of imperial competition not 
only between Qing China and Japan but also Britain and Russia from the 1880s.  
However, little attention has been paid to how other states reacted to China’s revival.  
Much light can be shed on this process by looking at how two of the most significant 
players, Japan and Britain, related to the reassertion of Qing power and to each other over 
the future of Korea in the period from 1876 to 1894.  This dissertation will demonstrate 
that it was difficult for the Anglo-Japanese relationship to become closer when the 
international environment in the region required them to prioritise their respective ties 
with the Qing Empire. 
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General Notes and Abbreviations 
 
This dissertation will use the McCune-Reischauer format for Romanisation of the Korean 
language for most of the Korean words and pinyin for the Chinese.  The Hepburn format 
will be used for Japanese, and prolonged vowels will be differentiated (eg. O and Ō, u 
and ū).  There will be some exceptions, as there are several pronouns that are more 
commonly known in other Romanisation formats, such as Seoul (instead of Sŏul), Hong 
Kong (instead of Xianggang), Tokyo (instead of Tōkyō), and Ryukyu (instead of Ryūkyū). 
 
In the text, East Asian names will be presented in the order of surname first, given name 
next.  However, when this dissertation is citing secondary sources written in East Asian 
language in the footnotes, the names of the authors will be presented in the order of given 
name first, surname last, to be consistent with the format of Chicago Manual Style. 
 
Abbreviations for Footnotes 
 
When this dissertation mentions “Itō,” “Inoue,” “Li” and “Hamilton” in the footnotes, it 
refers to Itō Hirobumi, Inoue Kaoru, Li Hongzhang and Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton.  If 
it is mentioning other individuals with the same surnames, it will be specified (eg. Itō 
Miyoji, Inoue Kowashi, Li Shuchang and Lord George Hamilton).  All sources with 
“FO,” “ADM” or “PRO” are tfrom the National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom.  Refer 
to the bibliography for translations of the titles of Japanese secondary sources. 
 
BDFA British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Part I From the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century to the First World War, Series E Asia. 
 
BKS Bōei Kenkyūjo Shiryōshitsu (Military Archives, National Institute of 
Defence Studies). 
 
BL British Library 
 
Bodleian Bodleian Library. 
 
CAC Churchill Archives Centre. 
 
CLNMM Caird Library, National Maritime Museum. 
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CAP China Association Papers 
 
CDP Papers of Sir Charles Dilke. 
 
CP Papers of the 1st Viscount Cross. 
 
CUL Cambridge University Library. 
 
DEWH Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton, Vol. II. 
 
DP LRO Papers of 15th Earl of Derby, kept at the Liverpool Records Office. 
 
EFP Papers of Sir Edmund Fremantle. 
 
ETMS Enomoto Takeaki Mikōkai Shokanshū (Collection of Unopened 
Manuscripts Related to Enomoto Takeaki). 
 
FYD Fukuzawa Yukichi Den (Biography of Fukuzawa Yukichi). 
 
FYZ Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshū (Collection of Fukuzawa Yukichi). 
 
GS Gaikō Shiryōkan (Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan). 
 
HCH House of Commons Hansard. 
 
HPP Papers of Sir Harry Parkes. 
 
HSM Hanabusa Shishakuke Monjo (Papers of Viscount Hanabusa). 
 
HTKM Hara Takashi Kankei Monjo (Papers Related to Hara Takashi). 
 
IHKM Itō Hirobumi Kankei Monjo (Papers Related to Itō Hirobumi). 
 
IKDS Inoue Kowashi Den, Shiryōhen (Biographical Sources of Inoue 
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Kowashi). 
 
IKM Inoue Kaoru Monjo (Papers of Inoue Kaoru). 
 
ITKM Iwakura Tomomi Kankei Monjo (Papers Related to Iwakura Tomomi). 
 
JACAR Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan. 
 
JMP Papers of Jardine Matheson and Co. 
 
JSP Papers of John Swire and Sons Limited. 
 
KP Papers of the 1st Earl of Kimberley. 
 
KS Kunaichō Shoryōbu (Archives of the Japanese Imperial Household 
Agency). 
 
KSKKT Kensei Shiryōshitsu (Modern Japanese Political History Materials 
Room), at Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan (National Diet Library). 
 
LP Papers of the 5th Marquis of Lansdowne. 
 
MBP Papers of Maurice de Bunsen. 
 
MaMKM Matsukata Masayoshi Kankei Monjo (Papers Related to Matsukata 
Masayoshi). 
 
MuMKM Mutsu Munemitsu Kankei Monjo (Papers Related to Mutsu 
Munemitsu). 
 
NGM Nihon Gaikō Monjo (Official Correspondences of Japanese Diplomacy). 
 
NGS Nikkan Gaikō Shiryō (Documents on the Japanese-Korean Diplomacy). 
 
NOP Papers of Nicholas O’Conor 
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NP HRO Papers of the 1st Earl of Northbrook, kept at the Hampshire Records 
Office. 
 
NSP Papers of Sir Nowell Salmon. 
 
ŌSKM (MSV) Ōkuma Shigenobu Kankei Monjo (Misuzu Shobō Version) (Papers 
Related to Ōkuma Shigenobu [Misuzu Shobō Version]). 
 
ŌSKM (NSKV) Ōkuma Shigenobu Kankei Monjo (Nihon Shiseki Kyōkai Version) 
(Papers Related to Ōkuma Shigenobu [Nihon Shiseki Kyōkai Version]). 
 
PP Papers of Ralph Paget. 
 
RCP Papers of Lord Randolph Churchill. 
 
RP NLS Papers of the 5th Earl of Rosebery, kept at the National Library of 
Scotland. 
 
RVHP Papers of Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton. 
 
SEDS Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Shiryō (Biographical Sources on Shibusawa 
Eiichi). 
 
SM Sanjōke Monjo (Sanjō Family Papers). 
 
SMAZ Shinshū Mori Arinori Zenshū (Complete Collection of Mori Arinori, 
New Edition). 
 
SOAS School of Oriental and African Studies Library Archives. 
 
SP Papers of the 5th Earl of Spencer. 
 
SP HHA Papers of the 3rd Marquis of Salisbury, kept at the Hatfield House 
Archives. 
 
TMKS Terashima Munenori Kankei Shiryōshū (Sources Related to Terashima 
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Munenori). 
 
TTI Tani Tateki Ikō (Papers of Tani Tateki). 
 
WGP Papers of William Gladstone. 
 
YAI Yamagata Aritomo Ikensho (Minutes of Yamagata Aritomo). 
 
YAKM Yamagata Aritomo Kankei Monjo (Papers Related to Yamagata 
Aritomo). 
 
YHM Yamada Hakushakuke Monjo (Papers of Count Yamada). 
 
YKKM Yoshida Kiyonari Kankei Monjo (Papers Related to Yoshida Kiyonari)
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Introduction 
 
A curious gap in the English-language literature on East Asian history is that it tends to 
offer little analysis of the international politics of the region in the thirty-five years or so 
between the end of the Arrow War and the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War in 
July 1894.1  Those few historians who do look at this period usually treat it only in 
passing as their focus is on regional history over a longer timeframe.2  As a result, the 
history of East Asia in this period is often understood within the conventional framework 
of China’s ‘century of humiliation,’ beginning with its defeat in the First Opium War, and 
                                                   
1 Works on mid-nineteenth century are; Paul Cohen, China and Christianity: The 
Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963); W. C. Costin, Great Britain and 
China, 1833-1860, (London: Oxford University Press, 1937); John K. Fairbank, Trade 
and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports 1842-1854, 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1953); Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War 
1840-1842: Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part of the Nineteenth 
Century and the War by which they Forced Her Gates Ajar, Paperback Ed., (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997; originally published 1975); Harry 
G. Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals: Britain’s 1840-42 War with China, and its 
Aftermath, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Michael Greenberg, 
British Trade and Opening of China, 1800-42, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1951); Glenn Melancon, Britain’s China Policy and the Opium Crisis: Balancing Drugs, 
Violence and National Honour, 1833-1840, (Aldershot, Hampshire and Burlington, 
Vermont: Ashgate, 2003); James M. Polachek, The Inner Opium War, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1992); J. Y. Wong, Deadly Dreams: Opium, Imperialism and 
the Arrow War (1856-1860) in China, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
For works on the period after 1895, see E. W. Edwards, British Diplomacy and Finance 
in China, 1895-1914, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) ; T. G. Otte, The China Question: 
Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894-1905, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007); L. K. Young, British Policy in China, 1895-1902, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1970). 
2 Robert Bickers, The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 1832-
1914, (London: Allen Lane, 2011); James L. Hevia, English Lessons: The Pedagogy of 
Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China, (Co-published by Duke University Press 
[Durham, NC] and Hong Kong University Press [Hong Kong], 2003); Peter Lowe, 
Britain in the Far East: A Survey from 1819 to the Present, (London: Longman, 1981); 
and Jürgen Osterhammel, “Britain and China, 1842-1914,” in The Oxford History of 
British Empire, Volume III: The Nineteenth Century, ed. Andrew Porter, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999): 146-169. 
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the inexorable rise of Meiji Japan.3 
In reality, East Asian affairs in the late-nineteenth century were much more complex 
than this image would suggest, as the Qing dynasty in China was not as passive as is 
conventionally believed.  On the contrary, during this period its government made 
conscious efforts to reassert Chinese influence in East Asia not only through domestic 
self-strengthening, but also by drawing on the traditional network between itself and its 
neighbouring tributary kingdoms.  In this context it is worth noting that while the 
Westphalian principle of international relations was introduced to the Chinese by the 
Western governments after the conclusion of the First Opium War, the Qing officials and 
ministers referred to it only when they were dealing with the Western governments and 
diplomats.  When interacting with local East Asian countries, other than Japan, the Qing 
continued to do so within the traditional framework, in which the Chinese empire acted 
as suzerain over its neighbours.4  From around the late 1870s, they even started to make 
conscious efforts to strengthen this influence by using the traditional suzerainty of the 
Celestial Empire to push for overt political and economic concessions from their vassals.  
This is a point that was first raised by the Japanese historian Banno Masataka in 1970, 
and then reasserted by Okamoto Takashi in 2004;5 meanwhile in English, Kirk Larsen 
has made the same point specifically in regard to Korea in 2008.6   However, their 
                                                   
3 Some of the few works that focus on Chinese foreign relations in the 1880s are; Lloyd 
E. Eastman, Throne and Mandarins: China’s Search for a Policy during the Sino-
French Controversy 1880-1885, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); G. 
V. Kiernan British Diplomacy in China, 1880 to 1885, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1939). 
4 Masataka Banno, Kindai Chūgoku Seiji Gaikōshi – Vasuko Da Gama kara Goshi 
Undō made, (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1971); Fairbank, Trade and 
Diplomacy on the China Coast. 
5 Banno, Kindai Chūgoku Seiji Gaikōshi; Takashi Okamoto, Zokkoku to Jishu no Aida: 
Kindai Shinkan Kankei to Higashi Ajia no Meiun, (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku 
Shuppannkai, 2004). 
6 Kirk W. Larsen, Tradition, Treaties and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Choson Korea, 
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interpretation has not been reflected adequately within the English-language 
historiography on East Asian affairs in the late-nineteenth century. 
These writers do not just point to the fact that the Qing introduced this new policy; they 
also argue that it was partly successful in expanding Qing power.  They contend, for 
example, that one should not assume that the Qing was acting primarily as a benevolent 
suzerain working in vain to protect its traditional vassal, the Chosŏn dynasty of Korea, 
from Japanese aggression, as Kim Key-hiuk has argued in his book on the international 
affairs surrounding Korea in the late-nineteenth century.7  Instead, they convincingly 
argue that the Qing policy towards Korea was neither as reactive nor benevolent as Kim 
argued. 8   Instead the Qing regime often accomplished its objectives through 
imperialistic measures, such as sending military forces to Korea and signing a de facto 
unequal treaty with the Chosŏn court.  Using this argument, the Qing Empire can be 
portrayed as no less imperialist than the Western great powers or the Japanese in that it 
attempted to expand its influence in Korea in a manner that was decidedly in its own 
benefit. 
                                                   
1850-1910, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008). 
7 Key-hiuk Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan and the 
Chinese Empire, 1860-1882, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1980). 
8 Martina Deuchler, The Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoy: The Opening of 
Korea, 1875-1885, (Published in the Republic of Korea, for the Royal Asiatic Society 
Korea Branch: University of Washington Press, 1977); C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo 
Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1967); Yur-bok Lee, West Goes East: Paul Georg von 
Möllendorff and Great Power Imperialism in Late Yi Korea, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1988); George Alexander Lensen, Balance of Intrigue: International 
Rivalry in Korea and Manchria, 1884-1899, vol. I, Foreward by John J. Stephen, 
(Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida, 1982); Young Ick Lew, “Yuen Shih-k’ai’s 
Residency and the Korean Enlightenment Movement, 1885-94,” Journal of Korean 
Studies, 5 (1984); Toshio Motegi, “Ri Kōshō no Zokkoku Shihaikan,” Chūgoku – Shakai 
to Bunka, 2 (1987): 89-116; Robert R. Swartout Jr., Mandarins, Gunboats, and Power 
Politics: Owen Nickerson Denny and the International Rivalries in Korea, (Honolulu: 
University Press of Hawaii, 1985). 
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In addition, because historians know that the Qing was ultimately defeated in the First 
Sino-Japanese War, it is tempting to assume that Qing imperialism in the 1880s was a 
complete failure.  Indeed, many historians have argued convincingly that the 
modernisation project that the Qing initiated from the mid-nineteenth century only had 
limited success in strengthening its power.9  This may be true, but it does not remove 
the fact that some contemporary foreign observers believed that the Self-Strengthening 
movement was leading to some significant improvements in the Qing’s military 
capability, and that that perception consequently allowed the regime to cast a significant 
degree of influence over its neighbours in the 1880s.  Far from being a powerless regime 
which was only waiting to be partitioned by the Western nations and Japan at the turn of 
the century, the Qing worked vigorously to expand its influence in East Asia from the late 
1870s onwards, and was temporarily successful at reasserting itself as the most influential 
country in the region. 
To date the research on this topic has focussed primarily on the ambitions and actions 
of China itself, with little attention paid to how this affected regional politics and how 
other states reacted to China’s revival.  Much light can be shed on this process by 
looking at how two of the most significant players, Japan and Britain, related to the Qing 
and to each other over one of the most important regional issues in the period from 1876 
to 1894 – the future of Korea.  The Kingdom of Korea had been under the rule of the 
Chosŏn dynasty since the fourteenth century, but by the late nineteenth century it had 
become a weak regime, with the result that the Korean peninsula attracted the attention 
of a number of imperial countries.  At one level, it emerged as the focus of competition 
                                                   
9 John K. Fairbank ed., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10: Late Ch’ing, 1800-
1911, Part I, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), chs. 9 and 10. 
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between the two main powers in East Asia, Japan and China.  After the Meiji Restoration 
of 1868, Japan had started to take diplomatic manoeuvres to strengthen its influence in 
Korea, which resulted in the signing of the Japanese-Korean treaty (Treaty of Kanghwa) 
in 1876.  Thus when the Qing began to reassert its influence towards that country from 
the 1880s, Korea inevitably became the main flashpoint between the two local powers in 
East Asia. 
However, Korea in this period is also important because it became a pawn in the 
broader international environment that surrounded the region at that time, namely the rise 
of global imperial rivalry and especially that between Britain and Russia.  As many 
accounts of the Western international and imperial history have argued, the competition 
between European great powers started to become more intense from the late 1870s 
onwards.10  This state of affairs began to have strong global implications in the 1880s, 
as the contemporaneous partition of Africa indicates.  In this environment, a country 
such as Korea, which mattered very little in trade terms but possessed an important 
geostrategic position, could not remain unaffected.  By looking at Korea, one can 
therefore come to a better understanding not only of the dynamics of international affairs 
within East Asia but also of the broader international environment that existed around the 
region at that time.  Most of the works on the ‘era of high imperialism,’ which started 
from the late 1870s onwards, tend to focus almost exclusively on analysis of events in 
Africa, and thus overlook the fact that East Asia was also affected by this global trend in 
                                                   
10 M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International 
Relations, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1966); Michael Edwardes, Playing the Great 
Game: A Victorian Cold War, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1975) ; David Gillard, The 
Struggle for Asia 1828-1914: A Study in British and Russian Imperialism, (London: 
Methuen & Co., 1977); Barbara Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and 
the Straits Question, 1870-1887, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973). 
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the 1880s, as both the French colonisation of Indochina and Kŏmundo incident indicate.11 
As Korea had begun to draw the attention of the Japanese and the British governments, 
it would be reasonable to assume that they reacted sharply and adversely to the Qing 
attempt to expand its influence in Korea.  This is particularly the case as the Chinese 
were attempting to strengthen their foothold in that country by utilising the traditional 
suzerain-vassal relationship with the Chosŏn court, a concept which was seen as 
anachronistic in relation to the Westphalian diplomatic principles adopted by Britain and 
Japan.  Moreover, considering that Britain and Japan were at the start of the twentieth 
century to become allies, it might be tempting to assume that it was in these years that 
they first turned to each other for support. 
This thesis will demonstrate that the reality was very different.  It will show that, 
contrary to the conventional wisdom, both Britain and Japan conducted their respective 
diplomacy towards East Asia in the years between 1880 and 1894 in the clear recognition 
that the Qing constituted the most important regional power. 12   They therefore 
considered it necessary to accept de facto the Qing claim of suzerainty in Korea rather 
than objecting to it. Accordingly, there arose in the years before 1894 a unique 
international environment in East Asia in which the Westphalian and Sinocentric orders 
were able to exist in tandem.13  To a considerable extent this was for Britain and Japan 
a policy of expediency.  It was based on their acknowledgement of the latent power of 
China, but it also had its roots in their own limited ability to project military influence in 
                                                   
11 French colonisation of Indochina and the Kŏmundo incident will be discussed in 
detail in chapters 2, 3 and 4.  For partition of Africa, see, among many, Ronald 
Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official 
Mind of Imperialism, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan Press, 1981). 
12 Banno, Kindai Chūgoku Seiji Gaikōshi, ch. 9. 
13 The works that offer detailed analyses of this ‘dual structure’ of international orders 
in East Asia in the late nineteenth century are; Banno, Kindai Chūgoku Seiji Gaikōshi; 
Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast. 
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the region and their mutual distrust.  By looking at the international affairs surrounding 
Korea between 1876 and 1894 one can therefore shed light on both the diplomatic 
relationship between Britain and Japan in this period and the complicated international 
environment that existed in and around East Asia, which is still overlooked by many 
historians today. 
 
Historiography on the Anglo-Japanese Relations, East Asia and Korea, 1876-1894 
 
Similar to the problem with the overall historiography on East Asian affairs from 1876 to 
1894, there is little in the existing literature on the Anglo-Japanese relationship that sheds 
light on this period.  The works that have been produced on the nineteenth century tend 
to concentrate either on the years around the Meiji Restoration of 1868, a time of domestic 
upheaval in Japan, or the period after 1895 in which the British and Japanese governments 
started to contemplate forming an alliance with each other. 14   There is not much 
literature on the period in-between, and the few existing works that do exist tend to deal 
with economic relations or cultural interactions instead of the political and strategic 
                                                   
14 For works that touch on the Anglo-Japanese relationship around the Meiji 
Restoration in English, see Michael R. Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The 
Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy, (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009); William G. Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 
1834-1858, (London: Luzac and Co., 1951); William McOmie, The Opening of Japan, 
1853-1855: A Comparative Study of the American, British, Dutch and Russian Naval 
Expeditions to Compel the Tokugawa Shogunate to Conclude Treaties and Open Ports 
to their Ships, (Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2006).  For literature on the period 
after 1894, see Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island 
Empires 1894-1907, (London: The Athlone Press, 1966); Ian Nish, “Origins of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance: In the Shadow of Dreibund,” in The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
1902-1922, ed. Philips Payson O’Brien, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004): 8-25; T. G. 
Otte, The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894-1905, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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dimensions.15  Another problem with the existing works on Anglo-Japanese relations in 
this period is that they tend to focus on issues that were purely bilateral, and do not offer 
detailed analysis on how the relationship between these two countries was influenced by 
their respective diplomatic environments.16 
In addition, there are several shortcomings in the literature on the British and Japanese 
policies towards East Asia and Korea, which are directly relevant to the topic of this 
dissertation.  First of all, there are very few works on how the British government 
formulated its policy towards Korea.  While there are some secondary sources in English 
language that look at the Russian and American policies towards Korea, there are almost 
no works that focus on the British side of the story.17  There are some studies on this 
                                                   
15 Perhaps the only exception to this rule is Olive Checkland, Britain’s Encounter with 
Meiji Japan, 1868-1912, (London: Macmillan, 1989).  For economic interactions, see, 
for example, Janet E. Hunter and Shinya Sugiyama, “Anglo-Japanese Economic 
Relations in Historical Perspective, 1600-2000: Trade and Industry, Finance, 
Technology and the Industrial Challenge,” 1-109; Kanji Ishii, “British-Japanese Rivalry 
in Trading and Banking,” 110-132, both in Janet E. Hunter and Shinya Sugiyama eds. 
The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations 1600-2000, Vol. 4: Economic and Business 
Relations, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).  For cultural 
interactions, see, among many, Gordon Daniels and Chushichi Tsuzuki eds., The 
History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Vol. 5 Social and Cultural 
Perspectives, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), parts I and II.  
Also see Toshio Yokoyama, Japan in the Victorian Mind: A Study of Stereotyped Images 
of a Nation, 1850-80, (Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: The Macmillan Press, 
1987). 
16 Works that represent this tendency are the five-volume series of The History of 
Anglo-Japanese Relations, general editors Chihiro Hosoya and Ian Nish.  See also 
Checkland, Britain’s Encounter with Meiji Japan; Gordon Daniels, Sir Harry Parkes: 
British Representative in Japan 1865-83, (Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 1996); 
Grace Fox, Britain and Japan, 1858-1883, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); H. 
J. Jones, Live Machines: Hired Foreigners and Meiji Japan, (Tenterden, Kent: Paul 
Norbury Publications, 1980). 
17 For Russian policies towards East Asia and Korea, see Alexander Lukin, The Bear 
Watches the Dragon: Russia’s Perceptions of China and the Evaluation of Russian-
Chinese Relations since the Eighteenth Century, (Armonk NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003); 
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the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
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topic in the Japanese language, but they are still relatively few in number, and therefore 
historians have little knowledge about British policy towards Korea in the period between 
1876 and 1894.18  Compared to the British side of the story, there is no shortage of 
literature on Japanese policy towards Korea, due to the fact that Japanese imperialism 
towards East Asia has drawn the close attention of historians from the 1950s onwards.  
A problem with these secondary sources, however, derives from the fact that they too are 
heavily influenced by the benefit of the hindsight. Historians know that Japan emerged 
as the most successful regional power in East Asia by the Edwardian era, and that it turned 
Korea into its protectorate in 1905 before annexation in 1910.  As a result, many assume 
that Japan was always a powerful regional great power that could bully its neighbours in 
East Asia, and that it must have possessed a blueprint to annex Korea ever since the Meiji 
Restoration of 1868.19  Even Kirk Larsen, whose book offers a detailed and convincing 
analysis of Qing imperialism towards Korea, writes under the assumption that the 
Japanese had a long-term ambition to annex Korea.20  Therefore, he argues, the Japanese 
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did not hesitate to push for annexation once they had managed to drive out their 
competitors, the Qing and Russia.21  Secondary sources in Japanese language have also, 
up until about the late-1970s, argued that the Japanese government in the early Meiji 
government possessed strong territorial ambitions.22 
This line of argument ignores the fact that Japan in the years before 1894 was a small 
regional power in East Asia working desperately to uphold its independence.  Japanese 
modernisation was far from complete in the 1880s, and thus the Japanese decision-makers 
often had to devote more attention and resources to domestic reform rather than 
diplomacy, which inevitably restrained their ability to engage in overseas adventurism.23  
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Shuppansha, 1970; originally published 1966).  Takahashi Hidenao and Saitō Seiji 
offer the best analyses on the Japanese historiography on the origins of the First Sino-
Japanese War, and this dissertation follows along the line that they forwarded as well.  
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Hidenao Takahashi, Nisshin Sensō eno Michi, (Tokyo: Tokyo Sōgensha, 1995), 311-3. 
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work that offers the overview, see Jun Suzuki, Ishin no Kōsō to Tenkai, (Tokyo: 
Kodansha, 2002).  There is no single work in English that offers a general overview.  
For the modernisation of political institution, see William Beasley, “Meiji Political 
Institutions,” in The Cambridge History of Japan, vol. 5, 618-673.  For military 
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(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 23-34; David C. Evans and Mark R. 
Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 
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It also ignores the fact, as noted above, that the Qing was recognised as the strongest 
regional power in East Asia for much of the period between 1876 and 1894.  Historians, 
such as Tabohashi Kiyoshi and Hilary Conroy, raised these points before 1960, but their 
arguments were not adequately reflected within the historiography for a long time.24  It 
was only after Takahashi Hidenao produced a series of articles in the late 1980s that the 
general line of argument on Japanese policy towards Korea before 1894 was revised.25  
Conroy, Tabohashi and Takahashi all point out convincingly that there was no consensus 
within the Japanese decision-making circle on the policy that they should pursue towards 
Korea.26   They also point out that, while there were individuals who called for an 
aggressive policy, those who mattered the most in the Japanese decision-making circle 
largely kept their distance from such opinions.  Peter Duus also forwarded a similar 
argument in 1995, although his book focuses primarily on the period after 1895 and thus 
discusses the period before that year only briefly.27  Compared to Duus, Conroy is more 
useful because he offered a detailed depiction of the debates within the Japanese decision-
making circle about policy towards Korea by devoting four chapters of his book to the 
period before the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War.  He argues that, at least in 
the years immediately before the outbreak of that conflict, Japanese policy towards Korea 
was generally cautious and reactive, rather than vigorous and expansionist; the bottom 
                                                   
relevant chapters in Daniels and Tsuzuki ed., The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations 
1600-2000, vol. 5; Jansen ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, vol. 5. 
24 Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868-1910 – A Study of Realism and 
Idealism in International Relations, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1960); Kiyoshi Tabohashi, Kindai Nissen Kankei no Kenkyū, 2 vols., ed. Chōsen 
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line was that there was no long-term blueprint for annexation.  Takahashi has argued 
along the same lines, and has also added to the historiography by providing a detailed 
analysis of the environment that surrounded the Japanese decision-makers.  Specifically, 
he has described how the Japanese domestic political situation affected policy towards 
Korea.  Takahashi’s argument has now become the orthodoxy within the Japanese-
language historiography on Japanese policy towards Korea before 1894, but his argument, 
as well as those of Conroy and Duus, has not yet been adequately reflected within the 
English-language historiography.28 
Another shortcoming in the existing literature on the Anglo-Japanese relationship in 
the nineteenth century is that it tends to emphasise the cordial aspects of the interaction 
between these two countries.  Grace Fox and Olive Checkland, for example, depict the 
British as benevolent instructors in modern civilisation, and the Japanese as zealous 
students trying to learn as much as possible from the British.29  Many of the historians 
working on the origins of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, formed in 1902, also assume that 
Japan and Britain had many interests in common and that a strong mutual sympathy 
developed through the late-nineteenth century, so that by the late 1890s the formation of 
alliance was all but inevitable.30 
Without doubt, it is impossible for any two countries to cooperate effectively if they 
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completely lack any common interests.  However, it also goes without saying that 
cordiality and cooperation are never the only constants in any diplomatic relationship.31  
No bilateral relationship is that simple, as each country has its own interests.  Whenever 
these interests coincide, they can lead to cooperation, but whenever they conflict, they 
alternatively can provoke friction.  For Japan, it is clear that the local situation in East 
Asia, due to its obvious geographical proximity, inevitably cast a strong influence over 
its foreign policy; accordingly, the Japanese often prioritised relations with the Chinese 
and Koreans over their ties with the Western countries, including Britain.  The situation 
was similar from the British perspective as well, because what they deemed as their most 
important interest in East Asia was their trade in China, and not their relations with Japan.  
Moreover, East Asia itself was considered much less important within British global 
interests than India or the Middle East, and also, as Britain was a European nation, its 
decision-makers naturally placed strong importance on their relations with the other 
Western great powers.  One must always remember that the British government 
formulated its policy towards Japan within this broader context.  This does not 
necessarily mean that the Anglo-Japanese relationship was hostile, as these two countries 
could cooperate when they had shared common interests in East Asia, but in many cases 
the pressures exerted on them kept them apart. 
It must also be remembered that the most important diplomatic issue between Britain 
and Japan throughout the late-nineteenth century was the negotiations over treaty revision.  
Japanese decision-makers saw the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1858 as an agreement that 
imposed severe restrictions on their administrative and jurisdictional abilities, as it denied 
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them tariff autonomy and granted extraterritoriality to the Western residents in Japan.  
They therefore wished to revise the existing treaty, which is often called an ‘unequal treaty’ 
by historians, in order to remove this obstacle.32  On the other hand, the British regarded 
the treaty as a necessary tool to protect and facilitate free trade in Japan, while the treaty-
port population – whose livelihood depended on commerce in Japan – was strongly 
opposed to the idea of abolishing extraterritoriality and handing tariff autonomy to the 
Japanese government.  Such views were shared by Sir Harry Parkes, the Minister 
Resident in Tokyo who originally had been a member of the consular service in China, 
and by senior officials in London who remained somewhat cautious about the idea of 
treaty revision until his departure in 1883.33   Negotiations proceeded after Parkes’s 
departure, but – to the frustration of both the British and the Japanese – at a much slower 
pace than expected. 
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These two countries also came from very different cultural backgrounds.  The 
Japanese often could not understand many of the customs, rituals and beliefs that were 
shared by people from ‘Western society’ regardless of their nationality.  Moreover, the 
decision of the Tokugawa Shogunate – the regime that placed the Japanese islands under 
de facto control from the early-sixteenth century to 1868 – to open up the country to the 
West in the 1850s made many Japanese dissatisfied, and this sentiment occasionally 
unleashed xenophobic violence against those uninvited aliens who looked and acted 
drastically differently from themselves; such incidents led the British to undertake two 
military operations against the Japanese in the 1860s.34  After the 1860s, the Japanese 
made determined efforts to Westernise their society so that they could be better 
understood and respected by Westerners, but it took some time until Japan was recognised 
by the great powers as a member of their international community.  It was also quite 
common for the British to view the Japanese people in racist terms.35  Such practices 
were observed well into the twentieth century, and frustrated the Japanese. For their part, 
the Japanese occasionally engaged in xenophobic outbursts. 36   Finally, economic 
historians point out that as Japanese products started to be exported into East Asian 
markets from the late 1880s onwards, strong trade friction developed between Britain and 
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Japan.37  Although this is not to argue that there was no aspect of cooperation in the 
Anglo-Japanese relationship, it is apparent that there were many issues that prevented the 
British and the Japanese from holding strong sympathy towards each other.  In order for 
researchers to offer more objective historical analysis, they must shed light on both of 
these aspects and examine how they affected the relationship from a more holistic 
perspective. 
This thesis will therefore examine the Anglo-Japanese relationship in the late-
nineteenth century from a different perspective than the existing works by focusing on 
how the international environment surrounding East Asia affected the relationship 
between these two countries.  This thesis will also address some of the conventional 
misunderstandings about East Asian and Korean affairs in the period between 1876 and 
1894, which are prevalent especially in the English-language literature, to offer a more 
accurate analysis of how the relationship between Britain and Japan was influenced by 
the international environment than hitherto.  By doing so, this dissertation will add to 
the existing literature on East Asian regional affairs and general international history in 
the late-nineteenth century by demonstrating the clear effect that China’s revival had on 
two of the key regional powers. 
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation will be divided into six chapters.  The first chapter will deal with the 
Anglo-Japanese relationship in the years before the outbreak of Imo mutiny in Seoul in 
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July 1882.  This was the period when the Japanese, who had conducted relations with 
their neighbours within a traditional East Asian framework until 1868, started to urge the 
Koreans to re-establish relations based upon Westphalian principles and tried to increase 
their foothold in the Korean peninsula.  This demand led initially to a negative reaction 
from the court in Seoul, and the Qing officials started to see the Japanese with stronger 
suspicion, fearing that the latter might be interested in annexing the kingdom that lay in 
their frontier.  The Chinese thus started to make stronger measures to retain their 
influence in Korea.  Yet, despite all of these reactions, the Japanese managed to sign a 
treaty with the Chosŏn, the Treaty of Kanghwa, in 1876, as it was deemed as the very 
important step to strengthen their influence in their neighbouring kingdom. 
The chapter will also outline how the British started to become interested in signing 
their own treaty with Korea.  From the late-1870s, the imperial competition between the 
European great powers became steadily more intense, and the British government started 
to feel the need to take some measures to check Russian encroachment into Asia, even 
into countries that were not particularly important in themselves, such as Korea.  They 
therefore concluded a treaty with the Chosŏn in June 1882 for this purpose.  This 
therefore was a period when the East Asian and Western powers started to establish their 
respective footholds in Korea.  Simultaneously, though, the negotiations over treaty 
revision progressed much slower than the Japanese wished, and it was therefore difficult 
for the Anglo-Japanese relationship to become cordial. 
The second chapter will analyse the Anglo-Japanese relationship in the period between 
September 1882 and April 1884, when both the British and Japanese were starting to 
perceive that the Qing was emerging as the most important regional power in East Asia.  
Prior to these years, they did not consider the Chinese claim of traditional suzerainty over 
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Korea as particularly important.  However, by the late-1870s, Qing decision-makers 
became concerned about the fact that various countries annexed, or were trying to annex, 
the regions which lay on their frontiers, and started to feel the need to be more assertive 
than they had been in the past to strengthen their foothold in these regions, including those 
that belonged to their traditional vassals.  These actions started to make the British and 
the Japanese feel that they must understand that the Chinese placed significant importance 
in upholding their influence as a traditional suzerain of the neighbouring kingdoms. 
This recognition became sharper after the series of crises which broke out in East Asia 
in the period between May 1884 and February 1887.  During this period, the Japanese 
became entangled in the Kapsin coup, which broke out in Seoul in December 1884, and 
the British government instructed its squadron in East Asia to occupy Kŏmundo in April 
1885.  These were both poorly planned military manoeuvres, which put both of these 
countries in diplomatic isolation, and unleashed destabilising war-scares in the region.  
In order to get out of these difficulties, both the British and Japanese governments had to 
make diplomatic concessions to the Qing so that the Chinese would use their influence to 
restore regional stability.  Therefore, they both decided to engage in de facto recognition 
of the superiority of Qing influence in East Asia, and chose to turn a blind eye to Chinese 
attempts to expand their influence through reasserting their claim of traditional suzerainty 
over their neighbours, including Korea.  As these events were important in establishing 
Qing China as the most important regional power, this thesis will devote two chapters on 
these years of crisis.  The third chapter will deal with the period between May 1884 and 
October 1885, when the international tension in East Asia was at its peak.  The fourth 
one will focus on the events which occurred from November 1885 to February 1887.  By 
this time, the war-scare in East Asia had subsided, but the regional order had not yet been 
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fully restored, as the British launched a military expedition towards Upper Burma in 
November 1885, and also their squadron continued to occupy Kŏmundo until early 1887.  
The British thus had to continue relying on Qing influence to get out of these troubles.  
The most important individuals in the Japanese decision-making circle also thought by 
this time that they could not dare to afford losing the goodwill of the Chinese officials if 
they wished to uphold their interests in East Asia. 
The fifth chapter will analyse the Anglo-Japanese relationship in the years between 
March 1887 and July 1892, when both the British and Japanese decision-makers started 
to prioritise their relationship with the Chinese instead of each other.  There is a scarcity 
of secondary literature about this period, perhaps because it was relatively uneventful.  
However, the events during this period were important in creating the international 
environment which made the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War possible.  Then, 
the sixth chapter will investigate how the British and the Japanese conducted diplomacy 
towards each other in the years immediately before the outbreak of war – August 1892 to 
July 1894.  It will look carefully not only at how the international environment 
influenced the Anglo-Japanese relations, but also at how the British and Japanese policies 
influenced the course of the Sino-Japanese crisis in the summer of 1894, which eventually 
led to the outbreak of a bilateral war between China and Japan over Korea. 
It is necessary to stress that this dissertation will concentrate on the analysis of the 
diplomatic and strategic aspects of the Anglo-Japanese relations.  This, of course, is not 
to deny the fact that the period from 1876 to 1894 is also interesting in the sense that 
Anglo-Japanese interactions at the non-political level increased significantly compared to 
the previous years.  After all, Britain provided the largest number of oyatoi (hired 
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foreign employees) who were highly valued by the Japanese as tutors in modernity.38  
Japan also started to become recognised as a tourist destination for the British public by 
the late 1880s, and Japanese arts started to attract more attention by that time. 39  
Reflecting this growing British interest towards Japan, the Japan Society of London was 
established in 1891, and it contained several influential writers and MPs in Britain, such 
as Sir Edwin Arnold, Trevor Lawrence and Edward Reed.40  In return, there were many 
Japanese writers, such as Tsubouchi Shōyō, who were inspired by British literature and 
theatre.41  At the same time, the increased interaction between Japan and the British 
Empire also created tensions between these two countries; for example, the 
aforementioned Anglo-Japanese trade friction between emerged from the 1880s onwards 
as a result of increased Japanese economic activities in East Asia.  Without question, 
these interactions were important aspects of the Anglo-Japanese relations in years 
between 1876 and 1894.  However, they are also very complex and it is impossible to 
provide full details of these exchanges while focussing on the political interactions. As 
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this dissertation will concentrate on the state-to-state interactions, it will also refrain from 
offering any detailed description of the non-political interactions between the people in 
Japan and the British colonies across the Pacific, unless they directly influenced Anglo-
Japanese diplomatic relations 
 
British and Japanese Policy-Making Process and Primary Sources 
 
The arguments of the existing works on British East Asian policy in the nineteenth century 
are by and large based solely on the official records of the Foreign Office, which contain 
large volumes of correspondence sent by the British diplomats in the region.  This is the 
most important archival source, as Cabinet ministers tended not to be heavily involved in 
the day-to-day policy-making process towards East Asia, and therefore often largely left 
matters to the Foreign Office.  Many of the important diplomatic questions in East Asia, 
such as the question over the revision of Anglo-Japanese treaty, were dealt with primarily 
by the senior officials and diplomats of the Foreign Office.  It should also be pointed out 
that the ministers and senior officials at the Foreign Office sometimes wrote minutes on 
the margins of the diplomats’ reports that are useful in understanding how these 
individuals perceived the situation in East Asia.  The senior officials formulated their 
policies based upon the information sent from their legations, and the British 
representatives in East Asia negotiated, in turn, based on the instructions that they 
received from London.  It is impossible to understand the British East Asian policy at 
this time without looking at the official records of the Foreign Office. 
At the same time, there is a danger when historians rely only on these archival materials.  
The biggest problem with the official records of the Foreign Office is that they do not 
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possess many materials that shed light on the discussions that took place between the 
officials in that bureaucracy, who actually carried greater weight within the British 
decision-making process than the diplomats.  The individuals who served as the 
Permanent and Assistant Undersecretaries of the Foreign Office – Baron Tenterden, 
Julian Pauncefote, Philip Currie, Thomas Sanderson and Francis Bertie – all cast a 
significant degree of influence over the British East Asian policy-making process.42  Yet, 
the quantity and quality of the minutes written by the senior officials of the Foreign Office 
is not large enough to allow researchers to have a good understanding of their opinions.  
This shortcoming can only be addressed by looking at the private letter collections of the 
Foreign Office’s ministers and undersecretaries, which are stored at various archives in 
the United Kingdom.  These contain the semi-official correspondence that the senior 
bureaucrats sent to and received from their colleagues to discuss political and diplomatic 
issues, and are useful in understanding the actual policy-making process in London. 
It must also be remembered that there were other institutions that mattered in the 
making of British external policy.  The armed forces always cast some influence over 
decision-making, and in this case it has been crucial to use the Admiralty’s records.  Also, 
as the Qing shared a frontier with Central Asia and Burma, British East Asian policy had 
repercussions for the Government of India, and therefore both Calcutta and the India 
Office in London could not remain indifferent.  This dissertation will also incorporate 
various other materials, such as corporate archives, to shed light on various groups of 
individuals that indirectly influenced the perceptions of the diplomats and decision-
makers. 
                                                   
42 Keith Neilson and T. G. Otte, The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
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Press, 2013), ch. 2-4. 
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It must also be remembered that Cabinet ministers could be important players in the 
British East Asian policy-making process on those rare occasions when the threat of war 
was in the air.  After all, they held the highest authority within the government, and once 
the ministers made the decisions, the senior officials within the government bureaucracy 
could not overturn them.  While it is true that for most of the time the ministers left 
matters in East Asia in the hands of the Foreign Office, they did intervene on some 
occasions, such as the East Asian crisis from December 1884 to February 1887, and the 
First Sino-Japanese War.   
At the initial stage of the East Asian crisis in the mid-1880s, the issue was discussed 
by various ministers in the governing Liberal administration, such as William Gladstone 
(Prime Minister), Earl Granville (Foreign Secretary), Earl of Northbrook (First Lord of 
Admiralty), Earl of Kimberley (Secretary of State for India), and Sir Charles Dilke 
(President of the Local Administrative Board, who had previously worked as a minister 
at the Foreign Office).  When the Conservatives took over the administration in the 
midst of the crisis in July 1885, the issue was handled primarily by the Marquis of 
Salisbury, who served as both the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, and Lord 
Randolph Churchill, the Secretary of State for India.  The First Salisbury administration 
was short-lived, as it fell after the general election in February 1886, but the 
Conservatives returned to office in October of that year, and from that point on remained 
in power until August 1892.  Throughout that period, Salisbury remained the most 
influential figure within the British foreign policy-making circle, but only occasionally 
noted his opinion in regard to East Asian issues in these years of peace.  Meanwhile, 
when the Liberals took over the government in the period from February to October 1886, 
Granville stepped down from the position of Foreign Secretary, and was succeeded the 
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Earl of Rosebery.  He and Kimberley cast a significant degree of influence over East 
Asian policy-making process during this short stint.  They resumed these places within 
the Cabinet after the Liberals returned to office in August 1892, and then went on to 
become Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary respectively when the First Sino-Japanese 
War broke out in the summer of 1894.  Again, the official records of the Foreign Office 
do not shed much light on the discussions within the Cabinet.  The private letter 
collections of the ministers are therefore important as they are one of the only sources 
that can shed light on these discussions. 
As for the Japanese side of the story, some historians have argued that the military cast 
strong influence over the policy-making process.43  However, this view was revised by 
researchers from the late-1970s onwards, as they presented evidence that indicated that 
the military was largely willing to follow the leadership of the government throughout the 
period before 1894.  While it is true that many military bureaucrats and officers 
supported hard-line policies towards East Asia, they were never able to dictate the 
decision-making process.  This, of course, does not mean that military had no influence 
within the Japanese decision-making, but stresses that civilian control was dominant in 
the period before 1894. 
Some other researchers have argued that the Japanese diplomats in Korea were 
successful in taking matters into their own hands on several occasions.44  Indeed, as 
communications with Korea were still underdeveloped until the 1880s, the diplomats who 
were sent to this country enjoyed a fair degree of freedom.  This was particularly the 
                                                   
43 Fujimura, Nisshin Sensō; Seizaburō Shinobu, Mutsu Gaikō – Nisshin Sensō no 
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case for the special envoys that were sent to negotiate treaties or commercial regulations, 
and also the diplomats who had to deal with the situation on their own initiative whenever 
political disturbances broke out in Korea.  It is the case that many of the diplomats sent 
to Korea often advised their superiors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimushō) that 
they should take more assertive measures against the Qing and Chosŏn to uphold Japan’s 
interests in Korea.  However, as this dissertation will demonstrate, there were no 
occasions when these diplomats overtly breached their instructions from Tokyo in the 
period before 1894.  Even in those situations when they had to act upon their own 
discretion, they did so within the framework of the instructions that they had received.  
Those who mattered the most within the Japanese foreign policy-making circle were the 
Cabinet ministers and the senior officials within the Gaimushō – the former in particular.  
While these individuals always had to be conscious about the hardliners who existed both 
within and outside of the government, they were by-and-large successful in establishing 
a cautious and conciliatory line of foreign policy.  The advocation of such a policy is 
primarily associated with key government ministers such as Itō Hirobumi and Inoue 
Kaoru.45 
As with the existing literature on British policy in the late-nineteenth century, the works 
on Japan written in English rely heavily on the official records of the Gaimushō, which 
are available in the Diplomatic Archives in Tokyo and in the Nihon Gaikō Monjo series, 
the published collection of diplomatic correspondence.  Only a handful of historians 
have made use of the private papers of the various decision-makers and diplomats, but in 
Japan’s case they are perhaps even more important for understanding the policy-making 
process than is the case for Britain, as it was not uncommon for the Japanese ministers 
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and senior officials to exchange unofficial minutes and memoranda through private 
channels.  The problem with these sources is that even for native speakers it is often 
difficult to read the handwriting in these late-nineteenth century private letters.  In order 
to tackle this problem, Conroy utilised published collections of the private papers.  It is 
common for Japanese historians to assemble private papers into published form after 
converting the handwriting into printed format in order to make them more accessible for 
the general public.  They are indeed very useful aids to research.  Since the publication 
of Conroy’s work, more private letters have been made available to researchers at the 
archives, and more of them have also been assembled into printed collections.  Papers 
of some of the influential entrepreneurs and individuals outside of the government, such 
as Shibusawa Eiichi and Fukuzawa Yukichi are also available in printed form, and 
therefore this dissertation makes as much use of them as possible. 
Another problem about the existing historiography, including the works written in 
Japanese, is that not too many historians have looked at the sources available at the 
Military Archives of Japan.  Perhaps the exception to this rule is a book by Saitō Seiji, 
but his work is geared towards analysing how the military influenced the Japanese policy-
making process during the First Sino-Japanese War. 46   His book devotes only one 
chapter to the events before the outbreak of war, and this chapter focuses more on the 
analysis on the military reforms.  This dissertation will therefore draw on these sources 
in order to analyse how the military affected decision-making before 1894.
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Chapter 1: Korea and the Anglo-Japanese Relationship until the Imo Mutiny 
 
As discussed in the introduction, modern East Asian history from the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards is often depicted as a narrative centred upon the Japanese trying to fulfil 
their long-term ambition to establish regional dominance.  According to this view, this 
process started in the early 1870s, immediately after the Meiji Restoration, when the 
Japanese government launched an expedition to Taiwan in 1874.  The signing of the 
Japanese-Korean Treaty of Kanghwa of 1876 is also understood within this framework.  
It is often depicted as a conscious effort by the Japanese ministers and government 
officials, who saw China as the primary obstacle to realising their ambition, to reduce the 
Qing influence in Korea by recognising the latter as an independent state rather than a 
vassal of the Celestial Empire.1  The treaty is also perceived as one of the events that 
influenced the long-term pattern of Japanese policy towards East Asia, which is typically 
characterised as a Machiavellian pursuit of self-interest; after all, the Treaty of Kanghwa 
was an unequal treaty that the Japanese forced upon the Chosŏn dynasty through gunboat 
diplomacy.2  Moreover, the initial years after the signing of the treaty are seen as a time 
when the Japanese tried to take advantage of the fact that there were no other foreign 
competitors to check their ambitions. 
However, historians who have published studies after the mid-1980s have pointed out 
that this understanding of the East Asian affairs in the late-nineteenth century is inaccurate.  
It is true that there were a significant number of hardliners, both inside and outside of the 
government, who advocated launching a military expedition against their Korean 
                                                   
1 Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, 47, 50; Kim and Kim, Korea 
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neighbours from the earliest years of the Meiji era, and that they were occasionally 
successful in casting some influence over the decision-making process.  It is also 
understandable that both the Chinese and Koreans became alarmed by the Japanese, who 
started to promote their interest in the region through gunboat diplomacy in the 1870s.  
Yet, the most important figures within the Japanese government were strongly against 
taking such a course.3  Ministers such as Ōkubo Toshimichi were well aware of the 
military weakness of Japan and were convinced that an ill-prepared expedition would lead 
to disaster.  As this chapter will argue, the Japanese leaders were merely trying to re-
establish a relationship with the Chosŏn regime by signing a treaty; they were not 
attempting to deconstruct the existing traditional East Asian order, based upon the 
traditional suzerain-vassal relationship between China and the neighbouring kingdoms, 
or establish regional dominance. 
Ōkubo was assassinated in 1878, but the individuals who succeeded him as the leaders 
of the Meiji government, such as Itō Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru, continued to follow his 
line of thinking.  They conducted diplomacy with a strong determination to avoid any 
action that could lead to the outbreak of war.  Gunboat diplomacy and punitive 
expeditions towards local Taiwanese tribesmen were the greatest risks that these decision-
makers were willing to take, and they even refrained from that unless they were convinced 
that there was no other way to solve a diplomatic difficulty.4  The Japanese ministers 
                                                   
3 Duus, The Abacus and Sword, 29-51; Ōsawa “Chōsen Eisei Chūritsuka Kōsō to Nihon 
Gaiko,” 43-64; Takahashi, Nisshin Sensō eno Michi, ch. 1, section 1.  There are some 
works that made this point before the 1980s, such as Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of 
Korea, ch.1; Tabohashi, Kindai Nissen Kankei no Kenkyū, vol. 1, chs. 3-15. 
4 For the most recent accounts of the Japanese expedition to Taiwan, see the articles of 
Gotō Arata, his latest article being “Taiwan Shuppei ni Okeru Ōkubo Toshimichi: 
Futatsu no Hyōgi to Pekin Danpan o Chūshin toshite,” Meiji Ishinshi Kenkyū, 10 (Oct 
2013): 38-55.  In English, see Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 36-59; Robert 
Eskildsen, “Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan’s 1874 
Expedition to Taiwan,” The American Historical Review, 107:2 (2002): 388-418; Edwin 
40 
 
and bureaucrats in the Gaimushō also stressed the importance of conducting diplomacy 
towards Korea in a conciliatory manner, as they were convinced that the best way to 
promote Japan’s interest in Korea was to win the goodwill and confidence of the Korean 
officials.  As a result, the unique international order of East Asia, in which the 
Westphalian and traditional regional order co-existed side by side, remained intact well 
after the signing of the Treaty of Kanghwa.  Both the Japanese and the British 
governments had to conduct diplomacy in this region within this framework, which also 
meant that they had to act with some discretion towards the traditional suzerain of East 
Asia. 
The British government did not start to contemplate the idea of signing a treaty with 
the Chosŏn court until around 1880.  Their suspicion towards Russia started to become 
stronger after the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War in 1878, and accordingly a treaty 
with Korea began to be seen as an effective measure to check Russian expansion in 
Northeast Asia.  However, while the British signed a treaty in June 1882, the 
government chose to postpone its ratification until April 1884, and thus there were no 
British individuals in the Korean treaty ports until that year.  As a result, there was very 
little common ground for any form of Anglo-Japanese relationship to develop over Korea 
in this period. 
 
Japanese Policy towards Korea before Imo Mutiny 
 
Throughout the history of the Chosŏn dynasty, which ruled the Korean peninsula from 
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1392, the regime conducted external relations in the recognition that the autonomy of the 
kingdom could be jeopardised if it failed to uphold peaceful relations with its powerful 
neighbours – China, Japan and the pastoral nomads scattered across the Asian steppe.  It 
was through this lens that they saw the Japanese.  The devastation that they suffered 
during Japan’s invasion of Korea in the late-sixteenth century left the strong impression 
that the Japanese were an aggressive people who needed to be handled with care.5  From 
the seventeenth century onwards, the Japanese-Korean relationship was maintained 
through the Sō family, the Japanese feudal lord in the island of Tsushima which lies in the 
middle of the Korean Strait.  As well as being a subordinate of the Tokugawa Shogunate, 
the Sō family also paid tribute to the king of Chosŏn, thus acknowledging the suzerainty 
of the latter.6  The king permitted the lord of Tsushima to build a waegwan (Japanese 
mansion) in the port of Pusan, where officials from the latter were permitted to reside and 
trade.  While the Japanese officials were not permitted to visit Seoul, they could 
negotiate with the local officials whenever there were some issues that they wanted to 
raise.  In addition, the Chosŏn court sent missions to Edo (modern day Tokyo) whenever 
there was a new Shogun.  Meanwhile, although the Japanese regime did not send tribute 
to China as the other East Asian kingdoms did, it utilised the concept of the suzerain-
vassal relationship so that it could interact with its neighbours on a permanent basis; it 
thus interacted with the Qing dynasty through the king of Ryukyu, who paid tribute to 
both the Chinese emperor and Japanese feudal lord of Satsuma.7  Through this structure, 
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peace in East Asia was maintained for about two and a half centuries. 
After the overthrow of the Shogunate in late-1867 and 1868, the new Meiji government 
started to reform the domestic political structure, and also found it necessary to make 
some changes to how it conducted external relations.8  Due to its geographical proximity, 
many individuals within the decision-making circle saw the Korean peninsula as a region 
of strong importance.  As many historians have pointed out, there were many Japanese 
who advocated an assertive policy towards Korea.  Some stressed the importance of 
establishing a foothold in the peninsula in order to promote Japanese trade, while others 
argued that Japan should establish a military base.  These individuals contended that as 
it was very important for the national interest of Japan to establish a foothold, the 
government should be prepared to go to war if the Chosŏn authorities resisted these 
demands.  There also were many who advocated the annexation of territory, such as 
Pusan and Ullŭngdo, an island off the eastern coast of the Korean peninsula. 
Debate over the policy towards Korea gathered momentum in the early 1870s within 
the Japanese decision-making circle just as the government was introducing a series of 
reforms that were considered necessary to prevent the country from falling prey to 
Western imperialism.  These reforms led to serious disgruntlement among some of the 
feudal lords and former samurai (warriors), who were the privileged class in the 
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Tokugawa era.  In this environment, the idea of taking aggressive action abroad to divert 
the dissatisfaction of the former samurais away from the new government attracted 
support from many decision-makers, including some of the most influential Meiji 
oligarchs such as Saigō Takamori.  However, this opinion did not represent the view of 
the entire government. In particular Ōkubo argued that Japan at this stage was not strong 
enough to launch an overseas expedition.  Ōkubo, though, recognised the need to deflate 
anti-governmental sentiment in 1874, and reluctantly authorised an expedition to Taiwan 
in order to punish the local tribesmen who had massacred shipwrecked fishermen from 
Ryukyu.9  However, that was as far as he was willing to go, as he believed that a war 
against Korea was beyond the military capacity of Japan, and was also convinced that his 
country would be powerless if the Western countries intervened.  He therefore argued 
that Japan should pursue its interests in Korea without resorting to war, and also 
advocated that it should prioritise domestic reform instead of pursuing aggressive 
diplomacy.  There were many individuals who sided with Ōkubo. Takahashi Hidenao 
has argued that out of all the newspapers that existed in the Tokyo area in the first decade 
after the Meiji Restoration, only the Yokohama Mainichi Shinbun (newspaper) can be 
identified as supporting an assertive policy towards Korea; the other major newspapers 
were all indifferent if not against such policy even in the mid-1870s.10  There was also 
little pressure from the economic sector, as most of the large-scale entrepreneurs were 
pessimistic about the commercial prospects of Korea.11 
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The Japanese government did, however, come to the conclusion that it should establish, 
through peaceful negotiation, a new diplomatic relationship with the Chosŏn dynasty 
based upon Westphalian principles – namely that at least in theory nation-states are 
sovereign and equal with each other.  Initially, the Korean regime refused the Japanese 
request.  They found no reason to change the existing framework of the Japanese-
Korean relationship, which had managed to keep their eastern neighbours at bay for two 
centuries and a half, especially when they had hitherto had minimal contact with the West 
and therefore possessed little understanding of the Western-style of diplomatic conduct.12  
Also, the Chosŏn regime considered the traditional East Asian order as being very 
important in its maintaining a peaceful relationship with the Qing.13  When the pastoral 
nomads known as the Manchus had established the Qing dynasty in 1642, the Chosŏn 
court had initially refused to acknowledge them as the legitimate rulers of the Celestial 
Empire, as the Manchus were not ethnic Chinese.  Instead they chose to uphold loyalty 
to the Qing’s predecessors – the Ming dynasty.  The Manchus duly attacked the 
peninsula, forcing the Chosŏn court to acknowledge the Qing dynasty as suzerain. 
Being fully aware that the pastoral nomads of Northeast Asia were perceived as 
‘northern barbarians,’ the Qing authorities recognised that the only way to legitimise their 
rule over the ethnic Chinese was through good governance.  They therefore placed 
strong emphasis on abiding by Chinese traditions in terms of domestic administration and 
conducting external relations. This benefitted the Chosŏn court in a number of ways.  
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The custom of the East Asian regional order was that even if the Chinese emperor claimed 
suzerainty, in practice he left governance in the hands of the king that he acknowledged 
as his vassal as long as the latter continued to pay tribute to the former.  Moreover, the 
traditional suzerain-vassal relationship obliged the suzerain to offer at least moral support 
to his vassal when the latter was threatened by external force.  Not only had this 
traditional framework kept the Japanese at bay, it was also useful in maintaining a good 
relationship with the Qing dynasty.  Koreans were therefore naturally reluctant to alter 
this framework. 
As the Koreans continued to procrastinate over their relations with Japan throughout 
the early 1870s, the Japanese gradually became frustrated as they perceived the former as 
being insincere.14  The Japanese government may have been determined to avoid war 
with Korea, but at the same time it started to feel that the Koreans would not come to the 
negotiating table without some display of military force.  In May 1875, an official in the 
Gaimushō named Moriyama Shigeru begged his superiors to engage in gunboat 
diplomacy for this purpose, and they approved.  There is some evidence which suggests 
that high-ranked ministers such as the Head Minister, Sanjō Sanetomi, the Minister of the 
Right, Iwakura Tomomi, and the Foreign Minister, Terashima Munenori, all saw this 
report, and that they did not raise any particular objection.  Accordingly, the warship 
Un’yō was sent to Korea, and engaged in several drills off the Korean coast in September.  
When it tried to land some of its seamen on to Kanghwa island near Inch’ŏn, the local 
coast guards opened fire, and the Japanese responded by successfully seizing the battery.  
The official and private letters that Inoue Yoshika, the commander of Un’yō, wrote to his 
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superiors in the Ministry of Navy before he left for Korea indicate that he was planning 
to provoke the Koreans to start a incident.  He believed that by doing so he could show 
the Chosŏn regime that it was inferior to Japan in terms of military strength, which 
consequently would convince the former that it might lead to serious consequences if it 
continued to refuse the Japanese requests to negotiate a treaty.  Some of these letters 
were read by Navy Minister Kawamura Sumiyoshi, and although Inoue’s superiors did 
not grant him definitive approval, neither did they openly disapprove of his initiative; it 
is therefore difficult to assume that the ministry was not aware of what he intended to do. 
Subsequently, two government ministers – Inoue Kaoru and Kuroda Kiyotaka – were 
sent to Inch’ŏn with an escort of warships to negotiate peace terms in early 1876.  By 
this time, the Chosŏn ministers were receiving advice from Li Hongzhang, the Chinese 
provincial governor of Zhili Haiwan (Capital District and Adjacent Waters) who wielded 
significant influence over the decision-making of the Qing dynasty.15  He argued that 
the Japanese would not start a war if the Chŏson regime agreed to sign a treaty, and thus 
strongly recommended the Koreans to do so.  It must also be remembered that Korea 
was now ruled by King Kojong rather than his father, who had acted as the Prince Regent 
(Taewon’gŭn) until his son came of age in 1873.  Although Kojong was a conservative 
monarch who was inclined to uphold the traditional structure of domestic politics and 
external relations, he was not as hardline a conservative as his father was, and recognised 
that the situation rendered it necessary for his country to sign a treaty with Japan.16  
These factors all helped the Japanese to accomplish their objective of peacefully 
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establishing a relationship with Korea in the Western style of diplomatic conduct.  The 
Treaty of Kanghwa was signed on 27 February 1876. 
It is undeniably true that this was a treaty accomplished by gunboat diplomacy – a style 
of diplomacy which the Japanese had resented when the West had imposed it on them in 
the 1850s and 1860s.  At the same time, as several Japanese historians have argued, the 
main objective of this expedition was to bring the Chosŏn officials to the negotiating table, 
and not to start a war.17  The primary objective for the Japanese decision-makers in 1876 
was to reach a peaceful settlement of the Un’yō incident before it excited the former 
samurai class, as the number of anti-governmental rebellions caused by this group of 
individuals was steadily increasing in the mid-1870s.18  In other words, the signing of 
the treaty was an objective in itself rather than a means to accomplish some other end.  
As a result, the clauses of the Treaty of Kanghwa inevitably became vague.  The five 
main points that the Japanese and Korean governments agreed were that; 
 
1. Chosŏn would be recognised as an autonomous country which possessed equal rights to 
Japan; 2. The two countries should exchange missions, who could stay at their respective 
capital city after negotiations; 3. Chosŏn would open Pusan and two other ports to commerce, 
and would permit consuls to reside in them; 4. Chosŏn would acknowledge Japanese 
consular jurisdiction over its residents in Korea; 5. The treaty would come into effect 
immediately after the signing, and not wait for ratification.19 
 
When the treaty was signed, the Japanese and the Koreans did not decide which two 
                                                   
17 Tabohashi, Kindai Nissen Kankei no Kenkyū, vol. 1, section 2; Takahashi, “Kōka 
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harbours, other than Pusan, should be made into treaty ports, and there was no agreement 
on commercial regulations.  The Japanese negotiators also accommodated some of the 
Korean demands.  Upon the request of the Chosŏn delegates, the Japanese agreed not to 
use the words ‘independent’ or ‘sovereign’ in order to describe the international status of 
the Chosŏn regime, and also avoided using the term ‘legation’ to describe the diplomatic 
institution in their respective capitals.20  Although the Chosŏn court was convinced that 
it could not escape the Japanese request to establish a diplomatic relationship based on 
the Western principles, they still wanted to avoid making it too radical a departure from 
the style of diplomatic conduct that they had hitherto followed.  There were therefore 
many unsettled elements left even after the treaty’s conclusion.  How far the Japanese 
would expand their interests in Korea thus depended on the negotiations that would take 
place after the signing of the treaty. 
Without question, on many issues the Japanese pursued their interests in a selfish and 
opportunistic manner.  In regard to the negotiations on Japanese-Korean commercial 
regulations, which immediately followed the signing of the treaty, the Japanese 
negotiators were successful in convincing their Chosŏn counterparts that both countries 
should not extract any tariff.21  Before the negotiators were sent to Korea, they had been 
instructed by the Gaimushō that they should endeavour to keep the tariff rate below five 
percent ad valorem.  However, as they realised during the talks that the Koreans were 
still ignorant about diplomacy based on Western principles, they decided to push for a 
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non-tariff clause and were duly successful.  As industry in Korea was at a primitive stage, 
even compared to Japan in the late-1850s and the early 1860s, the only Korean 
commodity that could be exported was rice, for which there was significant demand in 
Japan.  The increased demand resulted in inflation of the price of rice in Korea, and as 
a result most of the Korean peasantry, who were poverty-stricken already before the 
signing of the treaty, could not afford to buy staple food.  Yet, due to the non-tariff clause 
there simply was no mechanism that enabled the Chosŏn authorities to place any check 
on the outflow of goods to Japan.  They belatedly realised the hazard of the non-tariff 
clause of the treaty, and requested the Japanese to alter this.22   When the Japanese 
procrastinated about this request, the frustrated local authorities in Pusan responded by 
extracting a tariff without the consent of the Japanese government, but the latter’s 
diplomats complained that this was a violation of the treaty.23  The Japanese requested 
the Chosŏn officials to immediately return the self-imposed tariff to the Japanese 
merchants, and the Koreans reluctantly complied as the Japanese started sending gunboats 
to push their demand.24 
Over the issue of designating two treaty ports other than Pusan, the Japanese 
government requested the opening of one port each in the west (near the Kanghwa Island) 
and the northeast of the Korean peninsula.25  The decision to demand the opening of a 
port in the northeast was made more from strategic considerations; a rumour about 
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Russian interest in annexing Yŏnghŭngman (Port Lazareff) in the northwest was well-
known by the Japanese decision-makers already before the signing of the treaty, because 
individuals such as Sir Harry Parkes, the British Minister to Japan from 1865 to 1883, 
and Enomoto Takeaki, the Japanese Minister to Russia from 1874 to 1878, had warned 
them about this.  As the Chosŏn ministers did not raise strong opposition to opening a 
port in the northeast, the negotiations progressed relatively smoothly, and on 28 August 
1879 the Japanese and Koreans agreed that Wŏnsan would be designated as the treaty 
port.  While it is worth noting that security calculations started to be reflected more 
strongly in Japanese policy towards Korea by the late-1870s, it is important to observe 
that these strategic concerns were still addressed within the framework set up by the 
Treaty of Kanghwa, and that the Japanese government officials never contemplated the 
idea of occupying or annexing a territory.  On the other hand, the negotiations on 
designating a treaty port in the west of Korea dragged on much longer.26  The Chosŏn 
ministers were reluctant to allow foreigners any access to one of the most densely 
populated region of the country, but it was precisely because the west was the political 
and economic heartland of Korea that the Japanese were firm in their demand to open a 
port in this region.  It was only on 28 February 1881 that the Koreans finally agreed to 
open Inch’ŏn within five years, but the precise date of the opening was not fixed at this 
stage.27 
There also were quarrels over other issues, which derived from the fact that the 
Japanese and the Koreans interpreted the terms of the Treaty of Kanghwa differently.  As 
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the Japanese negotiators had agreed to an ‘exchange of missions’ in the treaty, the Chosŏn 
ministers insisted that the treaty did not oblige them to host a legation in Seoul, and that 
diplomatic negotiations should be conducted through the mutual sending of occasional 
envoys, as was traditionally done between East Asian countries.  Therefore, even after 
the signing of a treaty, the Japanese diplomats had to visit Seoul whenever they had some 
issue to negotiate with the Korean officials, and left the capital when the negotiations 
ended.  The Japanese, of course, interpreted the term ‘mission’ as synonymous to 
‘legation,’ and therefore pressed the Chosŏn authorities to permit their diplomats to reside 
permanently in the capital.  Eventually, the Koreans reluctantly approved this in 
December 1880.28 
Japanese negotiations with the Chosŏn officials were often very difficult, due to the 
strong suspicion that the latter held towards the former.  The assertive manner in which 
the Japanese pressed their demands led to strong resentment among the Chosŏn decision-
makers, just as the Japanese themselves had been frustrated when they were at the 
receiving end of the gunboat diplomacy of the Western nations in the mid-nineteenth 
century.29  The inflation of the price of rice in Korea immediately after the signing of 
the commercial regulation also helped to spread anti-Japanese sentiment outside of the 
government.30  In addition, there were many incidents in the 1870s that led to trouble 
between the local people in Korea and Japanese residents, just as there had been many 
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troubles between the locals and the foreigners immediately after the arrival of the Western 
residents in the Chinese and Japanese treaty ports.31 
When Pusan was designated as a treaty port, two major entrepreneurs in Japan – 
Shibusawa Eiichi and Ōkura Kihachirō – displayed an interest in starting a business there.  
In particular Shibusawa showed strong enthusiasm, as he opened a branch of his firm, the 
Daiichi National Bank, immediately after the port was opened. 32   It is tempting to 
assume from these cases that Korea attracted other entrepreneurs, but the evidence 
suggests that they were more of an exception rather than a rule.  Alexander Allan Shand, 
the oyatoi (hired foreign employee in Japan) in the Ministry of Finance, strongly 
discouraged Shibusawa from starting a business in a country which seemed to offer 
limited economic potential, and the board of Mitsui – one of the largest investor groups 
in Japan which also held a majority of the stocks of the Daiichi National Bank – was 
unanimously against Shibusawa’s plan. 33   Mitsubishi also did not agree to open a 
steamer line between Nagasaki and Pusan until the government guaranteed to pay it a 
hefty subsidy.34 
Shibusawa recalled in the twentieth century that his ventures in the early Meiji period 
were motivated by a strong sense of emotional affiliation towards Korea.35  However, 
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most of the major Japanese entrepreneurs did not share this sentiment and instead made 
their decisions based upon economic calculations, they preferred to invest in domestic 
Japanese industries and businesses which were at the developing stage.  Accordingly, 
those who decided to engage in business in Korea were usually only small-scale 
entrepreneurs with very limited capital, desperately seeking an opportunity to expand 
their fortunes.36  Their desperation often led them to be very assertive, and they often 
tried to expand their operations outside of the treaty port without the permission of the 
local authorities, and yet the local officials could not punish these merchants due to 
extraterritoriality.37  As the Chosŏn officials were suspicious towards the Japanese, the 
former were reluctant about giving any concessions to the latter.  The Japanese foothold 
in Korea therefore remained inevitably small even five years after the signing of the treaty.  
The commercial regulation and the opening of Wŏnsan was as much as the Japanese could 
gain from the Chosŏn court in the 1870s, and their diplomats had to negotiate very hard 
to win anything more. 
In order to retain their small foothold in Korea, the Japanese officials did not dare to 
lose the goodwill of the Chosŏn officials, and they were convinced that peaceful 
negotiation was the best means to nurture mutual confidence.38  Especially after the 
Chosŏn decision-makers agreed to make Inch’ŏn a treaty port, there were no particular 
issues which tempted the Japanese to resort to gunboat diplomacy.  The military 
personnel who were sent to Korea were “strictly instructed to avoid getting into 
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unnecessary trouble with the local people,” and were also told to abide by the orders of 
diplomats in the treaty ports.39  The Japanese decision-makers also tried to demonstrate 
their goodwill by trying to educate the Koreans in the need to modernise their country 
because it was the appropriate and rational measure for any country to take in order to 
maintain its independence in a modern international environment. 
From this perspective, the Gaimushō and Hanabusa Yoshitomo, the Japanese Minister 
to Korea, encouraged Chosŏn officials to send special missions to Japan in order to 
observe the progress of Japanese modernisation, so that they could convince the Chosŏn 
court that they were “encouraging the modernisation not because of any ill thoughts but 
instead from a genuine belief that it is in the best interest of Korea.”40  Their efforts did 
seem to pay off, as the Chosŏn ministers sent missions to Japan in August 1880 and 
October 1881.41  Hanabusa also continued to advocate the importance of political and 
military modernisation to Chosŏn officials, and the latter ultimately decided to accept 
Japanese military advisors in May 1881 in order to train and organise the Chosŏn royal 
guard into a modernised military unit.42  The Chosŏn decision in February 1881 to 
                                                   
39 For the quote, see Enomoto to Inoue (往出第五百二十一号), 16 Apr 1880, HSM KK 
36352.  See also Enomoto to Kawamura (往第二号 外入第二十一号), Gaimushō, 13 
Jan 1880, BKS 海軍省-公文類纂-M13-11-513 (JACAR Reference Code C09114126900); 
Inoue to Iwakura (甲第十四號), 29 Jan 1880. NGM vol. 13, pp. 431; Takino to Hayashi 
(城三第二号), sent from Warship Amagi (at Pusan), 4 Jan 1881, BKS 海軍省-公文類纂-
M14-4-578 (JACAR C09114906100); Nakamuta to Enomoto (往入第一三〇号 天城第六
号の二), 18 Jan 1881, BKS 海軍省-公文類纂-M14-4-578 (JACAR C09114906100). 
40 For the quote, see Hanabusa to Inoue (Unnumbered), Seoul, 10 Feb 1881, NGM vol. 
14, pp. 343-7.  See also Ueno to Sanjō (公第一六九九號), Tokyo, 23 July 1881, NGM vol. 
14, pp. 307; Inoue to Sanjō (Unnumbered), 2 Nov 1881, NGM vol. 14, pp. 310. 
41 For envoys in 1880, see the Report by Hanabusa, Written Sometime in 1880 Date 
Unknown, HSM KS 36361.  In this document, it is stated that the Chosŏn envoys 
stayed in Japan from 13 Aug to 8 Sept 1880.  Also, see Inoue to Sanjō (甲第百七十二
號), 17 Aug 1880, NGM vol. 13, pp. 389-396; Shibusawa to Hanabusa (Private), 26 Aug 
1880, SEDS, add. vol. 4, pp. 167-8.  For the envoys in 1881, see NGM, vol. 14, pp. 308-
310. 
42 Hanabusa to Inoue (Unnumbered), Seoul, 13 May 1881.  Inclosure to Inoue to Sanjō 
(Private), 16 May 1881, KSKKT SM 48-12. 
55 
 
introduce some reforms to their governance structure by creating a new Board of Internal 
and External Affairs (T’ongni Amun), which was modelled on the Zongli Yamen (Board 
of External Affairs) of the Qing, was positively received by the Japanese as a sign that 
the Korean regime was showing interest in modernising the country.43 
In other cases, the Japanese officials relied on gifts in order to win the goodwill of the 
Koreans.  Upon another recommendation of Hanabusa, the senior officials of Gaimushō 
agreed on 25 October 1880 to offer modern weapons to the king in order to show their 
goodwill. 44   The Japanese decision-makers in Tokyo also attempted diplomatic 
appeasement.  For example, they became convinced by early 1881 that some diplomatic 
compromise must be made in order to accomplish the opening of Inch’ŏn, and for this 
purpose they prepared to open negotiations for amending the non-tariff clause of the 
Japanese-Korean commercial agreement.45  Also, when the Chosŏn officials protested 
in August 1881 that Japanese fishermen were encroaching on Ullŭngdo to engage in 
fishery and forestry despite the fact that such an action was not permitted in the Treaty of 
Kanghwa, the Japanese promised to punish the culprits and try to prevent such cases from 
happening again.46  During the Tokugawa era some feudal lords had claimed possession 
of Ullŭngdo, and a few individuals within the government pointed to these claims as a 
rationale to occupy the island.  However, the Gaimushō concluded that the records 
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indicated that the Japanese feudal lords had agreed to give up their claim over Ullŭngdo 
in 1694, and they therefore thought there were no strong grounds for claiming possession 
of the islands.  Thus, through persuasion and appeasement, the Japanese ministers and 
diplomats sought to win the goodwill of their Korean counterparts. 
What lay beneath these policies was the conviction – which was shared by the majority 
of the Japanese ministers, the senior officials of the Gaimushō and the legation in Seoul 
– that there was a sizeable group of progressives within the Korean decision-makers.  At 
this stage, the Japanese had some faith in the potential of these “young, competent and 
progressive” individuals to overcome the old and incompetent reactionaries “who came 
from a privileged background and know nothing about what is happening outside of their 
family,” just as the Meiji oligarchs had accomplished with the overthrow of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate.47  This faith was strengthened by the fact that there also were many Korean 
individuals who unofficially came to Japan without the permission of the court to learn 
about the modernisation project of their neighbour.48  Of course, this perception was 
based upon a gross underestimation of the suspicion that the Koreans held towards the 
Japanese.  Accordingly, in the summer of 1882 the Japanese decision-makers received 
the news of the outbreak of an anti-Japanese riot in Seoul with great surprise.  They were 
even more shocked when they learned that the Chinese were determined to draw on their 
authority as a suzerain power over the Chŏson court to mediate this issue which was seen 
in Tokyo as fundamentally being a bilateral Japanese-Korean crisis. 
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British Policy towards Korea until the Imo Mutiny 
 
Throughout the history of the Chosŏn dynasty, its ministers and officials actively 
interacted with their East Asian neighbours, but there was very little contact between them 
and the Western world until the mid-nineteenth century.  Not even a trading relationship 
with restrictions existed between the Europeans and the Koreans, and not a single port 
was opened to Western merchants.  By the 1830s many Britons started to perceive 
overseas trade as something that could offer everyone in society an opportunity to expand 
their fortunes, and therefore believed that the chance to engage in such enterprises should 
be offered to everyone, not just a small number of chartered companies.49  The Industrial 
Revolution enabled larger number of Europeans to travel across the world, and this 
outflow started to become apparent in East Asia., Most of them set their sights on China, 
which seemed to offer the biggest commercial potential.  While some British individuals 
contemplated the idea of sending a mission to Korea, their priority was to negotiate with 
the Chinese first, and there was little reason for them to make similar attempts to open 
Japan and Korea before they had accomplished their objective in China.50 
After the 1830s, the British did not contemplate taking any initiatives to open a 
permanent trading relationship with Korea, because it seemed as if the Chosŏn court was 
very determined not to end its policy of seclusion.  In February 1866, nine French 
missionaries were arrested and executed by the Chosŏn court, which recently had come 
under the regency of the xenophobic Taewon’gŭn and was suppressing Christians in 
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Korea.51  In a separate incident which happened in the same year, the entire crew of the 
American merchant schooner General Sherman were attacked and killed by the local 
Korean population near Pyongyang.  When the regime refused to acknowledge 
responsibility for these incidents, the French launched naval expedition in October that 
year, and the Americans followed suit in 1871.  The British, though, remained 
uninvolved in these issues, and the Koreans subsequently succeeded in resisting the half-
hearted attacks by the Americans and the French.52  As there was already a functioning 
and profitable trade network in East Asia, there was no real incentive for the British to 
insist that the Chosŏn government revise its seclusionist policy.  Moreover, there was 
the danger that Korean resistance could lead to a military engagement that might, in turn, 
lead to a Parliamentary outcry and weigh down the Treasury.  A strong degree of apathy 
thus characterised the British attitude towards Korea. 
When the Japanese managed to sign the Treaty of Kanghwa, British diplomats in East 
Asia started to contemplate whether this might provide a chance for them to open relations 
with Korea.53  However, they quickly realised that the officials in Seoul were unwilling 
to negotiate treaties with Western nations.  Accordingly, the British diplomats in East 
Asia concluded that Britain would have to engage in gunboat diplomacy, just as Japan 
had, if it wished to bring Korea to the negotiating table.  Parkes thought that such a 
measure would be justifiable, as he saw Russia’s southward advance as a threat to the 
British trade network in East Asia, and viewed Korea as the region’s weak link as it had 
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no power to defend itself from the Russians.54  The best measure therefore to fill this 
vacuum was to open relations, as this would grant Korea recognition as an independent 
state, whose sovereignty would be respected at least in principle.  When Russia signed 
a treaty with Japan on 7 May 1875 to end the border dispute in the northeast Asian waters, 
Parkes became perturbed that the dispute that had led these two countries into a difficult 
relationship for a long time had been resolved.  He believed that Japan had come to this 
agreement in order to divert its territorial ambitions to elsewhere in East Asia, in other 
words by cooperating with the Russia it could annex some territory or ports from Korea.  
In order to prevent these two countries taking such course, Parkes advocated the 
occupation of Kŏmundo; Vice-Admiral Sir Alfred Ryder, the Commander-in-Chief of 
China Squadron, and his predecessor C. F. A. Shadwell also agreed that the possession of 
these islands would grant Britain a great strategic advantage over the other powers in this 
region if war broke out. 
However, Baron Tenterden, the Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, 
rejected such advice.  He argued in July that he did “not much like the policy of 
occupying outlying places to what we have no little.  If we set the example other Powers 
may be ready to follow it.”55  Tenterden feared that if Britain set a precedent by seizing 
Kŏmundo then Russia would use this to justify its own forceful occupation of territory in 
Korea, The Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Derby, agreed with him.56  A private letter that 
Robert Bourke, the Parliamentary Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, sent to Derby in 
October summarised the opinion of the senior officials of the bureaucracy. 
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On the whole I think: 1. It would be morally indefensible to take violent possession; 2) It is 
not reasonable to think that we could purchase these islands; 3) If we did they would be no 
use unless we fortified them strongly; 4) It is a matter of little consequence to us whether 
another… maritime power gains possessions of them or not.  I will say nothing of the 
suspicions it would arouse and the jealousy it would excite in Europe, Asia and America if 
we were to do… a violent or unjust act in the Chinese Seas.57 
 
Above all, they all questioned whether there really was a Russian threat to British 
interests in East Asia as Parkes had argued.  While the Commanders-in-Chief of the 
China Squadron agreed that the possession of Kŏmundo would be strategically 
advantageous if an Anglo-Russian conflict broke out, they nonetheless reported that there 
were only a few warships and troops in Vladivostok and therefore it was very unlikely 
that Russia would go to war.58  Bourke was also against the idea of attempting to open 
up Korea through gunboat diplomacy.  The problem here was that even if the navy 
appeared off Korea simply to make a demonstration and the Koreans resisted, the Foreign 
Office would have only two options; it could authorise the Commander-in-Chief to 
engage with the opponents, and thus risk criticism in Parliament, or withdraw without 
firing back, thus compromising British prestige.59  Neither option seemed desirable, 
especially when dealing with a country that offered very little commercial potential.  
British ministers and the senior officials of the Foreign Office therefore took every 
precaution not to throw themselves into an entangling situation.  And as the 
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governments of the other Western nations were also reluctant about taking the initiative 
with Korea, the British decision-makers found no particular reason to act unilaterally to 
bring the Chosŏn regime out of its isolated status. 
British thinking, though, began to change as the decade went on. The Un’yō incident 
and the subsequent signing of the Japanese-Korean treaty occurred just before the long-
running Eastern Question escalated into a Russo-Turkish War in April 1877.  The British 
government made manoeuvres to prevent the Russians from acquiring a foothold in the 
Balkans and Mediterranean in the late stage of this war and during the peace conference, 
and as a result, the Anglo-Russian relationship became increasingly tense.60  After the 
conclusion of the war the British and the Russians started to quarrel over Central Asia 
more directly than before.  For example, the British government raised strong objections 
when they learned that the Russians were planning to turn the port of Batum by the 
Caspian Sea into a military base.61  The British also watched the Russians suspiciously 
when the latter started to negotiate the delineation of their borders with the Ottoman 
Empire and Persia, in the fear that they would attempt to draw the frontier as far south as 
possible.62  Finally, the British government became alarmed when it learned that Russia 
had carried out a punitive military expedition against bandits who had harassed Russian 
residents in the region near Merv in Afghanistan in 1880.63  Although mutual suspicion 
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between Britain and Russia was quite strong already by the mid-nineteenth century, it was 
quite rare for them to quarrel directly over territory in Asia.64  However, after the Russo-
Turkish War, the decision-makers of Britain and Russia started to become more sensitive 
about each other’s actions wherever they took place, including in Asia. 
It was in these circumstances that the British government started in 1880 to receive 
numerous reports about an increase in the Russian naval presence in East Asian waters.  
This came about as a consequence of a Sino-Russian territorial dispute over the Ili region, 
in modern-day Xinjiang, which threatened to lead to war.65  In contrast to 1875-76, the 
Admiralty and the Foreign Office now received numerous reports which indicated that 
the Russians were actively reinforcing their military and naval forces in the Far East in 
order to prepare for the possible outbreak of war.66  In July the Sino-Russian relationship 
deteriorated to the extent that it developed into a war-scare between these two countries, 
and this issue was raised in the Cabinet and Parliament on several occasions.67 
                                                   
cabinet on 25 Feb 1884 summarises the development of the Merv question very well.  
See Memorandum by E. B. (unidentifiable author), 25 Feb 1884, PRO 30/29/365.  For 
the Government of India’s fear over Russian campaign to Merv, see Hartington to 
Granville (Private), 11 June 1880; Hartington to Granville (Private), 7 July 1880.  
Both from PRO 30/29/131. 
64 Anderson, The Eastern Question; Michael Edwardes, Playing the Great Game: A 
Victorian Cold War, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1975); Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, 
the Great Powers, and the Straits Question; David Gillard, The Struggle for Asia 1828-
1914: A Study in British and Russian Imperialism, (London: Methuen & Co., 1977). 
65 “Russia,” Times, 2 Jan 1880; From Correspondent in Shanghai, “Russia and China,” 
Times, Shanghai, 3 Jan 1880.  For secondary sources on the Ili crisis, see Immanuel C. 
Y. Hsü, The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy 1871-1881, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1965). 
66 Memorandum by Admiral Ryder, Duke of Wellington (Portsmouth), 9 Dec 1879; 
Memorandum by Captain Fisher, Northampton (Portsmouth), 8 Dec 1879.  Both are 
enclosures to the Secretary of the Admiralty to Coote (No. 81 Confidential), Admiralty, 
23 Mar 1880, ADM 125/25.  Also see Kennedy to Granville (No. 113 Confidential), 
Tokyo, 29 June 1880 (rec. 13 Aug), FO 46/257; Coote to the Secretary of the Admiralty 
(No. 263), Iron Duke (Yokohama), 30 June 1880 (rec. 23 Aug), ADM 1/6527. 
67 Commons Sittings, 27 May 1880, HCH, 3rd Series Vol. 252, pp.522; Commons 
Sitting, 1 July 1880, HCH, 3rd Series Vol. 253, pp.1260; Kennedy to Granville (No. 
110), Tokyo, 3 July 1880 (rec. 13 Aug), FO 46/257; Wade to Granville (No. 97 
Telegraphic), Beijing, 9 July 1880 (rec. 15 July), FO 17/831; Wade to Granville (No. 112 
63 
 
As a consequence, British diplomats and decision-makers became increasingly 
concerned about the Korean situation.68  Already on 29 June 1880 J. G. Kennedy, the 
British Chargé d’Affaires in Japan, reported that there was a possibility that “Russia is 
bent on war with China in order to maintain her Eastern prestige and possibly with a view 
to the annexation of Corea (sic).”69  Additionally, he reported that the Qing regime was 
becoming increasingly anxious about Japanese designs towards Korea.  Kennedy 
observed that China’s anxiety was driving it to try to strengthen its influence over Korea 
in order to prevent the country falling under Japanese control.70  The situation in Korea 
thus started to look increasingly dangerous, due to the concern that the power vacuum in 
the country might provoke its neighbours to scramble.  Therefore, on 25 May 1880, 
Kennedy reiterated what Parkes had argued in 1875, and suggested that Britain should 
sign a treaty with the Chosŏn regime in order to fill the vacuum.71 
Britain did not take any immediate initiative to negotiate a treaty, because the Foreign 
Office knew that an American Commodore, Robert W. Shufeldt, was already trying to 
open communications with Chosŏn officials over this issue in May 1880. They therefore 
chose to wait until they learnt of the outcome.72  However, despite the fact that Inoue 
Kaoru, who by this time was serving as the Foreign Minister, gave a letter to Shufeldt 
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which recommended the Korean government to negotiate a treaty, this overture failed.  
When Kennedy learned that the Chosŏn officials had returned the letter without opening 
it and refused even to sit at a negotiating table, he, as well as other British diplomats in 
Japan, understood the strong suspicion that the Korean elites had towards not only the 
Japanese but also the Westerners.73  As the senior officials of the Foreign Office were 
not inclined to resort to any form of gunboat diplomacy over this issue, Parkes, who was 
in London at this time, suggested that the Qing officials should be asked to mediate, as 
he was aware that the Qing had much stronger influence over the Chosŏn court than 
Japan.74  But from late-August 1880, the Foreign Office became more indifferent about 
the issue of a treaty with Korea as the Sino-Russian tension over the Ili crisis started to 
ease.  British diplomats in East Asia reported that the negotiations between China and 
Russia had finally achieved a breakthrough and thus the crisis would be settled without 
resorting to war; Russia agreed to drop its territorial claim over Ili if the Qing would pay 
an extra indemnity, and the latter agreed.75  The war-scare had certainly passed its peak 
after the summer of 1880, and a negotiated settlement – Treaty of St. Petersburg – was 
signed on 24 February 1881. 
As Sino-Russian tensions eased, the strategic importance of signing a treaty with Korea 
declined.  War in East Asia – its large expenditure and political risk – might be justifiable 
if it were for the protection of British imperial interests from Russian expansionism.  
Without it, British decision-makers were very reluctant to take coercive action in the 
region.  After February 1881, the dialogue between London and its representatives in 
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East Asia over this issue stopped, due to the fact that the Russian government started 
withdrawing the warships they had sent to the Far East.76  While the potential for future 
Russian expansion into Korea continued to linger in the mind, and the British decision-
makers continued to think it preferable to sign a treaty with the Chosŏn regime, the issue 
now became less pressing. 
From late 1881, Shufeldt made another attempt to negotiate a treaty with the Chosŏn 
court, this time through the mediation of Li Hongzhang.  By this point, Li too was 
starting to feel the need to induce the Chosŏn and the Western government to open 
diplomatic relationship, so that the latter’s influence could be used to check the possible 
Japanese or Russian expansionism into the kingdom.77  The British felt no problem 
about waiting until they learnt the outcome of the negotiation.  As Shufeldt was 
successful in signing the American-Korean Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce on 22 
May 1882, the British government duly sent Vice-Admiral Sir George Willes, the 
Commander-in-Chief of China Squadron, to Seoul in order to negotiate its own 
commercial treaty with the Chosŏn court.  The Anglo-Korean treaty was duly signed on 
6 June 1882, and the terms were identical to the American-Korean treaty.78 
However, this treaty provoked substantial opposition from the British community in 
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East Asia, for two main reasons.  First, they were upset with the commercial regulations 
stipulated in the treaty.  Parkes, who forwarded complaints to the Foreign Office on 
behalf of the treaty-port population, argued that the regulations prevented foreigners from 
shipping goods produced by Korean domestic producers between the treaty ports. 79  
Also, the average tariff rate was set at about 10%, with some products set at 30%; this 
was much higher than that set by the Anglo-Chinese and Anglo-Japanese treaties, whose 
average rates were around 5%.80  Finally, he thought it equally problematic to have a 
clause that obliged both the Chosŏn and foreign governments to establish appropriate 
legislation on the strict supervision and regulation of opium trade – a clause that did not 
exist in the regulations with the Qing and Japan.  Parkes feared that the Qing and 
Japanese governments might demand similar concessions if such terms were permitted to 
Korea, and if that happened it would have disturbing consequences for the British 
commercial position in East Asia. 
The question of the Qing claim of suzerainty over Korea also sparked controversy.  
The traditional suzerain-vassal relationship was a difficult concept for the Westerners to 
understand, as the former did not exercise the degree of control which would have made 
the latter its protectorate or colony, but at the same time the latter was still short of being 
completely independent.  The Western diplomats were therefore inclined to continue to 
adhere to the Westphalian system and clarify this vague status by signing a treaty with 
Korea as an independent nation, but in the summer of 1882 the Qing court insisted on 
making Westerners recognise its suzerainty.  Before the American-Korean commercial 
treaty was signed, when Shufeldt entered into preliminary negotiations in Tianjin with Li 
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Hongzhang before he negotiated with the Koreans, the latter attempted to insert a clause 
that would make the Americans accept Qing suzerainty over Korea.81  Li ended up 
facing a strong protest from Shufeldt over this request and agreed to drop it, but only on 
the condition that the American President would accept a letter from Kojong which stated 
that he recognised the suzerainty of the Qing.82 
As Willes had signed the Anglo-Korean treaty without making any amendments to the 
American-Korean original, the international status of Korea remained vague, and Parkes 
was not impressed by this point as well.  He contended that if the Western countries 
recognise Korea as an equal nation to themselves by signing treaties while at the same 
time also acknowledging Chinese suzerainty over Korea, then the Qing might interpret 
this as meaning that the Western governments accepted its vassal status.  Parkes also 
argued that if the Western countries accepted such a claim then the Russians might 
interpret it to mean that Korea was a colony or within the boundary of the Qing Empire, 
and use this to justify the occupation of Korean territory if war broke out between Russia 
and China.  Parkes forwarded his complaint to the Foreign Office throughout late June 
to early July of 1882, and argued that the terms of the Anglo-Korean treaty must be 
renegotiated on the grounds that it would have negative consequences for the British 
strategic and commercial position in East Asia.  But before the British government could 
decide on what to do, the Imo mutiny broke out in Seoul, thus bringing the problems 
raised by China’s new pretensions to the attention of Japan as well. 
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Japanese Policy During and Immediately After the Imo Crisis 
 
The international environment that surrounded Korea in 1882 was quite different from 
that in 1876.  In part this was because the British and the Russians had begun to see each 
other’s actions in Asia with stronger suspicion after the late-1870s, but it was also 
different because the Qing policy towards Korea had started to change at around the same 
time.  Before the late-1870s, the Qing had pursued a policy of non-intervention in the 
affairs of its vassals.  It had chosen to stay out of the Franco-Annamese War from 1858 
to 1861, and raised no particular objection when the French demanded that the Nguyen 
dynasty of Annam (modern-day Vietnam) – another kingdom recognised by the Qing as 
one of its vassals – cede Cochin China after their victory.83  Also, during the Un’yō crisis 
Li Hongzhang had guaranteed Mori Arinori, the senior official of the Gaimushō who was 
visiting Tianjin to discuss the situation in Korea, that the Qing would not intervene 
beyond the level of providing friendly advice.84  Indeed, when the Chinese had exercised 
influence over Korea in the 1870s, they did so in a way that did not particularly upset the 
Japanese. After all, it was Li who played a role in convincing the Koreans of the need to 
sign a treaty with Japan.85  To some extent, it was because the Japanese negotiators felt 
confident that the Qing would not intervene in Japanese-Korean affairs that they did not 
become desperate about clarifying the international status of Korea in the Treaty of 
Kanghwa. 
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However, Qing policy towards its vassals started to change after the signing of the 
treaty.  As already discussed in this chapter, the Qing experienced diplomatic difficulties 
with Russia over Ili in the late-1870s.  By then, the French had also acquired more 
territory in Indochina, and had signed a treaty with Annam which stipulated that the latter 
would sever its traditional ties with the Qing and instead accept French protection.86  
Finally, the Kingdom of Ryukyu – another traditional vassal of the Qing – was 
incorporated into Japan in 1879.87   As foreign powers annexed, or tried to annex, 
territories which the Qing officials considered as being within their sphere of influence, 
the latter started to feel the need to strengthen their strategic position on the frontier.88  It 
should also be remembered that by 1880, the wide-scale domestic rebellions – the Taiping, 
Ninan, Miao and Muslim revolts – that had ravaged the Qing Empire throughout the 
previous three decades had finally been quelled.89   China was therefore in a better 
position to assert its influence abroad than before.  It finally did so during the Imo 
mutiny which broke out in Seoul in July 1882. 
The cause of the mutiny was the dissatisfaction that many soldiers and officers felt 
towards the inequality that existed within the Korean army.90   As noted above, the 
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Chosŏn government had embarked on the modernisation of its armed forces from May 
1881, and invited Japanese military advisors to train the royal guards under modern 
Western military principles.  The soldiers and officers in the Japanese-trained unit were 
equipped with modern military armaments. They were also well-paid, whereas it was not 
rare for the government to be very late in paying rice stipends to most of the other 
personnel in the army.  When the latter soldiers found out that the army would not 
provide the expected stipends on 13 July 1882, some of them started a riot.  The 
Taewon’gŭn saw this as an opportunity to recoup the political influence that he had lost 
in 1873 by wiping out his political rivals, and thus escalated the riot into a large-scale 
mutiny.  He provoked the soldiers and officers to attack the Japanese-trained royal 
guards and the Korean ministers who had supported developing such a unit.  Since 
resentment towards the Japanese was shared by many Koreans regardless of their social 
background, some of the commoners joined the mutiny.  In face of the riot, the Korean 
government was powerless and in no position to offer protection to the Japanese; the 
rioters set fire to the legation, and killed many of its members, students, and military 
advisors.  Those who managed to survive the assault – including Minister Hanabusa – 
could do so only by scrambling to Inch’ŏn for their life and jumping onto a boat.  The 
news of the mutiny reached Japan only after the legation members managed to reach 
Nagasaki on 30 July 1882, having been rescued by a British warship sailing along the 
Korean coast.  The Japanese decision-makers unanimously agreed that they must hold 
the court in Seoul responsible for the deaths, injuries and damage caused to the Japanese 
in Korea, with the clear understanding that they must be firm in making their demands to 
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the extent that they would declare war if the negotiations failed.91 
On 31 July the government ministers agreed that they should demand;  
 
1. Apologies for not being able to prevent the damage caused to Japanese lives and 
properties; 2. Punishment of the culprits within fifteen days after the signing of peace terms; 
3. An indemnity for the Japanese victims and their families (in the cases which victims had 
been killed); 4. An indemnity to the Japanese government for violating the Treaty of 
Kanghwa, which clearly indicated that the host government must offer adequate protection 
to the Japanese residents; 5. Total indemnity should be about ¥500,000; 6. Permission to 
allow the Japanese government to station troops at the legation as guards for the next five 
years; 7. The ceding of Kŏmundo and Ullŭngdo to Japan if there was a clear evidence that 
the Korean government had supported the rioters.92 
 
In addition, it was decided that the negotiators should be escorted into Seoul by some 
soldiers and warships.93  The hardliners were able to cast some influence over this 
episode.  While many of the government ministers considered that the demand for 
¥500,000 was quite extravagant and that the Chosŏn ministers would be very reluctant to 
accept it, they nonetheless concluded that they must make that demand as the hardliners 
were calling for an indemnity of about ¥1 million.  They feared that it could lead to a 
domestic outcry if the amount were lowered any further.94  However, aside from the 
amount of the indemnity, the Japanese demands were relatively moderate and not too 
unreasonable.  Kuroda Kiyotaka, who was seen by most of his contemporaries as a 
hardline minister, advocated that he should be appointed as a special envoy to negotiate 
the peace terms, but Inoue Kaoru was successful in convincing Kuroda that the Minister 
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to the Chosŏn court should negotiate instead.95  Thus Inoue managed to place Hanabusa, 
who had pursued a conciliatory line throughout the early-1880s, in charge of the 
negotiations.  In addition, the Foreign Minister was able to keep the number of 
Hanabusa’s escort to a minimum – about 450 soldiers and some officers – and these troops 
were ordered strictly to refrain from making any engagement unless they were attacked.96 
By early August, news of the mutiny reached Li Hongzhang in Tianjin through Li 
Shuchang, the Qing Minister in Tokyo, and the Chosŏn officials in China, Kim Yun-sik 
and Ŏ Yun-chung.97  Li Hongzhang’s juniors immediately reported this to the Zongli 
Yamen, and on 4 August the latter ordered the former to mobilise the military.  However, 
despite the fact that the Japanese government officials had received information that the 
Chinese might be interested in intervening over this issue citing their traditional claim of 
suzerainty over Korea, Japanese policy-makers did not see this as a serious concern.  
When Li Shuchang made an official communication to the Gaimushō on 5 August that 
his government was prepared to mediate over this issue,98 Yoshida Kiyonari, the Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, simply replied the next day that “while [the Japanese 
government] appreciated the good offices of the Qing, the issue can be settled by itself 
without the help of third power.”99  After this overture, Inoue instructed his diplomats in 
China and Korea to observe the actions of the Qing decision-makers and diplomats closely, 
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but they did not see any particular reason to expect a serious counter-manoeuvre.100  
However, on 9 August Li Shuchang sent an official letter to the Gaimushō which stated 
that the Chinese government was preparing to make a military intervention in order to 
suppress the mutiny.101 
Now that the Chinese showed much stronger determination to insist on their suzerainty 
than before, the Japanese decision-makers were put into a difficult dilemma.  While the 
Japanese government was determined not to publicly accept the concept of suzerainty in 
relation to the Chosŏn court,102 it became aware that the Sino-Japanese relationship could 
potentially deteriorate if the Japanese insisted too strongly that Korea was an independent 
country.  As the Chinese were mobilising their military the situation could potentially 
lead to some kind of an armed engagement.  Yet, most of the Japanese ministers were 
well aware that Japan was not prepared to launch a military expedition.103   As the 
primary military concern for the new Meiji government in the 1870s had been the various 
anti-governmental forces within Japan, the military was trained and organised to respond 
to domestic rebellions rather than overseas expansion.  Conscripts were assembled at 
the nearest camp to where they lived, and about two or three camps came under the 
command of a base (chindai); as one camp was roughly equal to the size of a regiment, 
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each base had the force of about a brigade, and there were six bases in Japan, excluding 
Hokkaido and Okinawa.  Considering the fact that the bases had to suppress rebellions 
whenever they broke out within their jurisdiction, it was difficult to assemble them all at 
one place to engage in large-scale drills involving the coordinated action of more than 
one base, and therefore the commanders and senior officers of the Imperial Japanese 
Army (IJA) did not have a clear idea about how to manoeuvre units larger than size of a 
brigade.  Besides, the Meiji oligarchs did not have complete confidence in the discipline 
of the army, as a mutiny had broken out as recently as 23 August 1878.104 
It is true that the situation of the army in the summer of 1882 was better than it had 
been in the 1870s.  During the Satsuma Rebellion, the government had had to rely 
heavily on former samurai volunteers as well as reinforcements from the police force to 
make up for the numerical shortcoming of the regular army, but by 1882 the size of the 
army had expanded due to the fact that the state was becoming increasingly efficient in 
regard to conscription.  Also the standardisation of the army’s equipment was complete 
by 1882, and the troops were trained and equipped the same regardless of the base to 
which they belonged.  In 1878 an Army General Staff was established in order to create 
an independent bureau which specialised in military matters such as intelligence, war-
planning, organising, training, deciding on what kind of equipment were necessary and 
in what numbers and so on.  Lastly, the Japanese army in 1881 for the first time gathered 
all six bases at a single location and executed a drill, indicating that the Japanese decision-
makers were becoming somewhat more confident that the domestic situation in Japan had 
stabilised to the degree that it was no longer necessary to have military units scattered 
across Japan on a permanent basis.  However, the ‘national army’ of Japan was still at a 
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developmental stage, and there is no evidence to indicate that it had any war plans for an 
offensive on the Asian continent.   
Moreover, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was still quite underdeveloped in 1882.  
It did not have an adequate amount of warships even to contemplate the idea of starting a 
war abroad.  Additionally, due to the fact that the primary concern of the Japanese 
military in the 1870s was the suppression of domestic rebellion, the primary objective of 
the IJN in this decade had been to secure the lines of transport within Japanese waters and 
to patrol the treaty ports in Korea.  It also did not have a general staff independent from 
the army’s and did not possess a plan for engaging with foreign navies.  Therefore, the 
Japanese ministers were too ill-equipped to respond when the Chinese suddenly showed 
a much stronger determination to insist on their traditional suzerainty than had been the 
case in the 1870s.105 
The only option left for the Japanese decision-makers therefore was to negotiate and 
conclude peace terms with the Chosŏn government as quickly as possible before the Qing 
could intervene, and in the meantime to bite their tongue when the latter insisted on its 
claim of suzerainty.  On 20 August Inoue instructed Hanabusa that “if the Qing agents 
in Korea offer to mediate the Japanese-Korean negotiation, then [Hanabusa] should thank 
the Chinese for their goodwill, but reject the offer at once as he is instructed by his 
government to negotiate only with the Chosŏn delegates.” 106   However, Inoue also 
added that the Japanese government would not resist if the Qing would “use its influence 
towards the Chosŏn court so that the Koreans would comply with the Japanese 
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demands.”107  The Japanese utilised what they considered as carrots and sticks in order 
to sign the peace treaty as quickly as possible.  When Hanabusa returned to Inch’ŏn on 
12 August, en route to Seoul, he was confronted by Korean officials who politely tried to 
prevent him from entering the capital.  Ultimately, on 16 August he forced his way into 
the court in Seoul with a battalion of infantrymen he had brought as guards.108  The 
Chosŏn negotiators were frustrated by this high-handed attitude, and they also found it 
very difficult to accept the Japanese request to permit the stationing of their troops in 
Seoul as legation guards.  However, Hanabusa argued that his government could not 
compromise on this issue, and on 22 August he went as far as withdrawing to Inch’ŏn 
after sending an ultimatum after the Chosŏn negotiators continued to procrastinate.109  
At the same time, Inoue authorised Hanabusa to compromise over the Chosŏn requests in 
regard to the tariff negotiations in the hope that this would win the latter’s goodwill and 
speed up the talks on the resolution of the Imo crisis.110 
Ironically, what ultimately sped up the final stage of the negotiations was Qing 
intervention into this issue.  When Ma Jianzhong, a Chinese official who worked as Li 
Hongzhang’s agent in Korea, met with Hanabusa in Seoul, he told him that both he and 
his superior were of the opinion that the Taewŏn’gun’s strong desire to usurp political 
power was the main reason why a small riot had escalated into a political crisis, and that 
the political situation would remain unstable unless he was removed from the scene.111  
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After this conversation, Ma returned to China and came back with troops on 23 August 
in Inch’ŏn.  On the same day, two Chosŏn officials – Kim Hong-jip and Yi Yu-wŏn – 
arrived at the port and promised Hanabusa that they would start negotiations soon; 
Hanabusa replied that he would wait at Inch’ŏn for two or three days.112  Within this 
time, Ma’s troops abducted the Taewŏn’gun from Seoul and took him to Tianjin, where 
he was placed under house arrest for the next four years.113  Despite the fact that the 
Qing had made such a blatant intervention into the domestic politics of Korea, there is no 
evidence that Hanabusa raised a serious protest.  It is difficult to tell the reason behind 
this decision, but it probably was because this Chinese action provided a better 
environment within which to conclude the Japanese-Korean peace talks.  Kim and Yi 
duly arrived at Inch’ŏn on 28 August, and the Chosŏn side agreed to accept the indemnity 
that the Japanese had demanded and also to allow the latter to station troops at their 
legation.  Two days later the peace terms were signed at Chemulp’o, a small village on 
the outskirts of Inch’ŏn.114 
It was during – not before – the Imo crisis that the Japanese recognised that the Qing 
decision-makers were serious about maintaining their influence as the traditional suzerain 
over Korea.  After this incident, the Japanese government became convinced that the 
Qing was no longer pursuing a policy of non-intervention towards Korea and that 
therefore it had to take some measures in Korea to counter Chinese influence.  During 
the peace negotiations, Hanabusa told the Chosŏn negotiators that he was prepared to 
reduce the indemnity if the latter would give Japan concessions in the form of some mines 
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or permission to set up a telegraph cable. 115   The Koreans rejected this offer and 
preferred to pay ¥500,000 instead, and therefore Hanabusa dropped this clause; however, 
this was a clear sign that the Japanese were now interested in extending their influence in 
the country.  Also on 15 August 1882 – in the midst of the Imo crisis – the Japanese 
government concluded that it must strengthen its military, with the clear objective of 
providing it with the means to counter the Qing in East Asia.  It was after this point that 
the Ministry of Navy started drawing up detailed plans for expansion.116 
However, it must also be stressed that the Imo incident did not unleash serious anti-
Qing sentiment at the highest level of the Japanese government.  It is true that the Qing 
insistence on exercising its influence over a bilateral Japanese-Korean problem issue did 
frustrate the Japanese government, and that the Chinese seemed to be breaching Chosŏn’s 
independence when they abducted the Taewŏn’gun.  However, this had been done at a 
stage when the Japanese-Korean negotiations had hit deadlock, and the talks proceeded 
satisfactorily after the abduction.  At least in the summer of 1882, the Qing decision-
makers were not utilising the claim of suzerainty in a manner that seriously harmed 
Japanese interests in Korea. 
Therefore, Japanese policy towards Korea did not change too drastically after the Imo 
mutiny.  They continued to rely on persuasion and appeasement in order to win the 
goodwill of the Koreans.  Already during the negotiations, Hanabusa told the Korean 
ministers, who continued to be reluctant about allowing Japanese troops to be stationed 
in Seoul, that his government would withdraw the force after one year and replace them 
with the local guards if order had been restored by that time.117  When Inoue received a 
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report from Hanabusa about the signing of the Treaty of Chemulp’o on 2 September, he 
went further and replied immediately that the Japanese government would reduce the 
number of the troops in Korea to the size of a company, and it would be further reduced 
to half that size once the Chosŏn court managed to restore order.118 
 
Closing Remarks on the Chapter 
 
In the early-1880s, the decision-makers of Britain and Japan became more sensitive about 
the international environment that surrounded Korea than in the previous decade.  First 
and foremost, they became aware that the Chinese were making conscious efforts to 
uphold their influence in that country by utilising the prestige and suzerainty that they 
had enjoyed in East Asia for centuries.  They also started to be concerned that the 
Russian government might be taking measures to strengthen their influence in the region.  
British decision-makers became alarmed when they heard that the Russians were 
reinforcing their military strength in Vladivostok as a consequence of the Ili crisis, and 
this report began the momentum that drove the British to sign a treaty with the Chosŏn 
court in June 1882.  Concern over potential Russian expansion into Korea was shared 
by the Japanese decision-makers as well, and that was the major reason why they 
designated Wŏnsan as a treaty port.  In addition, when the Russian government 
announced the coronation of the new Tsar in 1882, the Japanese government decided to 
send Prince Arisugawa Taruhito to the ceremony, and the Prince was asked to gain as 
much information as possible about Russian intentions towards Korea.119 
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However, whether this common concern could develop into a cooperative relationship 
between Britain and Japan was a different question.  It is very important not to 
overemphasise the Japanese suspicion towards the Qing.  After all, they were not 
inclined to alter the existing international order in East Asia, in which the Westphalian 
and traditional principles co-existed.  When the Japanese decision-makers signed the 
Treaty of Kanghwa, they did not place too much importance on clarifying the 
international status of Korea.  Until the Qing intervention into the Imo crisis, the priority 
for Japanese policy towards Korea was to improve the bilateral relationship, instead of 
unilaterally strengthening their strategic foothold in the peninsula.  Just as in the case of 
the British diplomats, the Japanese government thought that it would be in its best 
interests for Korea to be recognised as a sovereign and independent nation-state by the 
Western nations, but when it realised that the Chosŏn court was extremely reluctant to 
open up the country to the rest of the world, it became cautious.120  For example, when 
John Bingham, the American Minister in Tokyo, first requested Inoue to write a letter of 
recommendation to the Korean government for Shufeldt in March 1880, the Japanese 
government rejected this request.121  It was only after Bingham made several overtures 
following this initial Japanese rejection that the Gaimushō decided to write a letter, 
fearing that further rejection might lead to a deterioration of the American-Japanese 
relationship when they were in the midst of important negotiations over treaty revision.122  
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Also, despite the fact that Shufeldt and Bingham considered the Koreans discourteous for 
returning the Japanese letter of recommendation without even opening it, the Japanese 
government did not feel insulted, arguing that the Koreans had the right to decide whether 
they should read what they received.123 
Meanwhile, while it is true that the senior officials in the Foreign Office did listen when 
their diplomats and naval officers in East Asia reported about possible Russian expansion, 
Korea remained a country located on the ‘fringe of the fringe’ of the empire for the British.  
Even if it were desirable to recognise Korea as an independent nation-state to check 
Russian expansion, the officials were still reluctant to take any move that might result in 
a military engagement.  The Japanese suspicion towards Russia should also not be 
overemphasised.  It is true that the Japanese decision-makers were frustrated when they 
had to give up control over Sakhalin to Russia, and that this experience resulted in the 
development of an image of Russia as a powerful expansionist empire.  However, while 
this image lingered in the minds of the Japanese decision-makers, the relationship 
between Russia and Japan after the signing of the delineation treaty of 1875 was generally 
cordial.  Over the question of treaty revision, the Japanese diplomats perceived that the 
Russian government officials were not particularly opposed to the demands, but that they 
were sensitive to the opinion of other Western countries, whose influence could not be 
ignored. 124   As a matter of fact, the Russo-Japanese treaty recognised mutual 
extraterritoriality – which acknowledged Japanese consular jurisdiction in Sakhalin as 
                                                   
1880, both from NGM vol. 13, pp. 442-6. 
123 Bingham to Inoue (No. 1326), Tokyo, 11 Sept 1880; Inoue to Bingham (No. 34), 18 
Sept 1880, both from NGM vol. 13, pp. 451-6. 
124 Yanagiwara to Inoue (Unnumbered), St. Petersburg, 4 Sept 1880 (rec. 28 Oct), 
NGM, vol. 13, pp. 217-8; Yanagiwara to Inoue (Unnumbered), St. Petersburg, 12 Sept 
1880 (rec. 6 Nov), NGM, vol. 13, pp. 218-222; Yanagiwara to Inoue (別信第五號 Extract), 
St. Petersburg, 17 Oct 1880, NGM, vol. 13, pp. 254-6; Yanagiwara to Inoue (十五年機密 
第八號), St. Petersburg, 19 Mar 1882, NGM, vol. 15, pp. 13-4. 
82 
 
well as the same right for the Russians in the Kurile Islands – and therefore the Russo-
Japanese relationship was regulated under the principle of equality at least in these areas.  
It provided an agreeable framework for the Gaimushō officials to solve disputes whenever 
they arose in the northern waters of Japan.125 
It should also be remembered that Anglo-Japanese relations were not particularly close. 
At this time, the Japanese tended to resent many of the rowdy Britons in the treaty ports 
because of the latter’s high-handed manner.126  To some extent, Parkes epitomised the 
attitude of such people, as he was quite notorious for his arrogant approach when 
negotiating with the Japanese decision-makers, and was bitterly opposed to the Japanese 
demand for treaty revision.127  When the Japanese government succeeded in signing a 
convention with the Americans in 1873 – in which the latter agreed to grant tariff 
autonomy to the former – Parkes urged his and the other Western governments not to 
negotiate similar agreement.128  As the convention was signed under the condition that 
it would not be ratified unless other Western governments would sign a similar agreement, 
it was turned into a dead letter.  The Japanese could not help but feel that the British and 
their Minister in Tokyo were unfriendly, especially because they thought they were only 
demanding tariff autonomy and full administrative control over their own country, which 
was seen as a right that every civilised nation should enjoy. Some Japanese officials 
described the attitude of Parkes as being “aggressive, rude and cruel.”129 
                                                   
125 Inoue to Sanjō (Unnumbered), 25 Jan 1882; Kobayashi to Ueno (Unnumbered), 
Korsakov, 25 Jan 1882 (rec. 26 Jan); Inoue to Sanjō (公第八九號), 2 enclosures, 23 Mar 
1882; Kobayashi to Ueno (第四號), 2 enclosures, 18 July 1882 (rec. 31 Aug), all from 
NGM, vol. 15, pp. 356-367. 
126 Hoare, Japan’s Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements. 
127 See, for example; Record of Conversation between Inoue and the German Minister 
in Tokyo at Gaimushō, 10 July 1880, NGM, vol. 13, pp. 150-161.  Iokibe, Jōyaku 
Kaiseishi, ch. 1. 
128 Iokibe, Jōyaku Kaiseishi, 313;  
129 For quote, see Takezoe to Ōkuma, Itō and Inoue (Private), Tianjin, 4 July 1881, 
83 
 
It was in early 1880 that the Western governments, including the British, finally agreed 
to hold a conference on treaty revision and receive a draft proposal of the revised treaty 
from Japan.130  However, this did not mean that the Anglo-Japanese frictions over this 
issue were eradicated all of a sudden.  The senior officials of the Foreign Office and the 
diplomats in Japan were often frustrated during this process, as they felt that the Japanese 
always asked for too much while not giving back enough in return.131  From the Japanese 
side of the story, the diplomats and senior officials at Gaimushō started to contemplate 
the idea of negotiating with Germany when they were preparing for this conference.  
While the Germans seemed, from the Japanese perspective, reluctant to sign any 
agreement with the Japanese that might put them at odds with Britain, they also did not 
seem to be as stubbornly against the Japanese draft on treaty revision as the British.  The 
Japanese authorities thus hoped that the Germans could act as a counterweight against the 
British if they succeeded in winning the former’s goodwill.132 
Of course, it should not be assumed that every Japanese resented the British.  After 
                                                   
ŌSKM (NSKV), vol. 4, pp. 280-283.  See also Sanjō to Yamagata (Private), 8 Apr 1881, 
YAKM, vol. 2, pp. 178; and the section on treaty revision of NGM vol. 14.  For 
secondary source, see Iokibe, Jōyaku Kaiseishi. 
130 Mori to Inoue (別信第三十二號), London, 16 Apr 1880 (rec. 1 June), NGM, vol. 14, 
pp. 28-9; Mori to Inoue (Internal), London, 11 June 1880 (rec. 26 July), NGM, vol. 13, 
pp. 126-7; Mori to Inoue (機密信 第八十號), Mori to Inoue (Unnumbered), London, 17 
Dec 1880, NGM, vol. 13, pp. 271-4. 
131 Circular Addressed to Certain Chambers of Commerce, by Sir C. Dilke, FO, 22 July 
1881; Glasgow Chamber of Commerce to Granville, 9 Sept 1881 (rec. 10 Sept); 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Granville, 9 Sept 1881 (rec. 13 Sept); 
Huddersfield Chamber of Commerce to Tenterden, 23 Sept 1881 (rec. 24 Sept); 
Matheson and Co to Pauncefote, 26 Sept 1881 (rec. 27 Sept); Birmingham Chamber of 
Commerce to Tenterden, 26 Oct 1881 (rec. 28 Oct); Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce to 
Granville, 11 Nov 1881 (rec. 12 Nov).  All from BDFA vol. 3. 
132 Aoki to Mori (Private), Berlin, 15 Apr 1881; Aoki to Itō (Private), Berlin, 24 June 
1881; Aoki to Itō (Private), 25 July 1881, all from IHKM, vol. 1, pp. 48-54.  Inoue to 
Mori (Unnumbered), 26 Sept 1881, NGM, vol. 14, pp. 68; Inoue to Mori (機密 第廿六
號), 26 Sept 1881, NGM, vol. 14, pp. 68-9; Inoue to Sanjō (秘第三十九號), 20 Oct 1881, 
NGM, vol. 14, pp. 88-90. 
84 
 
all, the conference on treaty revision did lead to some progress in the negotiation over 
this issue, as the Western representatives, including Parkes, reacted positively when the 
Japanese declared in the spring of 1882 that they were prepared to grant the freedom to 
travel, live and engage in commercial activity throughout Japan if the treaty powers would 
comply with the Japanese demands.133  In addition, the British political system attracted 
admiration from the activists of the Jiyū Minken Undō (Movement for Freedom and 
Popular Rights) in Japan, as the movement was becoming quite active by the early-1880s, 
and there were Meiji oligarchs such as Ōkuma Shigenobu, who supported this idea.134  
However, the individuals who took a more favourable view of the British were not the 
majority within the Japanese government at that time.  The Japanese government 
decided in 1881 to adopt the Prussian constitutional model, and Ōkuma was ousted from 
his post as the Finance Minister that year for insisting on adopting the British model of 
constitution. 135   The level of mutual confidence between Britain and Japan in the 
summer of 1882 was thus not very strong.
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Chapter 2 – The Years between the Crises, September 1882-April 1884 
 
Japanese Policy towards Korea 
 
In the period between September 1882 and April 1884, Japanese decision-makers 
continued to follow the line of policy that they had pursued during and immediately after 
the Imo crisis, and formulated policies under the clear recognition that they could not 
ignore the Qing presence in Korea.  Such a change of perception had several 
implications on the Japanese policies.  First of all, they realised the need to make some 
adjustments so that they would not fall behind their Chinese competitors after observing 
the Qing intervention in the Imo crisis.  As shown in the previous chapter, the Japanese 
government ordered the Ministry of Navy to draw up a plan for naval expansion during 
the crisis.  Three months later, Kawamura Sumiyoshi, the Minister of Navy, submitted 
a detailed plan for naval expansion, which called for an addition of thirty-six warships 
within the next eight years, and a budget of 670,000 yen per warship on average.1  
Iwakura agreed that the nation must strengthen its navy by stating that; 
 
The recent incident over Korea has been settled peacefully, but we must remain alert towards 
China.  China had been sleeping for decades, but it has recently strengthened its military 
capability by making determined efforts to reform its services.  …The security of our 
country will be at risk if we do not make serious efforts to improve the quality of the naval 
service.  …It is [politically] difficult to increase taxation at this moment, but we must do 
this as we have no other means to finance [the naval expansion].2 
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The Japanese decision-makers were aware by late-1882 that the Qing court was becoming 
more determined to uphold its influence in East Asia as a whole, not just in Korea, as the 
latter also reacted sharply when the French launched another military campaign in Tonkin 
in the northern part of modern-day Vietnam, which belonged to the Kingdom of Annam.3  
This meant that the Ryukyu question could also potentially turn into a diplomatic issue 
that might trigger a military confrontation.  There were therefore many reasons for the 
Japanese government to reiterate the importance of bolstering the military.4 
Japanese decision-makers also took various other measures to stabilise the Sino-
Japanese balance of influence in Korea in order to protect their interests.  For example, 
when Takezoe Shin’ichirō, the new Minister in Korea from January 1883, advised his 
government to withdraw some troops from Korea immediately after his arrival at Seoul 
in order to improve the Japanese image in the Chinese and Korean eyes,5 his superiors 
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pp. 561-2. 
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in the Gaimushō initially agreed, but then decided to resend the soldiers in mid-October 
when they learned that the Qing had not yet withdrawn its own forces.6  While the 
Japanese decision-makers were aware that its military presence raised the suspicion of 
the Koreans, it was equally important not to leave the Qing unchecked.  They also tried 
to encourage Japanese investors to establish a foothold in Korea.  Although they were 
very reluctant to offer economic aid to the Chosŏn court directly from their treasury – due 
to the dire financial situation that the Japanese government was in during the first half of 
the 1880s – they understood that it was necessary to take some initiative to urge Japanese 
investors to start businesses, as they were aware that not too many of the large-scale 
entrepreneurs would head to Korea spontaneously.7  This situation seemed particularly 
worrying, as Japanese officials were conscious that the Chinese were interested in 
expanding their trade in Korea. 
In 1882 a Sino-Korean Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade agreement was 
signed.  This agreement was important for two reasons.  First in these regulations, the 
courts in Beijing and Seoul reconfirmed the hierarchical relationship between the 
traditional suzerain and vassal.8  Second, it set up conditions for Sino-Korean trade that 
privileged China. On the face of it, the Sino-Korean Regulations closely resembled the 
treaties that the Chosŏn court had signed with other countries, in the sense that the 
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Chinese merchants were now permitted to trade in the treaty ports which were already 
opened to the other countries, although this agreement also opened another trading post 
on the Sino-Korean border.  Tariffs were to be fixed at 5 percent ad valorem, and in these 
trading posts the Chinese merchants were to enjoy extraterritoriality.  However, the 
regulations went further in some important areas. For example, they granted exclusive 
shipping rights over Sino-Korean maritime trade to the Chinese Merchants Steamship 
Company, and stipulated that ae telegraph line between these two countries was to be 
built and maintained exclusively by the Qing.  Moreover, around the time that the Sino-
Korean Regulations were signed, Qing officials started to send military and political 
advisors to the Chosŏn.9 
In response, the Japanese government decided on 18 December 1882 that it would grant 
about 170 yen to the Yokohama Specie Bank so that it could be used as a loan to the 
Chosŏn court, in the hope that such a measure would encourage the bank to offer long-
term investment that would make the Japanese presence in Korea more permanent.10  
Later, in November 1883, the Chosŏn authorities signed an agreement with the Daiichi 
National Bank which allowed the latter to collect tariffs on behalf of the former, as the 
bank had opened branches in all three treaty ports in Korea.  This negotiation was 
initiated by Takezoe, as he held informal talks with Paul Georg von Möllendorff, the 
German advisor to the Chosŏn court, over this issue from the summer.11  It is unlikely 
that the Japanese government instructed Takezoe to promote Japanese economic interests 
in Korea as enthusiastically as he did; when the Gaimushō learned that the bank and the 
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Chosŏn officials had entered official negotiations to sign an agreement over this issue 
from October 1883 they instructed the Minister that he should not take any part in the 
talks between the two parties, although he was permitted to act as a witness if the two 
parties asked him to do so.12  However, the Gaimushō also did not entirely disapprove 
of Takezoe’s action, and as the Chosŏn court started permitting the Daiichi National Bank 
to purchase Korean alluvial gold around the same time,13 his actions did play a role in 
strengthening the Japanese foothold in Korea to some extent.  The individuals outside 
of the government also thought some measures must be taken in order to strengthen the 
Japanese commercial presence in Korea.  For example, Shibusawa noted that “Japanese 
trade in Korea is struggling in the first place.  If the Chinese merchants would flood into 
Inchŏn and Seoul, then our traders might be forced to close their business.”14 
After the Imo incident, many Japanese individuals started to watch the Qing actions in 
Korea with stronger suspicion than before.  Takino Masatoshi, a naval officer who 
visited Seoul in December 1882, reported with alarm that the Qing officials in the capital 
were taking every measure to strengthen their foothold in Korea.  According to Takino, 
these actions included direct forms of influence such as forcing the Chosŏn officials to 
accept military advisors and loans from China, and indirect forms such as convincing the 
Korean officials to limit contact with the Japanese.15  It was also after the Imo crisis that 
the Japanese government began to be alarmed about King Kojong’s letters to the heads 
of the Western nations which indicated that his country was under the suzerainty of the 
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Qing.  Of course, the Japanese knew about these letters before the outbreak of the Imo 
mutiny, but the correspondence exchanged by the Gaimushō and diplomats over this issue 
now started to carry a stronger sense of concern and frustration than before.16  Takino 
went as far as describing the Chinese as “those pigtails who are notorious for being adept 
at deception” taking every measure to drive the Japanese out from Korea so that they 
could expand their interests.17 
Their frustration towards the Qing also derived from issues outside of Korea.  One of 
the diplomatic problems that they experienced during this period was the question of 
revision of the Sino-Japanese treaty, whose commercial clauses were about to expire.18  
Japanese decision-makers hoped that they would be able to use the opportunity to abolish 
the clause on mutual extraterritoriality in return for allowing both the Chinese and 
Japanese nationals to travel and reside freely in each other’s countries.  In other words, 
they wanted to amend the Sino-Japanese treaty in a manner similar to their blueprint for 
revised treaties with the Western countries, in the hope that such a success would make it 
easier to convince the latter to accept revision. 19   However, the Qing negotiators 
procrastinated over this issue, and asked the Japanese to make some concession over 
Ryukyu if they wanted to revise the existing treaty between the Qing and Japan.20  As 
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the question of treaty revision with the Western nations was the most important diplomatic 
issue for the Japanese decision-makers, they were frustrated by the attitude of its Qing 
counterparts. 
It is therefore tempting to assume that the Japanese started to take more assertive 
measures to push their interests in Korea after the Imo crisis in order to refute the Chinese 
claim to suzerainty.  However, at this stage most of the Japanese decision-makers agreed 
that the best way to accomplish this objective was not to confront China but rather to 
develop a friendly relationship with the Koreans in order to protect and extend their 
influence through appeasement and negotiations in a cordial spirit.  Therefore, whenever 
the Chosŏn court made requests the Japanese diplomats made efforts to accommodate 
them as much as possible.  For example, negotiations over the Japanese-Korean tariff 
agreement had begun already before the outbreak of the Imo mutiny as a result of a strong 
request from the Chosŏn ministers, and they managed to hammer out an agreement on 25 
July 1883, although the Japanese negotiators kept the tariff rate lower than the one their 
Chosŏn counterparts had requested.21  The Gaimushō also continued to persecute their 
nationals who were engaging in fishery and forestry in Ullŭngdo in a manner that was not 
permitted by the Treaty of Kanghwa, and reiterated to the Korean government officials 
that they considered the island to be under Korean jurisdiction.22  Finally, the Gaimushō 
avoided adopting the suggestions made by some entrepreneurs who wanted the Chosŏn 
court to grant them rights to invest in Korean alluvial gold mines in return for nullifying 
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the Imo incident indemnity, as such a demand might alienate the Korean officials.23  
Instead, the Japanese government decided to cancel the indemnity in early-1883 without 
demanding anything in return.24 
In addition, while most of the Japanese decision-makers pointed out the importance of 
preparing for the worst case scenario after the Imo crisis, they did not necessarily think 
that a Sino-Japanese confrontation was inevitable.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the Qing intervention into the Imo crisis was made in a form that did not undermine 
Japanese interests, and it was not seen as being deliberately confrontational.  Li 
Hongzhang’s relatively conciliatory manner during the negotiations over the Ryukyu 
question also reassured the Japanese that he was not interested in starting a war, even if 
the Qing did not officially approve the Japanese annexation.25 
Finally, there are several sources which indicate that there were many Japanese 
individuals, both inside and outside of the government, who thought the Qing, Chosŏn 
and Japan were interdependent with each other.  Many of them likened the relationship 
between these three countries to that between teeth and lips; it is impossible for anyone 
to digest their food without teeth, but at the same time teeth will be exposed to the external 
threats if they are not covered by lips.  Neither teeth nor lips can exist without each other, 
and many politically-conscious Japanese individuals considered that the same 
relationship existed between three East Asian countries.26  Due to their proximity to each 
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other, the social conditions of China, Korea and Japan were closely interlinked, and 
therefore they thought that the economic prosperity of Japan could not be achieved unless 
the interactions between these three countries become more active.  Many Japanese 
ministers and officials also perceived that if any of their East Asian neighbours collapsed, 
then their country would become more vulnerable to the threat of Western imperialism.  
The experience of being at the receiving end of the Western gunboat diplomacy in the 
mid-nineteenth century had created a strong fear and suspicion towards Western nations, 
which lingered in the minds of the Japanese decision-makers even in the 1880s.  Iwakura, 
for example, argued shortly after the Imo crisis that “teeth and lips should cooperate with 
each other so that they can both uphold their independence.”27  It goes without saying 
that many of his colleagues agreed with such opinion.28 
Of course, the Qing and Chosŏn decision-makers could not help but see this Japanese 
attitude as hypocrisy; despite calling for the unity of East Asian countries, what the 
Japanese were doing in reality was trying to create agitation in East Asia that suited their 
interests before those of the Chinese and Koreans, and they also often accomplished such 
objectives by mobilising their military and manipulating unequal treaties in that process.  
However, the fact that the Japanese decision-makers sought to develop a cooperative 
relationship with the Qing had an important influence on their East Asian policy.  In the 
early-1880s, British diplomats in East Asia and Qing decision-makers had feared that the 
Japanese might come to closer terms with Russia and France – two European great powers 
that had experienced diplomatic difficulties with the Qing – in order to strengthen their 
bargaining position over the Ryukyu question, but there is no evidence that indicates that 
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they contemplated such an option.29  As a matter of fact, when the Sino-French dispute 
over Tonkin escalated in 1883, the French diplomats made several overtures to the 
Japanese in order to establish a military alliance, but the Japanese ministers were very 
consistent in refusing such offers.30 
This stance also influenced the Japanese policy towards Korea.  While the Japanese 
decision-makers saw Korea as a region which was important for the security of Japan, 
and wanted to avoid it falling into the hands of hostile power, they were also aware of 
their own military weakness.  Under such circumstances, they thought that the best way 
to accomplish their objective was to create an environment that prevented any single 
external power from controlling the peninsula, while meanwhile helping the Chosŏn 
decision-makers to modernise, as such reforms would stabilise the domestic political 
situation and allow the Chosŏn to resist external threats.  Japanese decision-makers did 
not believe that the Qing presence would necessarily impede the Korean modernisation 
process, or that the Qing claim of traditional suzerainty would lead the Chinese to drive 
all the other external powers out of Korea.31  They also thought that they shared a 
common interest in preventing Russian encroachment into Korea, as they observed that 
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the Qing’s relations with Russia were still tense after the Ili crisis.32  The bottom line 
was that by late-1882 there was a near consensus within the Japanese decision-making 
circle that they must avoid pursuing any policy that would seriously upset the Qing 
decision-makers. 
This is not to say that there were not different views in the decision-making circle, as 
some did argue that there was a need to take strong measures to counter the Qing influence 
in Korea.  For example, Inoue Kowashi, the secretary of the Cabinet, advised the 
government to arrange an international agreement which would acknowledge Korea as a 
neutral state like Belgium or Switzerland. 33   While this suggestion should not be 
regarded as being aggressive, he nonetheless was suggesting that an effort should be made 
to ensure that Korea was recognised internationally as a state independent from the Qing 
claim of suzerainty.  Senior officials of military went further.  They argued that, 
considering the fact that both the Qing and Japan saw Korea as a region of vital strategic 
importance, it was inevitable that a war between these two countries would break out in 
the future, and argued that they should challenge the Qing earlier rather than later, before 
the latter strengthened its own military.34  However, Yamagata Aritomo, a prominent 
Meiji oligarch who had a strong connection with the army, was much more cautious as 
he was well aware that Japan was not ready for such an engagement.  While the Ministry 
of Navy had submitted its plan for naval expansion – which was deemed essential in order 
to protect and promote Japan’s interest on the Asian continent – this required annual 
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budgets of 3 million yen for the next eight years, which was way beyond the capacity of 
the treasury at that time.35  The navy’s administration drew up a more affordable plan as 
an alternative, but the important military officers who had backed the initial plan, such as 
Ōyama Iwao (Head of the Army General Staff) and Kajiyama Sukenori (Undersecretary 
of the Ministry of Navy), raised strong objections, and the debate was not reconciled 
before the outbreak of Kapsin coup.36  As a result, Yamagata argued that Japan must be 
careful not to take any action in Korea that might provoke a Qing reaction.37  Inoue 
Kowashi also agreed that the Japanese government must deal with the Qing cautiously, at 
least for the time being.38 
What lay underneath the Japanese policies towards Korea after 1882 was the perception 
shared by the officials in Tokyo that they had not completely lost their foothold in Korea 
after the Imo mutiny.  Despite the fact that the incident had resulted in a significant loss 
of influence for the radical progressive faction of the Chosŏn court, which was seen as 
being pro-Japanese, the members of that faction such as Kim Ok-kyun and Pak Yŏng-hyo 
still retained their position within the government, and both participated in a mission to 
apologise for the Imo incident in the autumn of 1882.39  They also thought that the 
Koreans were not completely pro-Chinese, as the Qing abduction of the Taewon’gŭn had 
resulted in his son, Kojong, holding strong suspicion towards the suzerain power.  Also 
many of the local population in Korea soon started to see the Chinese merchants and 
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soldiers in their country with resentment as they were no less rowdy than the Japanese 
residents.40  This optimism was shared by individuals such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of 
the most influential non-governmental individuals in Japan at that time as an entrepreneur, 
educator and journalist.  Thinking that there were a sizeable number of progressives in 
Korea, Fukuzawa held high hopes that Japan could strengthen its influence by acting as 
an instructor in modernity.  Not only did he encourage his junior associates to go to 
Korea for that purpose, he also hosted a group of Korean students in the summer of 
1883.41  Finally, by mid-1883, Japanese officials held the impression that, despite Li 
Hongzhang’s mediation of the treaties between Korea and the Western nations, the latter 
preferred to treat the former as an independent nation-state rather than a vassal of the 
Qing.42  The Japanese decision-makers thought therefore that there were various forces 
at play that checked the Qing influence in Korea, and did not believe that their own 
influence in that country had been eliminated. It was therefore not necessarily the case 
that the Westphalian system was incompatible with suzerainty. 
This perception, however, was based upon a serious misapprehension of the political 
situation in Korea.  In reality, the radical progressives remained a small minority within 
the Chosŏn decision-making circle.  It was difficult for a faction which was regarded as 
being pro-Japanese to expand its influence when the Chinese and Koreans remained, 
unsurprisingly, strongly suspicious of Japan after the Imo incident.  The radical 
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progressives also received no aid from the Japanese government, as the latter pursued a 
cautious policy towards Korea.  It was against this background that the radical 
progressives became more desperate about retaining their foothold, eventually leading 
them to launch the Kapsin coup in December 1884. 
 
British Policy towards Korea 
 
Compared to the Japanese, the Imo incident had a limited effect on British policy towards 
Korea, at least in the short term.  Although the incident caused British observers, both 
inside and outside of the government, to recognise that the Qing ministers took its claim 
of traditional suzerainty more seriously than they had expected, they remained quite 
uninterested in accepting this.  The senior officials of the Foreign Office and their 
diplomats were unsympathetic to the concept of suzerainty and had hitherto carefully 
avoided signalling any sympathy towards the Qing over the diplomatic difficulties that 
the latter had experienced with Japan over Taiwan and Ryukyu.43  In 1882 they did not 
see the Qing as having any more right to intervene in the Imo mutiny than the Japanese, 
whose legation members in Seoul had been attacked by the rebels.44  Yet, by April 1884 
they began to reformulate policy towards East Asia in the recognition that they had to 
take the suzerainty question more seriously in order to maintain the goodwill of the Qing.  
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99 
 
A series of events that occurred in East Asia over the period of a year and a half after the 
Imo crisis gradually changed the British perception of the Qing, and this change 
inevitably affected their policy towards Korea.45 
Just before the outbreak of the Imo mutiny, Sir Harry Parkes, the British Minister in 
Japan, had objected to the Anglo-Korean treaty that had been signed by the Commander-
in-Chief of the China Squadron.  While his criticism was directed towards both the 
commercial regulations and Chosŏn’s acknowledgement of Qing suzerainty, he raised a 
stronger objection towards the latter than the former.46  There were some individuals 
who raised counter-arguments against Parkes.  Sir Thomas Wade, the British Minister 
in Beijing, argued that the British government might jeopardise the goodwill of Qing 
decision-makers if it did not adequately acknowledge that the latter placed a strong stress 
on upholding the suzerain-tributary relationship with their neighbours, and therefore 
advised his government to ratify the treaty.47  Wade was one of the individuals who had 
continually stressed the importance of cooperation with the Qing in maintaining British 
interests in East Asia, and often from the late-1870s he had tried to induce his government 
to take steps to build a more friendly relationship with the Chinese government.  For 
example, Wade recommended his superiors in the Foreign Office in late 1879 that they 
sign an agreement with the court in Beijing which would allow British officers to act as 
instructors to the Qing’s naval squadrons, and serve the Qing in the case of defensive 
warfare against any country except Britain.48 
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However, Wade did not represent the opinion of the majority.  Wade’s suggestion in 
late-1879 was rejected by the senior officials in Foreign Office, due to a recommendation 
by Parkes who at this time was recuperating from an illness in London.  He argued that 
such an arrangement might result in making the Japanese feel isolated, as they were not 
in an easy relationship with the Qing.  He argued that; 
 
I do not believe that the Japanese Government entertain hostile designs against China for 
the furtherance of any aims purely Japanese.  Their Treasury is empty, and though the 
patriotism of the people would enable them to resist invasion, they must be aware of their 
inability to make offensive war, upon a country possessed of resources so much greater than 
their own.  But if China… contemplates – unwisely I presume – engaging in a struggle 
with Russia, the latter may certainly be expected to endeavour to obtain Japan as her ally, 
and it is not at all unlikely that the latter would be tempted by the inducements of such an 
alliance to take part in the contest.49 
 
Parkes noted that while the Japanese had not yet acquired military power that would allow 
them to pose a threat to the Qing or to British commercial interests in China, they were 
not completely powerless.  He therefore concluded that it would cause a tremendous 
inconvenience to the British if the Japanese felt so isolated that they might choose to come 
on to better terms with Russia. 
Besides, there were constant outbreaks of anti-foreign riots in China throughout the 
1870s, including the Margary Affair in 1875.50  These events were enough for many 
British observers to cast doubt on the validity of the arguments of Wade, and question the 
Qing constituted a natural ally. 51   Whenever these violent incidents turned into 
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diplomatic issues, the senior officials of the Foreign Office ordered their diplomats to deal 
with them by adhering to Western diplomatic practice rather than showing sympathy 
towards the Chinese tradition.  They were instructed to insist that the Qing provide 
protection to foreigners as the treaties guaranteed, and that if the existing arrangements 
proved inadequate then they should insist on new supplementary treaties or agreements.52  
Such perceptions also affected British policy towards Korea.  When the senior officials 
of the Foreign Office concluded in late 1882 that the British government had to 
renegotiate the Anglo-Korean treaty, they placed more emphasis on amending the 
suzerainty clause than the commercial regulations.53 
However, their perceptions started to change immediately after making this decision. 
In late-November 1882 Parkes learned that the Qing had issued a large loan to the Chosŏn 
court, leaving the impression that not only were the Qing trying to strengthen their 
influence in Korea but also that the Chosŏn decision-makers were content to accept that 
influence; after all, it was also through Qing mediation that the Western countries had 
managed to sign treaties with Korea, something that could not be accomplished through 
the Japanese in 1876 or 1880.54  Moreover, the British could not be indifferent to the 
situation in Southeast Asia, where the Qing court was now reacting sharply against the 
French attempt to make Annam its protectorate.  In doing so, the Qing ministers were 
making it clear that they were prepared to mobilise the military to uphold their influence 
over their traditional vassals, even if that resulted in a war against a European great 
power.55   
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After observing these events, Parkes reported on 21 December 1882 that the Qing 
influence in Korea was so significant that one had to expect very strong resistance from 
the Qing authorities if British attempted to undermine it.56  This despatch arrived at the 
Foreign Office on 29 January 1883 – immediately after its senior officials had decided to 
postpone the ratification of the Anglo-Korean treaty due to their concern about the 
suzerainty question – and thus too late to influence their decision.  However, from 
February 1883 the officials shifted to focus more on amending the commercial regulations 
than addressing suzerainty, and this stance was approved by the merchant community in 
East Asia.57  From mid-February to March 1883, the Foreign Office started to receive 
dispatches from the Chambers of Commerce in East Asia that argued in favour of the 
renegotiation of the commercial regulations.58  Also a report from the embassy in Berlin, 
which reached London on 12 April 1883, further encouraged the Foreign Office to 
renegotiate the terms.  In this dispatch, the ambassador stated that the German 
government wished to postpone ratification of its Korean treaty, whose terms were 
identical to the American-Korean and Anglo-Korean treaties, and was ready to 
renegotiate the terms together with a British plenipotentiary.59  As a result, the Foreign 
Office authorised Parkes on 22 April 1883 to officially communicate to the Qing and the 
Chosŏn officials that the British government wished to amend some of the clauses of the 
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Anglo-Korean treaty, and thus desired to postpone ratification.  The Foreign Office 
subsequently instructed Parkes to draw up a new draft of the Anglo-Korean treaty, and in 
this document he placed much emphasis on amending the commercial regulations.60 
At this stage, there still were some individuals who remained sceptical about 
developing British East Asian policy on the basis of accepting Qing’s strong emphasis on 
the suzerainty question.  For example, Thomas Grosvenor, who temporarily served as 
the Chargé d’Affaires in Beijing after Wade had left the post in August 1882 after thirteen 
years of service, was not as pro-Qing as his predecessor.  After he temporarily took 
charge of the legation, the Sino-French relationship deteriorated even further as the 
negotiations over the Annam question had resulted in deadlock, and brought these two 
countries closer to the brink of war.  When the Foreign Office asked Grosvenor for his 
opinion on Chinese policy, he replied that the Qing claim of suzerainty should not be 
taken as an acceptable casus belli.61 
But even those British observers who were unsympathetic towards Qing suzerainty 
came to the recognition by around September that, like it or not, they could not ignore 
China’s claim.62  On 8 September 1883, The Times posted a long article in which the 
author argued that although Chinese modernisation was still a work in progress, the 
Qing’s efforts had borne some fruit in improving its military capability.63  He contended 
that the Qing capability to defend its borders from external enemies had been greatly 
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strengthened, and went as far as predicting that it might be even capable of making some 
success in offensive operations in Tonkin.64  This was the most optimistic report yet 
about the military capability of the Qing.  Prior to this, most other reports, including 
those by diplomats, had stated that while the Qing military capability was definitely 
improving, the Chinese were not strong enough to have success against the French.65  In 
the light of this changing perception of China, when Parkes, who had been transferred to 
the legation in Beijing from September 1883, visited Seoul in November 1883 with the 
German plenipotentiary to negotiate the amended treaty he did not openly discourage 
Kojong from sending a letter stating that Korea was tributary to China to Queen Victoria.  
The treaty was signed on 26 November, and ratified on 28 April 1884.66 
British observers – the senior officials of the government bureaucracy, diplomats, and 
newspaper correspondents – therefore reappraised Qing power in the period between 
September 1882 and April 1884.  This was not, though, just because of the revival in 
Chinese power, but also because of who they were opposing.  It was the fact that the 
Qing were moderately successful in resisting two of Britain’s European rivals, that caused 
the British to view the Chinese re-ascendance in a relatively positive light.  As discussed 
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in the previous chapter, in 1881 the Qing had succeeded in upholding its territorial claim 
over Ili against Russia – a European empire which the British decision-makers and 
diplomats viewed with suspicion throughout the nineteenth century.  This was very 
satisfactory for Britain, but so too was the Qing’s strong reaction against the French 
attempt to establish a protectorate over Annam, to the extent that it was prepared to risk 
war if the French continued to reject its claim of suzerainty in this region.  
To understand this, it is necessary to reflect on the nature of Anglo-French relations.  
While the British were often frustrated by the French activities in Europe and 
Mediterranean throughout the nineteenth century, 67  these two imperial powers had 
sometimes been able to cooperate in Asia.  They had cooperated, for example, in their 
campaign against the Chinese in the Arrow War, and the British had raised no particular 
objection to the French acquisitions of Cochin China and Cambodia in the 1860s, despite 
their being adjacent to the Straits Settlements.68  However, the British attitude towards 
France started to change after the former’s occupation of Egypt in 1882.  The Liberal 
administration had authorised a military expedition when they heard the news that 
European residents in Egypt had been massacred by military forces of Ahmed Urabi, who 
rebelled against the rule of Khedive Tewfik.69  It was launched under the assumption 
that a limited military operation would be enough to defeat the rebels, but the 
expeditionary force faced a stronger reaction than they expected, and as a result they 
ended up escalating the operation which resulted in the occupation of the whole of 
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Egypt. 70   This unilateral occupation of Egypt resulted in unleashing anti-British 
sentiment in France, as a large amount of French capital had been invested in the Suez 
Canal, and also because the French saw the security of Mediterranean as an issue of great 
importance for the defence of their nation.71 
The deterioration of the Anglo-French relationship started to affect British East Asian 
policy around late-1883.  When British diplomats first began reporting about the Sino-
French dispute over Annam from the summer of 1882, the reaction of the Cabinet 
ministers and the senior officials of the Foreign Office was relatively calm.  Earl 
Granville, the Foreign Secretary, contemplated the idea of mediating the issue in order to 
improve the relationship between these two countries, but when he learned that neither 
side was interested in third-party mediation he decided to back down, fearing that 
continued intervention would only damage Britain’s relationship with those two 
countries. 72   But the perception of the British ministers towards France gradually 
changed due to a series of events that occurred after the Egyptian crisis.  The vociferous 
French opposition towards the British actions in Egypt and Sudan frustrated the 
government, and it became even more alarmed when it learned that the French now aimed 
at seizing Madagascar.73  The French, from their perspective, were only reacting against 
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the British action in Egypt and Sudan; however the British could not help but perceive 
the French claim to an island that lay in the sea-lane between the Home Islands and India 
as being unfriendly.  And, as the British observers became more frustrated towards the 
French, they started to see the latter’s designs to strengthen their foothold in Southeast 
Asia – a region on the eastern flank of India – with more suspicion and concern.74 
The fact that the Qing decision-makers seemed to remain suspicious towards the 
Russians even after the resolution of the Ili crisis and were in a hostile relationship with 
the French over Annam made the British diplomats in East Asia somewhat relieved, as 
there was less likelihood for a cooperative relationship between the Qing and these 
European countries to develop.75  Due to the fact that the Qing military strength was 
improving, the British decision-makers now began to contemplate the possibility of 
forming an alliance with China, as they thought that such an arrangement would be useful 
in checking Russia and France from making any further advances in Asia.  Britain was 
adjusting to the China’s revival, just as Japan was. 
 
Closing Remarks on the Chapter 
 
After the Imo crisis, the Japanese decision-makers realised that the Qing was now much 
more determined to uphold its influence over those kingdoms which it regarded as 
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traditional vassals than in the previous decades.  In order to deal with this new 
circumstance, they were compelled to take some measures to check the growing Chinese 
influence in Korea, such as military expansion and encouragement of investments in that 
country.  At the same time, one should not assume that the Japanese started to pursue an 
assertive policy towards Korea and China after the summer of 1882.  The policy 
remained quite consistent with the line that they had pursued before the crisis, and the 
Japanese worked with a strong determination to avoid war against the Qing.  For this 
purpose, they were quite happy to bite their tongue over the Chinese claim of suzerainty 
as much as possible. 
The British did not feel the need to adjust their policies towards the Qing immediately 
after the Imo incident.  However, they became convinced after observing the series of 
events that occurred afterwards that they must take account of the fact that the Chinese 
were placing strong emphasis on upholding their influence as the traditional suzerain of 
East Asia.  Such determination was already visible from the way they dealt with the Ili 
and Imo crises, and in 1883 they chose to go to war with France to preserve their prestige 
in Annam and Tonkin.  By April 1884, the British diplomats and their superiors in 
London became aware that they might also get entangled in a military confrontation with 
the Qing if they openly objected to the Chinese claim of suzerainty.  As they were 
extremely reluctant to put Britain into such situation, they carefully chose not to do so 
when they were renegotiating some of the terms in the Anglo-Korean treaty in late 1883. 
Both the Japanese and the British were therefore becoming aware that the Qing 
presence in East Asia was increasing rather steadily, and in many cases they had to 
prioritise their relationship with this important regional power.  Furthermore, both of 
them actually thought that there was much to gain if they managed to win the goodwill 
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of the Qing.  From the Japanese point of view, it should also be remembered that their 
policy-making process was heavily influenced by their strong fear towards the Western 
imperialism.  Any positive images of the West as being a model of modern and 
progressive society were offset by the latter’s resort to gunboat diplomacy, unequal 
treaties, colonisation and imperialism.  In addition, by 1883 the Gaimushō was receiving 
numerous reports about Japanese migrant labourers being forced to work under very harsh 
conditions in various regions across the Pacific, which had the effect of making the 
Japanese see the West in general under a suspicious light.76  Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom – which claims that the Japanese were driven by their will to acquire colony in 
the region from the early times of the Meiji era – they continued to place significant 
emphasis on maintaining, and improving, their relationship with the Qing and the Chosŏn, 
with hope that they could cooperate with their neighbours to resist the potential Western 
expansionism. 
Meanwhile, the British perception towards the Qing was influenced by their relations 
with the other great powers.  They saw Russian actions across Eurasia with strong 
suspicion throughout the nineteenth century, and also the Anglo-French relationship had 
started to deteriorate around 1883 as a result of the Egyptian crisis that broke out in the 
previous year.  The fact that the Chinese had experienced, or were in the midst of, 
diplomatic disputes with Russia and France allowed them to see the Qing as a potential 
ally against the European empires which were not in a good relationship with the British.  
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The bottom line was that it seemed unlikely, at least at the present, that the Qing would 
form some kind of anti-British alliance with these two powers.  It was the Qing that the 
British government deemed as being the most important regional power in East Asia – 
not Japan. 
In addition, the Anglo-Japanese relationship remained far from being cordial, as they 
remained frustrated by each other’s attitudes over the question of treaty revision.  The 
Japanese government and its diplomats in Europe still perceived that the British and the 
French – the two European nations that had established trading relations with Japan earlier 
than any other country – were reluctant to amend the existing treaty.77  The Japanese 
government had already contemplating the idea of coming on to closer terms with 
Germany before 1882, but after the summer of that year they started to take this option 
more seriously, so that the latter could act as a wedge to divide Britain and France.78  
Aoki Shūzō, the Japanese Minister in Berlin, encouraged the government in taking such 
course on the grounds that Germany, as a latecomer to the European imperial competition, 
saw Britain and France as obstacles to its global expansion and therefore had an interest 
in cooperating with Japan against its rivals.79  Japanese diplomats and decision-makers 
felt somewhat betrayed when the German government did nothing to prevent the British 
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from submitting a counterproposal to Japan in the summer of 1883, which denied some 
of the demands that the Japanese had made in their initial proposal.80  However, the 
bottom line was that it was the British government that submitted this counterproposal, 
and therefore it was the British who still appeared to be the most unfriendly Western 
nation over this issue.81 
The Russians meanwhile seemed much more reasonable over the question of treaty 
revision than the British.82  The Japanese did not experience any serious diplomatic 
difficulty with them before the outbreak of the Kapsin coup.  The Japanese diplomats in 
Sakhalin often reported about the troubles that occurred between the Japanese fishermen 
and the local population, but by and large they argued that the Russian authorities had 
dealt with the issues cordially based on the framework of the Russo-Japanese treaty of 
1875.83  While it is true that many Japanese decision-makers continued to hold an image 
of Russia as being an expansionist empire which might have an interest in making 
territorial expansion in Korea,84 one should not overemphasise this point and assume that 
the Japanese considered Russia as the primary and only Western threat. 
This is not to say that there was absolutely no Anglo-Japanese cooperation in the early-
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82 Hanabusa to Inoue (機密信第三十一號), St. Petersburg, 4 Aug 1883, NGM, vol. 16, 
pp.74. 
83 Yoshida to Ōki (公第五三號), one enclosure, 23 May 1883, pp. 431-2; Yoshida to Ōki 
(公第六三號), 29 June 1883, pp. 436; Ōki to Yoshida (司法省第二六六五號), 31 May 1883, 
pp. 432-3; Yoshida to Ōki (公第六三號), 29 June 1883, pp. 436; Ōki to Yoshida (司法省第
三三七七號), 4 July 1883, pp. 436-7; Ōki to Yoshida (司法省第三三七七號), 4 July 1883, 
pp. 436-7.  All from NGM vol. 16. 
84 Kawamura to Sanjō (秘第七十二號), 15 Nov 1882, KSKKT SM 48-17; Minute by 
Wada and Imabashi (第百十一), 29 Jan 1883, KSKKT SM 48-18. 
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1880s.  The fact that the negotiations over treaty revision had made some progress after 
the preliminary session of the treaty revision conference in May 1882 did lead to some 
improvement in the Japanese impression of the Western nations, including Britain.  
After Parkes had left Japan in the summer of 1883, British legation members in Tokyo, 
such as Ernest Satow, began to contend that it was necessary to comply with some of the 
Japanese requests for treaty revision.85  Accordingly, the new Minister, Francis Plunkett, 
adopted a moderate line than his predecessor, and from that point on the legation and the 
Foreign Office were at least willing to discuss the Japanese proposals and work towards 
a new treaty that both the British and the Japanese could accept.86 
From the naval perspective, Britain was the country that the IJN had turned to its model 
for an ideal modern navy, and the Japanese officers and seamen were trained under a 
curriculum which was very similar to that of the Royal Navy.87  Moreover, the Japanese 
naval academy had now started sending their cadets across the Pacific on training ships 
as part of their curriculum, and the officers and cadets were often satisfied by the cordial 
reception they received from the local officials at various ports – most of them being 
British colonies such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand.88  Finally, 
as the Sino-French relationship had deteriorated to the brink of war by mid-1883, the 
                                                   
85 Memorandum by Satow on the Revision of the Treaty with Japan, London, Dec 1883 
(date unknown), FO 46/303. 
86 Ibid; Memorandum by Hatzfeldt (Translation), Berlin, 4 July 1883, communicated to 
Granville by Count Munster on 9 July; Count d’Aunay to Granville, London, 10 July 
1883 (rec. 12 July); Stuart to Granville (No. 130), The Hague, 4 Oct 1883 (rec. 5 Oct).  
All BDFA, Vol. 3. 
87 Hamish Ion, “Towards a Naval Alliance: Some Naval Antecedents to the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, 1854-1902,” in The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 26-47; Noboru 
Umetani, Noboru, Oyatoi Gaikokujin, (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2007; originally published 
1965), 104-110. 
88 Kawamura to Sanjō (往出第一六六六号), 26 Dec 1882, 海軍省-公文類纂-M15-4-625 
(JACAR C09115477500); Itō to Nire (龍第廿四号 旗計第六〇五号 受第二三五四号), 
Ryūjō (Shinagawa), 16 Sept 1883 (rec. 19 Sept), 海軍省-受号通覧-M16-17-17 (JACAR 
C10101125800).  Both from BKS. 
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British decision-makers started to feel the need for making some arrangement with the 
other treaty powers in China in order to protect the commercial ships of neutral nations, 
and the Japanese agreed to cooperate with the British over this issue.89 
However, while it is inaccurate to assume that the Anglo-Japanese relationship in the 
early-1880s was hostile, it is also undeniable that there were more cases that led to friction 
than cooperation.  Such was the state of the Anglo-Japanese relationship when the 
Kapsin coup broke out in December 1884.
                                                   
89 Yoshida to Inoue (機密信第六十號), Beijing, 19 Dec 1883 (rec. 9 Jan 1884), NGM, vol. 
16, pp. 673; Itō to Sanjō (Private), 2 Jan 1884, KSKKT SM 188-23. 
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Chapter 3 – East Asian Crises, Phase One: May 1884-October 1885 
 
By the spring of 1884, both the British and Japanese officials started to recognise that the 
Qing Empire was becoming increasingly influential in East Asia.  This impression was 
further enhanced after the East Asian crises from December 1884 to February 1887.  
After this series of events, they came to recognise that the Qing had emerged as the most 
powerful regional power in East Asia.  It was accordingly during this time that the 
governments involved in East Asian affairs at that time, including Britain and Japan, 
started to formulate policies in the clear recognition that it would be very difficult to 
uphold their interests in the region if they put themselves at odds with the Chinese.  This 
consequently led them to act in as conciliatory manner as possible towards the Qing claim 
of suzerainty over its traditional vassals, including Korea, as they considered it necessary 
to maintain the goodwill of the court in Beijing. 
It is therefore necessary to offer detailed analysis of how the Qing consolidated its 
prestige within this region during these vital years.  The period from April 1884 to 
February 1887 is therefore divided into two, as it is difficult to contain it in a single chapter.  
The third chapter will deal with the events that happened from April 1884 to October 
1885 – the period when war-scares loomed over East Asia – and will analyse how the 
Japanese and the British decision-makers dealt with these crises by acknowledging the 
Qing superiority in East Asia.  The fourth chapter will examine the period from 
November 1885 and February 1887, when the Chinese superiority in the region was 
further consolidated. 
As the years between December 1884 and February 1887 were ones of crises, there is 
no shortage of secondary literature on the events which happened in this period.  In 
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particular, there is an abundance of works on the Kapsin coup, due to the fact that 
Japanese imperialism towards Korea has attracted the interest of many historians in 
Japan.1  The problem about the existing historiography, though, is that few of these 
works explain the importance of regional events after this incident.  For example, 
despite the fact that there are a few secondary sources that deal in passing with the British 
occupation of Kŏmundo, they only attempt to offer a descriptive analysis of why the 
British decision-makers authorised their squadron in East Asia to occupy the islands on 
14 April 1885, and chose not to withdraw until 27 February 1887.2  More detailed 
analysis is needed on how precisely this incident influenced East Asian regional affairs.  
This is important because it appears that after the British occupation of the islands, 
Japanese decision-makers became convinced that relations between Britain and Russia 
were so tense that a war between these two countries would probably break out sooner or 
later, and that Japan must make adequate preparations as East Asia lest its independence 
                                                   
1 For general overviews of the Kapsin incident in English, see Deuchler, Confucian 
Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, ch. 11; Kim and Kim, Korea and the Politics of 
Imperialism, 46-58; Lee, West Goes East, 66-79; Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, vol. 1, 23-
30.  For the Japanese policies on this issue, see Banno, “Jingo/Kōshin Jihenki no 
Gaikō to Naisei”; Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 141-174; Nose, “Kōshin 
Seihen no Kenkyū (1)”; Peng, “Kōshin Jihen o Meguru Inoue Gaimukyō to Furansu 
Kōshi tono Kōshō”; Hidenao Takahashi, “Keiseiki Meiji Kokka to Chōsen Mondai – 
Kōshin Jihenki no Chōsen Seisaku no Seiji Gaikōshiteki Kentō,” Shigaku Zasshi, 98:3 
(Mar 1989): 1-37; Tabohashi, Kindai Nissen Kankei no Kenkyū, vol. 1, 904-923; 
Kentarō Yamabe, “Chōsen Kaikaku Undō to Kin Gyokukin – Kōshin Jihen ni 
Kanrenshite,” Rekishigaku Kenkyū, 247 (Nov 1960): 31-46.  For the Qing policy, see 
Banno, Kindai Chūgoku Seiji Gaikōshi 389-391; Larsen, Tradition, Treaties and Trade, 
124-7. 
2 Mon-pil Ahn, “Igirisu no Kyobuntō Senryō Jiken (1885-1887),” Daitō Bunka Daigaku 
Keizai Gakkai Keizai Ronshū, 26 (Mar 1977): 79-114; Young-Chung Kim, “The 
Kŏmundo Incident, 1885-1887,” Korean Observer, 20:3 (1984); Kobayashi, 19 Seiki 
Igirisu Gaikō to Higashi Ajia, ch. 4 section 3; Lee, West Goes East, ch. 5; Lensen, 
Balance of Intrigue, vol. 1, ch. 2; Takehiko Okuhira, “Eikan no Kyobuntō Senryō 
Jiken,” Chōsen, 215 (1933); Il-kŭn Pak, “Kyobuntō Jiken to Ri Kōshō no Taikan 
Seisaku,” Han, 106 (1987): 56-95;; Katsumi Watanabe, “Kyobuntō Gaikōshi,” Fusei 
Senmon Gakkō Kenkyū Nenpō Fusen Gakkai Ronshū, 1 (1934). 
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be threatened in such a conflict.3  One of the policies that they pursued in order to 
prepare for possible eventuality was to strengthen the military.4  But also, they became 
ever more convinced of the need to maintain a peaceful relationship with the Qing, in 
order to avoid any situation in which they would have to deal with a bellicose China and 
an Anglo-Russian war simultaneously.5 
Another incident during this period that deserves close analysis is the British expedition 
to Upper Burma from November to December 1885, which resulted in its annexation of 
this region.  As the Kingdom of Burma was another country that Qing claimed as its 
traditional vassal, the British had to negotiate very carefully in order to avoid losing the 
goodwill of the former, and to avoid falling into the same difficulty that the French and 
the Japanese had when they had intrigued in Annam and Korea.  This incident reinforced 
the British decision-makers in their conviction that they had to formulate their East Asian 
policy in the knowledge that the Qing decision-makers placed tremendous importance on 
their claim of suzerainty.  The Burmese affairs were therefore perceived as an important 
issue for East Asian politics at that time.  Yet, only Hakoda Keiko and Kobayashi Takao 
have looked at the importance of the Anglo-Chinese negotiations over Burma in terms of 
East Asian international politics.6  This dissertation will offer detailed analysis of this 
                                                   
3 Hidenao Takahashi, “1880 nendai no Chōsen Mondai to Kokusai Seiji – Nisshin 
Sensō eno Michi o Megutte,” Shirin, 71:6 (Nov 1988): 47-67. 
4 Ibid; articles by Hiroaki Ōsawa, the latest being “Chōsen Eisei Chūritsuka Kōsō to 
Nihon Gaikō.” 
5 Takahashi, Nisshin Sensō eno Michi, ch. 2; Ōsawa, “Tenshin Jōyaku Taisei no Keisei 
to Hōkai, 1885-94 (1),” 49-66; Hiroaki Ōsawa, “Tenshin Jōyaku Taisei no Keisei to 
Hōkai, 1885-94 (2),” Shakai Kagaku Kenkyū (Institute of Social Science, University of 
Tokyo), 43:4 (Dec 1991): 79-101; Saitō, Nisshin Sensō no Gunji Senryaku, 16. 
6 Keiko Hakoda, “Chūei ‘Biruma/Chibetto Kyōtei’ (1886 nen) no Haikei – Shinmatsu 
Chūgoku Gaikō no Seikaku o Meguru Ichikōsatsu,” Shirin, 88:2 (2005): 233-258; 
Kobayashi, 19 Seiki Igirisu Gaikō to Higashi Ajia, ch.4, section 4.  For works that offer 
analyses of the British motives behind the annexation of Upper Burma, see Aparna 
Mukherjee, British Colonial Policy in Burma: An Aspect of Colonialism in South-East 
Asia, 1840-1885, (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1998); D. P. Singhall, The 
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incident – based upon the primary research on the private papers of the British Cabinet 
ministers and diplomats at that time – in the fourth chapter. 
It should also be noted that most of the existing literature tends to focus on just one of 
the various individual events that occurred in the period from December 1884 to February 
1887.7  There are only a few historians who stress the importance of looking at these 
events as a whole and in sequence and examine how they influenced regional affairs 
generally during and after this period.8  By looking at the East Asian crises from this 
perspective, this thesis will argue that both the British and the Japanese governments 
made a definite shift from their previous ambivalence to prioritising their respective 
relationships with the Qing and choosing to react in a conciliatory manner to the re-
emergence of its power.  To some extent, they made that decision because they had no 
other option but to compromise on the suzerainty issue in order to avoid diplomatic 
isolation.  However, while there were many individuals in Britain and Japan who saw 
this as humiliating, the individuals who mattered most within their respective diplomatic 
policy-making circles did not consider these concessions as coming at too high a cost if 
                                                   
Annexation of Upper Burma, (Singapore: Easter University Press, 1960); Nicholas 
Tarling, Imperialism in Southeast Asia: ‘A Fleeting, Passing Phase,’ (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2001); Anthony J. Webster, “Business and Empire: A Reassessment of 
the British Conquest of Burma in 1885,” Historical Journal, 43 (2000): 1003-25.  For 
works on the experiences of local Burmese population, see John F. Cady, A History of 
Modern Burma, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958); Myint-U Thant, The 
Making of Modern Burma, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
7 There are many historians that start or end their books after analysis of the Kapsin 
coup, thus not engaging with the entire sequence of crises.  See, for example, 
Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys; Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, 
vol. 1.  Also, while Lee Yur-bok’s West Goes East deals with the events after 1885 to 
some extent, it is largely devoted to the analysis of Möllendorff ’s career in Korea, which 
ended in September 1885. 
8 These few works include Banno, Kindai Chūgoku Seiji Gaikōshi; Kobayashi, 19 Seiki 
Igirisu Gaikō to Higashi Ajia; Larsen, Tradition, Treaty and Trade; Okamoto, Zokkoku 
to Jishu no Aida; Tabohashi, Kindai Nissen Kankei no Kenkyū, 2 vols; Takahashi, 
Nisshin Sensō eno Michi. 
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they would help to re-establish long-term stability in East Asia.  It goes without saying 
that such consideration inevitably influenced the Anglo-Japanese relations in those years. 
 
The Kapsin Incident and Its Aftermath, December 1884-April 1885 
 
Unlike in 1882, when Japan was the victim of a xenophobic riot in Seoul, there is ample 
evidence that the Japanese in Korea were involved in the coup organised by the radical 
progressive party of the Chosŏn.  Inoue Kakugorō, a protégé of Fukuzawa Yukichi who 
had set up a newspaper company in Korea, was involved in drawing up the plan with the 
radical progressives, as well as some other fellow Japanese residents in the capital.9  
Whereas Hilary Conroy has argued that these Japanese collaborators participated in the 
plot without the approval of the government, most other historians do not think that this 
was the case.10  Just before Takezoe left Tokyo on 20 October 1884 to return to Seoul 
after a leave of absence, Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru told his Minister to the Chosŏn 
court that perhaps a “little shock therapy” against the pro-Qing camp might be effective 
in checking Chinese influence and improving the Japanese foothold in Korea, even if that 
might led to some temporary friction.11  The questions posed by the researchers circulate 
around why Inoue gave such an instruction when it was so inconsistent with the line of 
                                                   
9 For an overview on the outbreak of the coup, see Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of 
Korea, 144-159; Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, 205-7; Kim 
and Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 49-51; Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, 
vol. 1, 25-6; Tabohashi, Kindai Nissen Kankei no Kenkyū, vol. 1, pp. 924-6; Takahashi, 
“Keiseiki Meiji Kokka to Chōsen Mondai,” 8-10. 
10 Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 147. 
11 Takahashi, “Keiseiki Meiji Kokka to Chōsen Mondai,” 7-8.  Takahashi cited Takezoe 
to Enomoto (Private), 22 Oct 1884, Enomoto Takeaki Kankei Monjo (Papers Related to 
Enomoto Takeaki), kept at KSKKT.  Also see Peng, “Kōshin Jihen o Meguru Inoue 
Gaimukyō to Furansu Kōshi tono Kōshō,” 36: Tabohashi, Kindai Nissen Kankei no 
Kenkyū, vol. 1, 925-6.  They cite Yoshida Kiyonari Monjo (Papers of Yoshida Kiyonari) 
98, kept at Kyoto University Museum. 
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policy that the Japanese government had hitherto pursued.  Until late-1884, the Japanese 
had been careful not to take any action that might lead to a serious deterioration of their 
relationship with the Qing.  There is no evidence which indicates that Takezoe was 
already on close terms with the radical progressives and neither had the members of the 
Japanese legation in Chosŏn previously endeavoured to improve its relationship with this 
anti-Qing faction.12  In addition, it is important to observe that around the time that 
Takezoe departed from Japan, the Japanese government made an official declaration of 
neutrality in regard to the Sino-French War, which meant that the Japanese formally 
refused to cooperate with the war aims of a country that was in a hostile relationship with 
the Qing.13 
To provide an answer to this question, historians have paid close attention to the 
international situation that surrounded East Asia in late 1884.  In the autumn of 1884, 
the situation in Korea seemed somewhat more worrying for the Japanese decision-makers 
than earlier in that year.  By this time, the Chinese merchants in Korea – who had started 
to arrive at Korea after the signing of the Sino-Korean commercial regulation in 1882 – 
were growing into a significant community.14  As their numbers increased, incidents 
between them and the Japanese also grew.  One of those cases involved Inoue Kakugorō, 
who reported about the murder of a local Korean in Seoul by a Qing soldier in his 
newspaper on 30 January 1884.  Chen Shutang, the Qing agent in Seoul, immediately 
                                                   
12 NGM, vols 16 and 17.  Most of the archival materials relevant to the Kapsin 
incident in GS 1-1-2-3-25 (JACAR B03030193100) are included in NGM vols 16 and 17.  
Unless specified, this chapter will use only the NGM when citing official diplomatic 
correspondence. 
13 Inoue to Yamada (Private), 25 Oct 1884, YHM, vol. 7, pp. 212-9.  This document 
also contains a draft of the declaration of neutrality as an enclosure.  Also see Nose, 
“Kōshin Seihen no Kenkyū,” 133-160; Peng, “Kōshin Jihen o Meguru Inoue Gaimukyō 
to Furansu Kōshi tono Kōshō,” 36-7. 
14 Larsen, Tradition, Treaty and Trade, 106-123. 
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raised a protest against what he considered as being a completely groundless accusation, 
and Inoue Kakugorō in the end had to resign his post as the editor.15 
There were then good reasons for many Japanese individuals living in Korea to see the 
increase of Qing influence with a strong sense of concern.  And, despite this, the 
Japanese foothold remained very small.  In 1882, Chosŏn officials had requested the 
Daiichi National Bank to support them in establishing a mint, and the latter had started 
purchasing machinery and the raw copper necessary for this, but in early 1884 the Chosŏn 
court cancelled the project without providing any compensation, resulting in a significant 
loss for the bank.16  No matter how much the Japanese government and diplomats tried 
to encourage investment, the major entrepreneurs in Japan were still reluctant to invest in 
Korea as such incidents continued to ward them off. 
Considering the fact that military reform had only begun in Japan, it is difficult to 
imagine that important decision-makers such as Itō and Inoue were bent on war.  Yet, it 
seems that the escalation of the Sino-French dispute over Annam made the Japanese 
government think that the Qing would have to devote a significant degree of attention to 
Southeast Asia instead of Korea.  Indeed, in August 1884 the court in Beijing ordered 
Li Hongzhang to withdraw some of his troops from Korea so that they could be 
transferred to Tonkin. 17   This environment thus might have induced the Japanese 
decision-makers to assume that the Qing would not be able to respond if Japan took more 
assertive measures towards Korea than before.18 
                                                   
15 Ibid, 98-9; Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 140-1. 
16 This incident is reported retrospectively in “25th Half-Annual Report of the Daiichi 
National Bank,” Jan 1886, SEDS, vol. 16, pp. 34-6. 
17 Banno, Kindai Chūgoku Seiji Gaikōshi, 390; Tabohashi, Kindai Nissen Kankei no 
Kenkyū, vol. 1, 877; Takahashi, “Keiseiki Meiji Kokka to Chōsen Mondai,” 8-9. 
18 Banno, “Jingo/Kōshin Jihenki no Gaikō to Naisei,” 600-1; Peng, “Kōshin Jihen o 
Meguru Inoue Gaimukyō to Furansu Kōshi tono Kōshō,” 36-7; Tabohashi, Kindai 
Nissen Kankei no Kenkyū, vol. 1, 904-5, 922-3, 927-930; Takahashi, “Keiseiki Meiji 
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When Takezoe learned immediately after his arrival on 30 October that the ministers 
within the Min faction, who were generally regarded as pro-Qing, were plotting a purge 
of the radical progressives, he became more convinced than ever that he must execute a 
strong shock therapy.19  He sent a dispatch on 12 November, which asked for approval 
to support a coup by the radical progressives, but when this reached Tokyo two weeks 
later the ministers and officials of the Japanese government considered this scheme as 
being too reckless and instructed him to refrain from taking such a course.20  However, 
since the Japanese government had permitted Takezoe to engage in measures that were 
somewhat more assertive than in the past, he acted on his own initiative before the 
instruction reached him.21 
The problem was that Inoue and Takezoe had grossly underestimated the Qing’s 
military manoeuvrability.  The radical progressives launched their coup on 4 December, 
and the Japanese Minister was present at the royal palace with his legation guards when 
they declared the establishment of the new government.22  But the regime lasted only 
for two days.  After the Queen managed to escape from the scene, she requested support 
from Yuan Shikai, a commander of the Qing army in Korea, and his troops stormed the 
palace. 23   The Japanese government, which was completely unprepared to make a 
                                                   
Kokka to Chōsen Mondai,” 8-10; Yamabe, “Chōsen Kaikaku Undō to Kin Gyokukin,” 
31-46. 
19 Yoshida to Inoue (Unnumbered, draft of a telegraph instruction that he was about to 
send to Seoul under the name of him and Itō), Gaimushō, 28 Nov 1884; Takezoe to Itō 
and Inoue (Unnumbered), Seoul, 12 Nov 1884, both from NGS, vol. 3, pp. 3-6. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Itō and Yoshida to Takezoe, 28 Nov 1884, NGS, vol. 3, pp. 3-4. 
22 Takezoe to Yoshida (特別機密第二號), Seoul, 9 Dec 1884; Takezoe to Inoue (特別機密
第三號), 1 enclosure, Seoul, 12 Dec 1884, both from NGM, vol. 17, pp. 326-333.  Also 
see the memoir of Kim Ok-kyun, 甲申日録 (Kapsin Ilrok), available in FYD, vol. 3.  
Lee, West Goes East, 74; Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, vol. 1, 26-7; Tabohashi, Kindai 
Nissen Kankei no Kenkyū, vol. 1, 946-957; Takahashi, “Keiseiki Meiji Kokka to Chōsen 
Mondai,” 6. 
23 Ibid.  Tabohashi cited telegraphs sent by the Commander Murakami, who was in 
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determined commitment, learned about the incident after the badly-outnumbered 
Japanese and the radical progressives had all been driven out.24  After his efforts had 
failed, Takezoe denied any involvement in the coup and claimed that he had been at the 
royal palace with the troops only because King Kojong had requested protection from the 
Japanese legation, but no diplomat in Seoul took this argument seriously.  Unlike in the 
case of 1882, the Western nations now had diplomats in Seoul, and all of them, including 
the British Consul-General William Aston, were convinced that the Japanese had pulled 
the strings behind the incident. 25   Takezoe’s efforts resulted only in the complete 
elimination of the radical progressives – something that he desperately wanted to avoid – 
and the Japanese became isolated in Korea. 
From this point on, the Japanese ministers and senior officials recognised that they 
were no longer in a position to strengthen their influence in Korea.  All they could do 
was to minimise the damage incurred by their involvement in the failed plot and try to 
escape from diplomatic isolation as quickly as possible.  It was therefore decided on 19 
December in a ministerial meeting in Tokyo that Inoue would be sent to Seoul in order to 
negotiate a peace treaty, in which the Japanese government would demand an indemnity 
from the Chosŏn court and an apology for the damages and deaths caused by the new 
                                                   
charge of the Japanese legation guards in Seoul, sent on 12 Dec 1884 as a source.  
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Tabohashi also cited Report by Wu Dachen, the Chinese agent in Korea available in 光
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24 Inoue to Itō (Private), 7 Dec 1884, IHKM, vol. 1, pp. 188; Yoshida to Inoue 
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domestic insurrection in that country.26  The ministers also agreed that they needed to 
negotiate with the Qing separately for the mutual and simultaneous withdrawal of troops 
from Korea, and would demand the punishment of the Qing military officials if there was 
clear evidence that they had initiated an assault.  In other words, they decided to try 
shifting the point at issue to the Chosŏn court’s failure to prevent disorder and its inability 
to protect foreigners in Korea, so that they could avoid being held responsible for the 
outbreak of the coup.27 
The Chosŏn negotiators were naturally reluctant to accept such terms, which essentially 
made them responsible for a coup that had in part been instigated by the Japanese.28  
Takahashi has also suggested that the domestic situation in Japan made the negotiations 
more difficult, as the Japanese government could not afford to compromise due to the fear 
that such an action could lead to an explosion of popular dissatisfaction.29  By late 1884, 
the political awareness of the Japanese public was becoming much stronger than in the 
past.  The government had already declared that it would issue a constitution and open 
a Diet by 1889, and also the Jiyū Minken Undō (Movement for Freedom and Popular 
Rights) was becoming increasingly popular.  In October 1881 Japan had seen the birth 
of its first modern political party – the Jiyūtō (Liberal Party) – and six months later the 
                                                   
26 Itō Miyoji to Itō (Private), 12 Dec 1884, IHKM, vol. 2, pp. 31-2; Inoue to Sanjō 
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Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 154-8; Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and 
Barbarian Envoys, 208-9; Kim and Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 49-53; 
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Rikken Kaishintō (Constitutional Progressive Party) followed suit under the leadership of 
Ōkuma Shigenobu, who was looking for a means to recoup his influence after being 
ousted from the government.30  The number of newspapers circulating in Japan also 
increased in the 1880s as the parties started to issue them as a means to win support.31  
By this time, therefore, the Japanese decision-makers had to be more conscious about the 
opposition outside of the government.  When the news about the Kapsin incident spread 
across Japan, many in the press argued that the Qing was imposing an obsolete tradition 
on the Chosŏn court, thus impeding the progress of modernisation, and concluded that 
the influence of the former must be wiped out even if this required a military campaign.32  
The Japanese ministers were aware that many individuals within the military were 
receptive to this opinion, and considered some of the ministers, such as Kuroda Kiyotaka, 
as long-term supporters of a hardline policy towards Korea.33  Despite the fact that the 
bargaining power of the Japanese government was much weaker than it had been in 1882, 
they had to be firm about denying their responsibility for this incident. 
By late-December, the negotiations hit deadlock.  Although Inoue and most of his 
colleagues were not bent on war, the Japanese ministers believed that they had no 
alternative but to prepare for the mobilisation of the military and intimidate the Chosŏn 
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negotiators in order to succeed in the negotiations.34  Ironically, it was the Qing officials 
who helped them to smoothen the talks, just as in 1882.  On 4 January 1885, the Chosŏn 
negotiators reluctantly agreed to draw up a draft peace convention based upon the 
Japanese demands, as they had learned three days prior that Li Hongzhang had no interest 
in using his military against the Japanese on their behalf. Instead he had advised them 
that they should avoid attempting to hold the Japanese government responsible for the 
outbreak of the Kapsin coup.35   Inoue, in return, promised that he would limit the 
indemnity to 110,000 yen – much lower than the figure that had been demanded in 1882, 
despite the fact that the number of Japanese victims in 1884 was larger.36  In addition, 
while Inoue never accepted responsibility in front of the Chosŏn negotiators, he 
understood that the latter were extremely suspicions towards Takezoe and therefore 
ordered the latter to return to Japan for good.37  While the Chosŏn ministers could hardly 
accept this as a satisfactory compromise, it was enough to send a signal to them and the 
Qing that the Japanese government would not make further demands over this issue, and 
this message was duly recognised. 38   The Japanese-Korean peace agreement – the 
Hansŏng Convention – was signed on 9 January 1885. 
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As the talks with the Chosŏn court ended, the Japanese government started to prepare 
for the more important negotiations with the Qing.  By this time, ministers and senior 
officials of the Gaimushō were receiving additional reports which indicated that some of 
the Japanese residents in Seoul had been killed not only by Korean mobs but also by Qing 
troops, and therefore thought that some form of resolution over this issue must be 
reached. 39   Moreover, they needed to negotiate with the Qing over the issue of a 
simultaneous withdrawal of troops from Korea, and also wanted to hammer out an 
agreement in order to avoid another similar outbreak in the future.40 
Yet, it was now becoming even more difficult for Itō and Inoue to maintain a 
conciliatory policy towards the Qing than it had been a month before because the popular 
outcry had become even stronger.41  On 18 January there was a rally of about 3,000 
people in Tokyo calling for a war against the Qing, and the police narrowly prevented the 
protestors from setting fire to the headquarters of Chōya Shinbun, a newspaper which was 
regarded as being too conciliatory. 42   Government ministers were also receiving 
memoranda from various individuals outside of the government who advocated war.43  
In addition, Itō and Inoue had to be sensitive about the hardliners within the government.44  
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They were well aware that they were not universally popular, due to the fact that they had 
assumed leadership of the government as a result of the overthrow of Ōkuma and his 
supporters in 1881, and that this included many within the Satsuma faction.45  Their 
opponents were thus looking for an opportunity to regain their influence, and an assertive 
policy towards Korea was one of the means to attack Itō’s faction.  Finally, as many of 
the individuals in the Japanese military were already of the opinion that a Sino-Japanese 
war over Korea was inevitable, they became more convinced after the Kapsin coup that 
they should start a conflict sooner than later, before the Qing could further utilise China’s 
abundant resources and wealth to strengthen its military.46 
By around the first week of February, Itō and Inoue were finally able to suppress the 
hardliners. 47   The fledgling Japanese political parties were still powerless against 
newspaper censorship, police persecution and outright intrigue, such as bribery of the 
leaders of the parties. 48   Moreover, the hardliners within the government did not 
constitute a majority and thus could not cast an overwhelming influence over the decision-
making process.49  In addition, Saigō Jūdō, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce 
who, as the younger brother of Saigō Takamori, wielded significant influence within the 
Satsuma faction, was able to act as a mediator between the hardliners and Itō.50 
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The government therefore managed to maintain the line of policy it wished to pursue, 
which was to re-stabilise the environment surrounding Korea by requesting the 
simultaneous withdrawal of troops and also by making some agreement that could serve 
as a basis to uphold the Sino-Japanese relationship in a peaceful manner.  Still, Itō and 
Inoue had to make some compromises to the hardliners.  First, they promised that if the 
Qing decision-makers would not agree to the mutual withdrawal of troops from Korea, 
then the Japanese government would send reinforcements so that the numbers of their 
troops in Korea would be roughly equal to that of the Qing.51  Second, they agreed to 
stiffen their attitude over the issue of the death of Japanese troops and residents in Seoul 
and to demand the punishment of the Qing commander who was leading the troops when 
the incident had occurred, instead of demanding that the Qing officials merely investigate 
whether the Qing soldiers had fired the first shot or not.52  On 28 February, Itō departed 
for Tianjin as an envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary and arrived on 14 March.53 
The negotiations proved to be very difficult.54  The Qing negotiators were reluctant 
to accommodate the Japanese request to punish their military commander, when 
Takezoe’s involvement in the Kapsin coup had by then become an open secret.55  Also, 
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just as Itō and Inoue had had to suppress hardliners, Li Hongzhang, who acted as the chief 
negotiator at Tianjin, had to struggle against the influence of conservatives in the Qing 
decision-making circle in order to uphold his conciliatory policy towards Korea and Japan.  
The influence of those individuals who advocated taking a firm attitude against any 
external power that posed a threat to China’s suzerainty over its neighbours had already 
become quite significant by the late-1870s. 56   After the hardliner Prince Chun had 
replaced his older brother Prince Gong – the former leading figure in the Zongli Yamen 
and a supporter of Li’s conciliatory approach to foreign affairs – in mid-1884, Li’s 
position within the Qing decision-making circle became more vulnerable than before.57  
At one point, the Sino-Japanese negotiations came to the verge of breakdown, when Li 
insisted on 12 April that there should be an agreement which obliged the King of Chosŏn 
to consult his suzerain before anyone else when he was under threat.58  This comment 
led to a strong reaction from Itō as he thought that such an agreement would allow Qing 
influence in Korea to become even stronger.59 
However, the negotiations did not break down as they were conducted by individuals 
who were determined to avoid the outbreak of war, even if both Itō and Li felt the need 
to accommodate some of the hardliners’ sentiments.  The former was fortunately 
supported by Inoue and the senior officials of the Gaimushō at home, while the Qing 
hardliners were not influential enough to dominate the decision-making circle.60  Li and 
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Itō came to a preliminary settlement on 14 April, and the Tianjin convention was signed 
four days later.61  They agreed that:  
 
1. Governments of Qing and Japan would withdraw their troops within four months; 2. They 
would encourage the Chosŏn government to hire military advisors from Western countries 
while refraining from sending their own; 3. Both countries would retain the right to resend 
the troops when the situation rendered it absolutely impossible for the Chosŏn to maintain 
its territorial integrity on its own.  In such a case, they had to send a document to the other 
signatory which would state when the troops would be sent and in what quantity.62 
 
Over the issue of the punishment of the officer, Li told Itō that he could not punish his 
commander unless there was clear evidence that he had ordered his troops to open fire at 
the Japanese soldiers, but he nonetheless promised that the commander would receive 
some reprimand for his carelessness.63 
The Tianjin Convention came under strong popular criticism in Japan, but there were 
many reasons for Itō, Inoue and the Gaimushō to see it as being satisfactory.  First and 
foremost, they were able to avoid war, and second, the Japanese government evaded being 
held responsible by the Qing and Chosŏn for their involvement in the coup.  They also 
received the right to send troops to Korea in case of an emergency if they informed the 
Qing in advance.  As the Japanese had managed to avoid being punished despite 
                                                   
Kōshō, 146. 
61 Itō and Li agreed on 16 April that the convention would be signed and ratified two 
days later.  O’Conor to Granville (No. 27 Telegraphic), Beijing, 16 Apr 1885 (rec. 17 
Apr), FO 17/987; O’Conor to Granville (No. 166), Beijing, 16 Apr 1885 (rec. 16 June), 
FO 17/979; Yoshida to Inoue (Private), 17 Apr 1885, KSKKT IKM 594-4.  See also 
Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, vol. 1, 27-29. 
62 Minute of conversation between Itō and Li, held at Tianjin, 15 Apr 1885, NGM, 
vol.18, pp. 290-305; Itō to Inoue (Telegraphic), Tianjin, 16 Apr 1885, NGM, vol. 18, pp. 
306; O’Conor to Granville (No. 166), Beijing, 16 Apr 1885 (rec. 16 June), FO 17/979.  
Lee, West Goes East, 79. 
63 Ibid. 
131 
 
instigating a coup, and as the Qing had to agree to withdraw troops from Korea, Kirk 
Larsen argues that the Tianjin Convention was a diplomatic failure on Li’s side. 64  
However, this argument neglects the fact that the Japanese foothold in Korea – which was 
not so big to begin with – had already shrunk by the time Li and Itō sat down at the 
negotiating table, as the radical progressives had been driven out of the Chosŏn court in 
December 1884.  The Tianjin Convention in essence provided the written consent of the 
Japanese government to recognise the current position – in which the Qing enjoyed 
superiority in Korea – as the status quo and that it would not attempt to amend this 
situation through the use of force.  Such an agreement was the price that the Japanese 
government had to pay to the Qing in order to get out of the diplomatic isolation that they 
had created for themselves as a result of their ill-prepared involvement in the Kapsin coup.  
For Li, who wanted to expand Qing influence in Korea without using the military, the 
result was quite satisfactory and all the compromises that he gave to the Japanese were 
tolerable.  More importantly, the convention provided a basis to prevent future Sino-
Japanese confrontation over Korea, which was something that Li, Itō and Inoue all wanted.  
The Sino-Japanese tension was further reduced as both of these countries acted upon the 
agreement and withdrew their troops by July 1885.65 
The Sino-Japanese crisis over Korea was thus settled satisfactorily.  However, just as 
one war-scare subsided, another one started to threaten East Asia.  An Anglo-Russian 
war-scare was unleashed as the result of a skirmish between Russian and Afghan troops 
in a region called Penjdeh in Central Asia in mid-March 1885.  This development had a 
significant effect on East Asian affairs, as the British government authorised its squadron 
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to occupy Kŏmundo on 14 April. 
 
The British Occupation of Kŏmundo 
 
There are some articles in Japanese language that argue that the British government had 
nurtured an ambition to seize Kŏmundo ever since its diplomats and naval officers 
recommended occupation of these islands ten years previously. 66   This argument 
overlooks the simple fact that the latter’s opinions had never convinced the decision-
makers in London, and also ignores the general line of policy that Britain hitherto had 
pursued in Korea, if not East Asia.  The British government had not placed any East 
Asian territory under even temporary control after it acquired Kowloon in 1860.  Even 
in the late-1870s, when they started to see Russian activities in Asia with a stronger sense 
of suspicion, the senior officials of the Foreign Office were cautious about taking any 
action because they feared that this might provoke a negative reaction from the Chosŏn 
court.  Just as the Japanese decision-makers chose to undertake a policy in late-1884 
which was markedly different than that they had pursued for much of the past five years, 
the decision made in April 1885 was inconsistent with Britain’s long-term policy trend.  
To understand why the British government chose to undertake the occupation of 
Kŏmundo, despite the fact that such an action was clearly highly provocative, one must 
shed light on the political environment that surrounded the Liberal administration at that 
time. 
The direct cause of the British occupation of Kŏmundo was the Anglo-Russian war-
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scare which was unleashed across the British Empire from 30 March as a result of the 
Penjdeh crisis in Central Asia.67  Already by the early-1880s, the territorial dispute 
between Russia and Afghanistan – a country which at that time was under heavy influence 
from British India – over Merv was becoming a serious diplomatic question between 
Britain and Russia.  The British officials considered the region as an important buffer 
between Russian Central Asia and India, as the local rulers controlled a network of roads 
and paths through the rugged terrain.  And when the British decision-makers learned 
that the chiefs of Merv had agreed at the point of a gun to be incorporated into Russia in 
February 1884, Anglo-Russian relations over Central Asia became inevitably tenser.68  
After being shocked by the news, the British concluded they should negotiate the 
delineation of Central Asian spheres of influence with the Russian government, and talks 
began from October 1884.69 
Despite wanting to avoid future complications over Central Asia, British Cabinet 
ministers were convinced that they must remain firm with the Russians.  This in large 
part reflected the public mood. The British public was becoming increasingly critical 
towards the Liberal administration, as they believed that it was failing to make adequate 
preparations to prevent Russian encroachment towards British India.70  It should also be 
remembered that the British campaign in Egypt by this point had escalated into an 
attempted occupation of Sudan.  Not only did this continue to strain the Anglo-French 
relationship, but it was also becoming a huge drain on the Treasury.  This campaign had 
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started to excite public opinion, and there was a popular jingo sentiment which demanded 
that the government not withdraw before the local rebels had been thoroughly defeated.  
If the Liberal administration had ever dreamt of possible withdrawal from Sudan in the 
near future, this was now impossible.  It could not afford to weaken its political base 
anymore – particularly when it was already facing difficulties in Parliament over the 
question of Irish Home Rule.  This background made the administration even more 
reluctant to make compromises over the Central Asian negotiations.71  For example, the 
Earl of Kimberley, the Secretary of State for India, wrote several letters in late February 
1885 which expressed his concern that the government had no other option but to go to 
war if the negotiations over Afghan boundary failed to produce a satisfactory result.72  
In particular, the British and Russian negotiators disputed fiercely over whose sphere of 
influence Penjdeh belonged to, as it was adjacent to Merv and was considered to be a 
region of vital strategic importance. 
In the face of this growing Anglo-Russian tension, the Foreign Office and the 
Admiralty started to examine what kind of consequences a war might create for British 
interests across the world.  The situation looked worrying in East Asia due to the fact 
that the Kapsin coup had recently destabilised the regional order. 73   Under these 
circumstances, the Admiralty had already in December 1884 ordered Vice-Admiral Sir 
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William Dowell, the Commander-in-Chief of China Squadron, to move some warships to 
the waters adjacent to Kŏmundo with orders to report if Russian vessels were making any 
suspicious manoeuvres. 74   Around the same time, the Foreign Office asked the 
Admiralty whether it saw the islands as providing any strategic advantage, as Parkes had 
argued in 1875.75  The survey was conducted by an officer under Dowell’s command, 
Lieutenant-Commander Reginald Carey-Brenton, and his report, which reached London 
in mid-February, argued strongly in favour of occupation in case of the outbreak of war.  
He reported that Kŏmundo lay in an important location, and then added that the 
topography of the islands rendered it quite easy for an occupying force to fortify.76  The 
report by Carey-Brenton was deemed more comprehensive and detailed than the one that 
Sir George Willes had written in 1883 when he had been the Commander-in-Chief of 
China Squadron – a report that was highly sceptical about the strategic value of the islands 
– and senior officials in the Admiralty therefore argued that an occupation should be 
undertaken if war broke out.77  By the end of February 1885 the Foreign Office was also 
convinced of the strategic importance of Kŏmundo. 
Meanwhile, the difficult negotiations over the delineation of the frontier between India 
and Russian Central Asia continued to strain the Anglo-Russian relationship.  And when 
the news that Russian and Afghan troops patrolling the vicinity of Penjdeh had collided 
                                                   
74 The Secretary to the Admiralty to Currie (No. M3122), Admiralty, 18 Dec 1884, ADM 
116/70; Granville to Parkes (No. 308), FO, 31 Dec 1884, FO 17/947. 
75 Parkes to Granville (No. 50 Telegraphic), Beijing, 14 Dec 1884, (rec. 14 Dec), FO 
17/954. 
76 Carey-Brenton to Commander Hippesley (Confidential), Merlin (Shanghai), 26 Dec 
1884.  Enclosure to; Dowell to the Secretary to the Admiralty (No. 12), Audacious at 
Hong Kong, 6 Jan 1885, ADM 1/6757. 
77 Ibid; Willes to the Secretary of the Admiralty (No. 463), Iron Duke (Zhifu), 21 Sept 
1882, ADM 1/6618; Currie to the Secretary to the Admiralty, FO, 15 Jan 1885, (rec. 16 
Jan), ADM 116/70; Thornton to Granville (No. 11), St. Petersburg, 19 Jan 1885, ADM 
116/70. 
136 
 
with each other reached London on 30 March, it unleashed a war-scare across the British 
Empire.78  As the possibility of an Anglo-Russian war started to look more realistic, 
senior officials of the Foreign Office started to consider whether the occupation of 
Kŏmundo would be possible without causing a reaction from the Qing and Japanese 
governments.  The reports that they received from Francis Plunkett, who served as the 
British Minister in Tokyo from 1884 to 1887, indicated that the Japanese government was 
perturbed by the recent intensification of the Anglo-Russian tensions.  He observed that 
the Japanese were concerned that if an Anglo-Russian war broke out then the British and 
Russians might ask the Japanese government to open their ports to shelter or repair their 
respective warships and crews, and that if they allowed this for one side then the other 
would see this as a hostile act.79  Yet, Japanese decision-makers were not confident about 
their military being strong enough to risk a war against either of the European great 
powers.80  Compared to this, the response from the Qing officials seemed much more 
pro-British.  Halliday Macartney, a British national who served as a secretary at the Qing 
legation in London, called on the Foreign Office on 8 April 1885 and told senior officials 
that “if Port Hamilton was to be occupied by Russia or England, China would prefer that 
England should be the Power to take possession of it….  [T]he matter could without 
difficulty be arranged with China.”81 
Until 11 April, there are several documents that indicate that while the ministers felt 
that Anglo-Russian tensions had become very serious as a result of the Penjdeh incident, 
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they still thought that the outbreak of war could be averted.82  However, on that day it 
was decided at a Cabinet meeting that Kŏmundo should be occupied if an Anglo-Russian 
war would break out. 83   The ministers and senior officials of the government 
bureaucracies then started to discuss the state of the Anglo-Russian relationship with a 
stronger sense of concern from that point on.  On 12 April, the Foreign Office came to 
the conclusion that it must urge the Russian government to withdraw its troops from 
Pendjeh at once before any negotiations over the current Central Asian crisis could 
commence.84  Meanwhile, senior officials in the Admiralty started to discuss the menace 
that an Anglo-Russian war would pose to British trade across Eurasia.85  The Earl of 
Dufferin and Ava, the Governor-General of India, also wrote a long letter which argued 
that, considering the rugged terrain and harsh climate of Afghanistan, it would be very 
difficult to send an adequate number of troops swiftly to Penjdeh to confront the 
Russians.86 
There is, though, no document that offers a direct explanation of why the Earl of 
Northbrook, the First Lord of Admiralty, authorised Dowell to make a pre-emptive 
seizure of Kŏmundo on 14 April.87  When the Foreign Office explained the decision to 
Zeng Jize, the Qing Minister in London, it contended that as the Anglo-Russian 
relationship had deteriorated much quicker than they had expected, they had found it 
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necessary to swiftly occupy Kŏmundo in order to prevent these islands, which had such 
a vital strategic importance in East Asia, from falling under Russian control.88  However, 
Northbrook offered an alternative explanation.  He argued retrospectively in July 1885 
that he had authorised the occupation because there was no other way in which Britain 
could put pressure on the Russian government so that the latter would be discouraged to 
forward their troops in Penjdeh further to the south.89 
This explanation was linked to the fact that in the early-1880s, Otto von Bismarck, the 
German Chancellor, had managed to reconstruct the relationship between Germany, 
Austria-Hungary and Russia, which had become somewhat strained after the former two 
countries had failed to stand on the latter’s side during the Russo-Turkish War.90  It was 
therefore unlikely that the German and Austro-Hungarian governments would permit the 
British to send warships into the Baltic and Black Seas as a means of coercing the Russian 
government into pulling back from Penjdeh.  Northbrook thus contended that Kŏmundo 
was the only place that was available for the British government to take such action.  It 
is also interesting to note that there is a journal article in The Spectator written in 1886 
which also argued that the British government decided to occupy Kŏmundo because it 
thought it was necessary to take a pre-emptive effective measure to check the Russian 
southward advance in Asia.91 
However, the direct cause of the occupation remains unclear.  While it is difficult to 
assume think that Northbrook authorised the occupation without the approval of his 
colleagues in the Cabinet, there is also evidence that suggests that some of the important 
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ministers such as Kimberley and the Prime Minister William Gladstone were not 
necessarily supportive of the occupation, as they assumed that the Russians would not 
take such an action lightly.92  These documents imply that they were frustrated because 
Northbrook had demanded this action be taken, which unnecessarily raised the tension 
between them and the Russians, when they were negotiating hard to avoid war.  What is 
clear is that the British decision-makers were under such tension in the days between 11 
to 14 April that the environment could easily have induced the First Lord of Admiralty to 
demand that Britain had to take naval action as swiftly as possible. 
 
The Anglo-Russian War-Scare and East Asia, April-September 1885 
 
No matter what the reason behind the occupation, the fact was that Kŏmundo was 
occupied by the China Squadron.  As this event made Anglo-Russian relations even 
tenser, the British government became aware that it had to make various preparations lest 
war broke out.  On 20 April the government duly asked Parliament to approve an 
additional budget in order to prepare for the possible outbreak of an Anglo-Russian war, 
which was approved immediately. 93   One of the measures that the Admiralty 
immediately took after the occupation was to build a coal depot, telegraph stations and 
lines, and fortifications in Kŏmundo.  The senior officials acted in the firm belief that 
possession of the islands would give them better command of the seas adjacent to the 
Korean coast, and therefore overruled the suggestion of Dowell, who, after vising the 
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Kŏmundo for the first time on his own in May 1885, argued that the site did not possess 
the strategic merit that Carey-Brenton had argued.94 
Simultaneously Cabinet ministers and senior officials in Foreign Office discussed 
whether it might be possible to form an alliance with the Qing Empire and Japan.95  In 
late-April, Philip Currie, the Assistant Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, wrote a 
memorandum indicating that Plunkett should be informed that the British government 
“attach importance to an alliance with Japan in the event of war with Russia and would 
be glad to have his opinion as to any steps it might be advisable to take now,” and some 
ministers such as Northbrook and Sir Charles Dilke were receptive to this proposal.96  
The idea of an alliance with Japan was attractive because it would allow the Royal Navy 
to use Japanese ports for logistics and repairs under the protection of the IJN.  Moreover, 
the British naval observers thought that the quality of the IJN had improved significantly 
as a result of the latter’s determined effort to modernise.97 
However, it must also be said that when the British decision-makers and diplomats 
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discussed the prospect of an alliance with the East Asian countries, they placed much 
stronger emphasis on acting in common with the Qing Empire than Japan.98  The British 
decision-makers in London were well aware of the fact that their army was much smaller 
than that of the Russians, and thus they considered it crucial to have the cooperation of a 
strong local country if they wished to protect their interests in Asia.  A country like 
China, with its massive manpower, could provide a buffer to protect the Indian frontier 
from Yarkand to the Himalayas, and check the French at the Sino-Burmese border.99  
Although most British observers, both official and public, recognised that Qing military 
modernisation was not yet complete, they were nonetheless impressed that it had 
managed to accomplish limited success against the French army.  This success 
encouraged the British decision-makers to seek an alliance with the Qing.100  Finally, it 
was hoped that some Qing warships might be available for joint Anglo-Chinese 
operations in East Asian waters.  Indeed, it was not uncommon for British officials in 
East Asia to discuss an Anglo-Chinese alliance without any Japanese involvement.101  
The British decision-makers were almost unanimous that if they formed an alliance with 
the Japanese, then the latter would be included as a junior partner within a more important 
Anglo-Chinese alliance.  Besides, there were many individuals, such as Nicholas 
O’Conor, the Chargé d’Affaires to Beijing from April 1884 to July 1885, who were 
pessimistic about the prospect of bringing the Qing and Japan together in a trilateral 
alliance.  He believed that suspicion between these two countries towards each other 
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was still significant after the Kapsin coup.102  O’Conor therefore argued that the British 
government should not make any overtures to Japan, as such a gesture might discourage 
the Qing decision-makers from contemplating the idea of signing an alliance.103 
Before the British decision-makers could hammer out a concrete policy, the British 
experienced a near-miss incident with Russia.  Captain Samuel Long, one of the officers 
under Dowell’s command, reported on 6 May that he had encountered a very hostile 
demonstration from a local Russian naval force when he was leading three warships into 
the port of Yokohama.  According to Long’s report, he witnessed the guns of a Russian 
ironclad anchored in the port being loaded, opened and pointed towards the British 
warships entering the port, and that it seemed as if the Russian seamen were all assembled 
behind the guns ready to open fire at any moment.104  Long, at first instance, thought 
that an Anglo-Russian war might have already been declared, but on second thoughts he 
fortunately concluded that such a case was unlikely, and decided to take his warships into 
Yokohama without making any counteraction; he also decided to withdraw his ships to 
Yokosuka the next day to alleviate the tension.105   When Plunkett made an official 
complaint to Alexander Davidov, the Russian Minister in Tokyo, the latter replied that the 
recent increase of Anglo-Russian tensions in East Asia, had caused this dangerous 
encounter.  He complained that the Russian naval personnel were extremely frustrated 
as the British warships had been shadowing their Russian counterparts in East Asia 
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waters.106  The Russian commander had not felt confident that he enjoyed the security 
normally guaranteed by international law to warships in the ports of a neutral country in 
Japan, due to the fact that the unequal treaties that Japan had signed with Western nations 
posed some restrictions on Japanese sovereignty, and therefore had decided to put his 
seamen on alert.107  Plunkett argued that the British government could not accept such 
an interpretation of the treaties, and was of the opinion that no state should permit its 
military to engage in a hostile manoeuvre in a country that they recognised as an 
independent nation.108  Plunkett and Davidov nonetheless concluded that the action that 
Long had taken was satisfactory, and were happy to call the case closed as neither the 
British and Russian governments wanted war.109  However, it was an incident that was 
enough to make not only the British diplomats in East Asia but also the decision-makers 
of Qing and Japan recognise how strained the Anglo-Russian relationship had become, 
and realise that East Asia could not be unaffected if a war broke out. 
The ill-prepared occupation of Kŏmundo also caused difficulties for the British 
decision-makers in other ways.  Ten days after the incident in Yokohama, British 
diplomats reported that the Chosŏn court was making overtures to Russian diplomats in 
East Asia.  The unilateral occupation of Kŏmundo by Britain had naturally made the 
Chosŏn officials extremely upset, and they started to protest from early-May onwards.110  
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In particular, Georg Paul von Möllendorff, the German advisor to the Chosŏn court, felt 
the need to come to closer terms with some other Western country so that the Chosŏn 
could improve its bargaining power vis-à-vis the British, and he concluded that he should 
ask the Russians for support.111  It is not clear if Kojong officially authorised the German 
advisor to contact the Russian diplomats in East Asia on his behalf, but the latter certainly 
indicated in his overture to the Russians that the Chosŏn regime would be willing to cede 
some of its islands if the latter offered military support to maintain the autonomy of the 
kingdom.112  This manoeuvre put the British decision-makers into a difficult position. 
They now became aware that, as they had made no effort to gain permission to occupy 
the islands from the Chosŏn court beforehand it was difficult to justify the occupation 
within the eyes of other countries that were involved in East Asian affairs.113 
In these difficult circumstances, the British decided to respond by making their own 
overtures to the Qing so that the latter would exercise its influence and silence the protest 
raised by its traditional vassal.  As the previous chapters have indicated, there were 
many precedents which indicated that the Qing cast a significant degree of influence over 
the Chosŏn.  It was, furthermore, encouraging for the British ministers and the senior 
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officials of the Foreign Office when Zeng informed them that the court in Beijing would 
not object to a British occupation as long as it was only temporary, and the British 
promised to uphold Qing interests and prestige in Korea.114  Finally, British decision-
makers and diplomats also recognised that the Qing remained suspicious towards the 
Russians despite the fact that the Ili crisis had been resolved without a war.115 
Before the British government made any specific overtures to the Qing to deal with 
this issue, Li Hongzhang pressed the Chosŏn court through his agent in Seoul to 
immediately repudiate Möllendorff’s offer to Russia.116  Li was fortunate in that Russia 
overplayed its hand when Alexei Speyer, the secretary of its Legation in Japan, threatened 
the Chosŏn ministers during the talks in Seoul that the Russian government might 
authorise a military expedition if the Chosŏn did not honour Möllendorff’s promises in 
the preliminary conversations. 117   This attitude seems to have alarmed the Chosŏn 
negotiators and made them question whether the Russians would really act as a 
benevolent protector of the autonomy of their kingdom as their German advisor had 
insisted.  The Chosŏn ministers and Kojong, who by then were under strong pressure 
from Li, therefore dismissed Möllendorff from the position of government advisor on 27 
June for trying to arrange a diplomatic agreement without approval, and also sacked him 
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from the customs two months later.118 
After observing this development, the Marquis of Salisbury, the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Secretary for the Conservative administration which succeeded the Liberals on 
23 June, informed O’Conor on 10 July that the British government is “ready to make full 
acknowledgement of Chinese suzerainty” over Korea if the Qing in return would use its 
influence to prevent the Chosŏn court from making further protests against Britain.119  
There is no evidence in the Foreign Office records to indicate that O’Conor acted upon 
this instruction or how Li and the ministers in Zongli Yamen reacted.  However, it was 
a significant moment, for the Foreign Office had never hitherto permitted their diplomats 
in China to communicate to the court in Beijing that they acknowledged the Qing claim 
of suzerainty over its neighbours as explicitly as this dispatch.  It is an episode which 
indicates the degree to which British decision-makers were now convinced that they had 
to be on close terms with the Qing in order to get out of their present diplomatic difficulty 
over Korea.  And the British decision-makers managed to get what they wanted, as 
O’Conor reported on 16 July that the Koreans had finally withdrawn their protest about 
British occupation of Kŏmundo at least for the time being.120 
In mid-July there was also a breakthrough in the Anglo-Russian negotiations for the 
settlement of the Penjdeh crisis.121  On 10 September the British, Russians and Afghans 
struck an agreement that the Russo-Afghan border would be drawn 1,000 yards north of 
Zulfiqur pass.122  This agreement on the Russo-Afghan frontier was part of the broader 
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Anglo-Russian negotiations over the delineation of spheres of influence between India 
and Russian Central Asia, and these two countries continued to contest over this broader 
delineation until the 1890s.123  However, there was a sense that the Anglo-Russian 
tension had eased in September 1885 at least to the extent that any immediate outbreak 
of war seemed unlikely.  In a private letter that O’Conor wrote on 6 September he 
mentioned that Li felt that Anglo-Russian tensions were easing.124  All eyes were now 
on what the British government would do with Kŏmundo. 
 
Closing Remarks on the Chapter 
 
After December 1884, both the Japanese and the British governments engaged in military 
operations on Korean soil – the former in the form of involving itself into a coup d’etat 
that broke out in Seoul, and the latter by occupying Kŏmundo.  They did so in the hope 
that these respective actions would help to protect or expand their interests in that country.  
However, their hastily prepared interventions only resulted in destabilising the 
international environment in East Asia.  The Japanese involvement in the Kapsin coup 
was poorly planned, and failed as a result of the Qing counter-manoeuvre.  Consequently 
Japan became diplomatically isolated, and in order to get out of the situation, Inoue and 
Itō chose to give de facto recognition of the Qing’s superior influence – although not of 
its exclusive privileges – in Korea in the peace terms that they signed.  In their own crisis, 
the British decision-makers permitted O’Conor to communicate that they acknowledged 
the Qing claim of suzerainty over Korea to get out of the difficulties that they had created 
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for themselves as a result of the unilateral occupation of Kŏmundo.  In the end, both the 
Japanese and the British decision-makers could not settle these regional crises alone, and 
could emerge out of isolation only by making compromises with Qing China, the one 
country that was successfully reasserting its influence over East Asia. 
To some extent, decision-makers of Britain and Japan were induced by the same 
circumstances to make these moves.  However, it would be inaccurate to assume that 
they were necessarily reluctant to do so.  From the British perspective, the need for an 
Anglo-Chinese alliance in case of a possible war with Russia outweighed any concerns 
about the suzerainty question.  Similarly, the key individuals in Japan, such as Itō and 
Inoue, were quite happy to make concessions to the Qing over the Korean question if that 
would prevent the outbreak of war.  Many studies argue that the setback in the Kapsin 
incident induced the Japanese government to embark on military expansion so that Japan 
could defeat the Qing, which was now identified as the biggest obstacle to fulfil their 
long-term ambition to colonise Korea. Takahashi Hidenao, however, convincingly argued 
in several articles published in the 1980s against such an assumption.  He contended that 
the key individuals in Japan kept their distance from those who advocated reform in Korea 
through military intervention right up until the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War.125  
Takahashi also presented evidence which suggests that the Kapsin incident was an 
important event for the Japanese government precisely because it led to the Tianjin 
Convention, which provided both the Qing and Japanese governments with a basis for the 
peaceful conduct of Sino-Japanese relations over Korea.  Indeed, from this point, the 
Japanese pursued policies which closely followed the spirit of the agreement after April 
1885. 
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In addition, the occupation of Kŏmundo reinforced the impression that the imperial 
competition between the great powers was intensifying, and was starting to have 
repercussions in East Asia.  After observing the British action and the intensification of 
the Anglo-Russian war-scare in the summer of 1885, Inoue was convinced that “Western 
countries are expanding into the East with much stronger zeal than they did ten years ago,” 
and that a peaceful relationship with China was therefore essential to uphold Japan’s 
independence.126  Already in September 1884, when Plunkett had contacted Inoue and 
asked if the Japanese government would declare neutrality over the Sino-French war and 
cooperate in offering naval protection to the neutral shipping, Inoue had answered in the 
affirmative, but questioned whether if his government could impose neutral rights on a 
country whose extraterritoriality in Japan was guaranteed by treaty.127  It was under such 
conditions, with Japanese decision-makers feeling somewhat wary about their 
international status, that they heard the Russian commander explain why he had ordered 
his seamen to prepare to fire during the Anglo-Russian near-miss in Yokohama in May.  
This reinforced the Japanese recognition of how vulnerable their country was under the 
unequal treaties.128  They could not dare enter into a hostile relationship with the Qing 
when a war between two European great powers might threaten the independence of 
Japan.  On 10 June 1885, Inoue handed a memorandum on policy towards Korea to Xu 
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unknown, all from IKDS, vol. 1, pp. 401-5.  Also refer to Yoshida to Inoue (Private), 3 
Sept 1884, KSKKT IKM 601-2. 
128 Inoue to Kawase (Unnumbered), 13 June 1885, NGM, vol. 18, pp. 601-2; Hatano to 
Inoue (機密第五十八號), Tianjin, 7 Sept 1885 (rec. 21 Sept), NGM, vol. 18, pp. 388-390; 
Inoue to Itō (Private), 19 Oct 1885, IHKM, vol. 1, pp. 194-6.  Also see NGM, vol. 18, 
pp. 126-140. 
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Chengzu, the Qing Minister in Japan.  In this memorandum he suggested that:  
 
1. Any policy towards Korea by these two countries should be executed under Li’s authority 
after it had been discussed by Li and Inoue; 2. The king of Chosŏn should be turned into a 
mere figurehead; 3. The king should delegate all of the administrative issues to able 
individuals such as Kim Hong-jip, Kim Yun-sik and Ŏ Mun-jung, and the nomination of 
ministers by the king must be approved by Li; 4. The Chosŏn should establish specialised 
institutions for foreign affairs, military and treasury; 5. The Chosŏn should find an able 
American advisor to replace Möllendorff; 6. Li should replace Chen Shutang, his political 
agent in Seoul, as the Japanese government considered him incompetent; 7. The new Qing 
agent and the American advisor to Chosŏn should visit Tokyo en route to Seoul and have 
interviews with Inoue; 8. The new Qing agent should also maintain a friendly relationship, 
and be in close communications with, the Japanese Minister in Seoul.129 
 
Li, who was facing pressure from the hardliners within the Qing decision-making circle, 
could not officially approve this memorandum, and his attitude frustrated many Japanese 
diplomats; nonetheless Li replied that he supported the principle and the spirit of this 
initiative.130  By submitting the additional memorandum, Inoue showed that he had no 
objection to using the Tianjin Convention of April 1885 as the guideline for future Sino-
Japanese relations in regards to Korea.  It goes without saying that Li found no reason 
to reject such an offer. 
It was also very difficult for Britain and Japan to come to closer terms when the 
Japanese fear of European imperialism – which was quite strong already before the crisis 
– had become stronger.  If there was a possibility for an Anglo-Japanese alliance to form 
in the period before 1894, then it could not have happened in any period other than during 
the crisis of the mid-1880s, when the dual crises created an environment that might induce 
                                                   
129 Inoue to Enomoto, 10 June 1885, KSKKT MuMKM 73-4. 
130 Enomoto to Inoue, 19 July 1885, KSKKT MuMKM 73-3. 
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the Russians to make an advance towards Korea.  As the primary concern for the British 
government was the European encroachment towards its spheres of influences, there was 
no reason to reject the prospect of forming an alliance with as many local countries as 
possible, and the Foreign Office did contemplate the idea of making overtures to Japan 
as well as the Qing in the summer of 1885.  However, at that time the latter was seen as 
being much more powerful and therefore more useful in checking the Russians than the 
former.  Therefore the Japanese were only ever perceived as a potential junior partner in 
a much more important Anglo-Chinese alliance.  Many of the British were also 
pessimistic about the prospect of bringing the Qing and Japan together in a trilateral 
alliance, as they believed that the suspicion between these two countries towards each 
other was still significant after the Kapsin coup.  This environment discouraged them 
from making any substantial overtures towards Japan, as they feared that such a gesture 
might create a negative impression in Qing court.  From the Japanese side of the story, 
the British occupation of Kŏmundo created the impression that the British were no less 
imperialist than the other Western nations, and thus its actions were viewed with grave 
suspicion.  Moreover, difficulties over the treaty revision negotiations continued to 
prevent these two countries from coming on to closer terms, especially after the Japanese 
government officials started to be aware of the danger that the claim of extraterritoriality 
could pose towards the security of their country. 
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Chapter 4 – The East Asian Crises, Phase Two: November 1885-February 1887 
 
The British and Japanese governments salvaged themselves from the diplomatic isolation 
which had resulted from the Kŏmundo and Kapsin incidents by acknowledging – more 
or less voluntarily – that China had become the most influential country in the region.  
By November 1885 this recognition started to emerge as the guiding principle of the 
regional order.  In order to understand why this principle continued to prevail even after 
the initial crises had subsided, it is important to analyse how the sequence of events until 
February 1887 – when the British squadron withdrew from Kŏmundo – influenced East 
Asian affairs, and this will be examined in this chapter. 
Particular attention will be placed on the British side of the story, as they had to 
continue to rely on Qing influence to suppress Korean discontent about the British 
occupation.  The British government also had to rely on its influence when Kojong made 
another overture to Russia in the summer of 1886 to drive the British out from Kŏmundo.  
Also in November 1885 the British government launched an offensive into Upper Burma, 
which was another kingdom that the Qing decision-makers claimed as being their 
traditional vassal.  The British government had to negotiate very carefully, in order to 
avoid the same difficulty that the French and the Japanese had fallen into when they 
intrigued in Tonkin and Korea, and in the end they were successful in keeping Qing 
goodwill. 
From the Japanese side of the story, they were frustrated towards the Chinese when a 
brawl broke out between the local population in Nagasaki and the Qing seamen who 
visited the Japanese port.  This incident resulted in stirring another wave of anti-Chinese 
sentiment in the Japanese public, but the government dealt with this issue based upon the 
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stipulations of the Tianjin Convention, and with a strong determination not to turn this 
into another serious diplomatic crisis.  The series of events which occurred from 
November 1885 to February 1887 thus induced the British and Japanese governments to 
continue to prioritise upholding the goodwill of the Chinese, instead of focusing on their 
relationship with each other. 
 
The British Annexation of Upper Burma 
 
By November 1885 Lord Dufferin was consistently pressing the ministers and officials in 
London to launch a military campaign against Upper Burma. 1   He had received 
numerous reports from British merchants that the local Burmese were interfering with 
their business, and the Governor-General was convinced that the latter were doing so on 
the orders of King Thibaw.2  In the beginning, some of the individuals in the British and 
Indian governments argued that their objective could be accomplished by dethroning the 
king instead of annexation.  This debate continued even after the Indian Army began its 
campaign on 7 November 1885.  There were several factors which made the British 
government take its time before making a decision on this issue.  One of the main 
concerns was, of course, the cost, as it expected that a large budget would be needed to 
administer the region on a permanent basis.  But there is also ample evidence to suggest 
that many British ministers, officials and diplomats were concerned that the annexation 
could upset the Qing authorities, as they were aware that the Kingdom of Burma was a 
                                                   
1 Salisbury to Walsham (Private), 8 Sept 1885, SP HHA A/44/7; Pauncefote to Godley 
(Confidential), FO, 4 Nov 1885, FO 422/15; Salisbury to O’Conor (No. 51 Telegraphic), 
FO, 11 Nov 1885, FO 17/987. 
2 Ibid. 
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traditional vassal of Qing.3  For example, the British head of the Chinese Imperial 
Customs Service, Sir Robert Hart, recommended that the British government should ask 
Qing officials to mediate in the Anglo-Burmese dispute in order to show that it respected 
the Chinese claim of traditional suzerainty and thus win their goodwill.4  Most of the 
British decision-makers did not feel the need to go that far and thus rejected this opinion.5  
Nonetheless, after observing the recent events in Tonkin and Korea, the British officials 
understood that the Chinese claim of suzerainty had to be handled very sensitively in 
order to maintain the goodwill of the Chinese, which was now vital due to the problems 
over Kŏmundo.6  Therefore, they contemplated the idea of establishing a protectorate 
over Upper Burma after replacing King Thibaw with some other prince, which would 
allow the new king to continue sending tributary missions to Beijing.7 
However, by early-1885, the British government perceived French manoeuvres across 
the world with increased suspicion and therefore could not help but be alarmed by reports 
indicating that the French were attempting to expand their influence in Southeast Asia to 
Upper Burma, a region that lay on the eastern flank of British India.8  By November, the 
                                                   
3 O’Conor to Salisbury (No. 445), 1 enclosure, Beijing, 29 Oct 1885 (rec. 24 Dec), FO 
17/987; O’Conor to Currie (Private), Beijing, 2 Nov 1885, NOP CAC OCON4/1/1; 
Salisbury to Churchill (Private), 4 Nov 1885, RCP CAC RCHL 1/9; Walpole to 
Pauncefote, 3 enclosures, IO, 10 Nov 1885 (rec. 10 Nov), FO 422/15; Salisbury to 
Churchill (Private), 15 Nov 1885, RCP CAC RCHL 1/9; Eden to Salisbury (Private), FO, 
29 Nov 1885, SP HHA A/36/15; Godley to Currie (Secret), 1 enclosure, IO, 7 Dec 1885 
(rec. 8 Dec), FO 422/15; Currie to Godley (A and B Confidential), FO, 9 Dec 1885, FO 
422/15. 
4 Hart to Campbell (No. 292 Confidential for Pauncefote, Telegraphic), Beijing, 1 Nov 
1885.  Enclosure in Campbell to Pauncefote (Private), London, 2 Nov 1885 (rec. 2 
Nov), FO 422/15. 
5 BDFA, vol. 23, 3-5. 
6 See footnote 4 of this chapter and; Godley to Currie (Secret), 2 enclosures, IO, 9 Dec 
1885 (rec. 10 Dec); Currie to Godley (Confidential), FO, 14 Dec 1885, both FO 422/15. 
7 O’Conor to Salisbury (No. 445), Beijing, 29 Oct 1885 (rec. 24 Dec), FO 17/987; 
Churchill to Dufferin (Secret, Telegraphic), IO, 5 Nov 1885, FO 422/15; Dufferin to 
Churchill (Secret, Telegraphic), 8 Nov 1885 FO 422/15; Salisbury to O’Conor (No. 51 
Telegraphic), FO, 11 Nov 1885, FO 17/987. 
8 Kimberley to Dufferin (Private), IO, 26 Mar 1885, IOR BL Mss Eur F130/3; Salisbury 
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idea of annexing Upper Burma started to appear as a better option than simple 
dethronement or the establishment of a protectorate.  For example, the legal officer of 
the Foreign Office contended that it would be easier to annul all the arrangements that 
Thibaw had made with the French if Burma was annexed instead of turned into a 
protectorate, as it would then immediately be put under the legal and treaty obligations of 
British India.9  The decision-makers were also encouraged by a report sent by O’Conor, 
which argued that: 
 
Although the link binding Burmah (sic) and China is very weak, duty to a tributary State, 
and, still more, a sense of what is required by her own dignity, may possibly compel China 
to interfere so far as to remonstrate in a manner likely to cause a coldness in her present 
friendly relations with England.  I trust, however, that before this course can be taken, 
events will have so shaped themselves that China will think it is not worth her while to take 
up a cause which has already been judged and decided by a stronger and more energetic 
power.10 
 
Along with Macartney, O’Conor noted that, despite the fact that the Qing officials placed 
emphasis on the importance of upholding its suzerainty over every kingdom that paid 
tribute to the suzerain, the Burmese had sent tribute only once in ten years – much less 
                                                   
to Churchill (Private, Telegraphic), 25 July 1885, RCP CAC RCHL 1/6; The Burmese 
Minister for Foreign Affairs to Bernard, Mandalay, 26 July 1885 (enclosure to Godley to 
Pauncefote [D], 5 enclosures, IO, 12 Nov 1883, [rec. 13 Nov]), FO 422/15; Bernard to 
Durand, Rangoon, 11 Aug 1885 (enclosure to Godley to Pauncefote [D], 5 enclosures, 
IO, 12 Nov 1883, [rec. 13 Nov]), FO 422/15; Kimberley to Dufferin (Private), 24 Dec 
1884, IOR BL Mss Eur F130/3; Salisbury to Churchill, (Private), 21 Aug 1885, RCP 
CAC RCHL 1/7.  See also Lyons to Salisbury (No. 720), Paris, 3 Nov 1885 (rec. 4 Nov); 
Lyons to Salisbury (No. 741 Ext. 45), Paris, 9 Nov 1885 (rec. 11 Nov); Godley to 
Pauncefote, IO, 9 Nov 1885 (rec. 9 Nov); Lyons to Salisbury (No. 763), Paris, 24 Nov 
1885 (rec. 25 Nov).  All from FO 422/15. 
9 Salisbury to Walsham (Private), 8 Sept 1885, SP HHA A/44/7; Dufferin to Churchill 
(Secret, Telegraphic), 5 Dec 1885, FO 422/15; Godley to Currie (Secret), IO, 9 Dec 1885 
(rec. 10 Dec), FO 422/15. 
10 O’Conor to Salisbury (No. 445), Beijing, 29 Oct 1885 (rec. 24 Dec), FO 17/987. 
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frequently than the Koreans and the Annamese had done – and therefore China probably 
would be hesitant about taking strong action against the British.11  In December, the 
officials of the Foreign and Indian Offices concluded that they should annex the region, 
and on 1 January 1886 it was declared that Upper Burma would be administered as a 
Crown Colony.12 
The British ministers nonetheless understood that some agreement with the Qing 
decision-makers over the suzerainty question was necessary in order to uphold the latter’s 
goodwill. On 9 November Salisbury wrote to his Secretary of State for India, Lord 
Randolph Churchill, that “it might be a hassle, but there is no sacrifice” in sending a 
special mission to Beijing over the issue of annexation of Upper Burma.13  In December 
1885 the senior officials of the Foreign Office contemplated that this question could be 
settled by agreeing that the Government of India would allow envoys from the local 
Burmese population to go to Beijing even after the annexation – although they were of 
the opinion that any agreement should make it clear that the British and Indian 
governments considered these missions as strictly ceremonial with no political 
significance.14  The negotiations did not, though, proceed as smoothly as the Foreign 
Office expected.  Contrary to the expectations of O’Conor and Macartney, the Qing 
officials immediately raised complaints against the British annexation of Upper Burma.15  
In January, Currie asked Zeng if the court in Beijing would be satisfied if the Government 
                                                   
11 See footnote 6 of this chapter. 
12 Godley to Currie (Secret), 2 enclosures, IO, 9 Dec 1885 (rec. 10 Dec), FO 422/15; 
Harris to Currie (Secret), IO, 23 Dec 1885, FO 422/15; Churchill to Dufferin (Private), 
IO, 31 Dec 1885, IOR BL Mss Eur F130/3. 
13 Salisbury to Churchill (Private), 9 Nov 1885, RCP CAC RCHL 1/9. 
14 Ibid; Currie to Godley (A and B Confidential), FO, 9 Dec 1885, FO 422/15; Currie to 
Godley (Confidential), FO, 14 Dec 1885, FO 422/15. 
15 O’Conor to Salisbury (No. 1 Telegraphic), Beijing, 1 Jan 1886 (rec. 2 Jan), FO 
17/1021; Zeng to Salisbury, Chinese Legation in London, 1 Jan 1886 (rec. 4 Jan), FO 
422/16. 
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of India sent missions composed of Burmese Buddhist monks.  However, there is no 
document that indicates that the Qing decision-makers accepted this idea as a basis for 
negotiation.  The talks became difficult because whereas the Qing officials wanted the 
tributary missions to be conducted in a way that symbolised the traditional political 
suzerain-vassal relationship between Qing and Burma, the British were striving to ensure 
that the missions carried no political significance.16 
By March, the India Office and the Government of India were becoming increasingly 
inpatient, and Dufferin and Lord Kimberley expressed their exasperation towards the 
Qing negotiators.  They saw the latter as procrastinating and constantly changing their 
demands, thus causing unnecessary delays, and also felt continuously demanding more 
concessions without giving anything in return. 17   They also criticised their own 
diplomats for being too patient with the Qing, and were even more suspicious towards 
the British employees in Qing service, such as Hart and Macartney. 18   After these 
experiences, Kimberley concluded that “I can hardly believe [the Chinese] differ from 
other Orientals so much that a humble tone is likely to succeed with them.”19 
However, even these individuals could not deny that the Qing’s power and influence 
                                                   
16 Salisbury to Conor (No. 9), FO, 12 Jan 1886, FO 17/1012; Churchill to Dufferin 
(Private), IO, 14 Jan 1886, IOR BL Mss Eur F130/6; Godley to Currie (C), 27 Jan 1886 
(rec. 28 Jan), FO 422/16; Memorandum by Currie, FO, 23 Feb 1886, FO 422/16; 
Memorandum by Currie, FO, 2 Mar 1886, FO 422/16; Kimberley to Dufferin (Private), 
IO, 5 Mar 1886, IOR BL Mss Eur F130/6. 
17 Kimberley to Dufferin (Private), IO, 17 Mar 1886, Mss Eur F130/6; Kimberley to 
Dufferin (Private), IO, 6 Apr 1886, Mss Eur F130/6.  Both IOR BL. 
18 Kimberley to Dufferin (Private), IO, 6 Apr 1886, IOR BL Mss Eur F130/6; Kimberley 
to Dufferin (Private), IO, 28 Apr 1886, IOR BL Mss Eur F130/6; Salisbury to O’Conor 
(No. 44 Telegraphic), FO, 7 Aug 1885, FO 17/987; O’Conor to Salisbury (No. 432 
Confidential), Beijing, 16 Oct 1885 (rec. 14 Dec), FO 17/985; Kimberley to Dufferin 
(Private), IO, 5 Mar 1886, IOR BL Mss Eur F130/6; Dufferin to Kimberley (Private), 
Calcutta, 29 Mar 1886, IOR BL Mss Eur F130/5; Dufferin to Kimberley (Private), 
Simla, 4 June 1886, IOR BL Mss Eur F130/5. 
19 Kimberley to Dufferin (Private), IO, 5 Mar 1886, IOR BLMss Eur F130/6. 
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were important.  They therefore realised that they had to deal with this power carefully 
in order to avoid any unnecessary quarrel that might endanger British interests in Asia.  
The final stage of the negotiations was undertaken in Beijing.  The Cabinet ministers 
and the senior officials of Foreign Office instructed O’Conor from late-May onwards that 
the missions should not be labelled as ‘tributes’ or ‘offerings’ as they feared that such 
terms would be interpreted by Qing as a sign of British acceptance of suzerainty. 20  
Instead, the British side insisted to the Qing negotiators that they should agree “that the 
highest civil or spiritual authority shall continue to send the customary ten-yearly 
Missions sent from Burmah (sic) to China, members of Missions to be of Burmese race” 
if the court in Beijing would acknowledge British authority over Upper Burma.21  This 
was successful, but the British government had to make one compromise in order to make 
the Qing negotiators accept this agreement; it had to promise that it would not press the 
Qing to open Tibet to the merchants in India for an indefinite period of time, and would 
only start negotiations when both the British and Qing governments considered it as being 
the ideal moment.22  The declaration was not the most pleasant of compromises for a 
people who believed in the virtues of free trade,23 but in the end, the British and Indian 
governments considered this compromise as acceptable, as the prospects for commerce 
in Tibet were not considered very significant.24  After sorting out the minor details, the 
                                                   
20 Kimberley to Dufferin (Private), IO, 28 May 1886, IOR BL Mss Eur F130/6; O’Conor 
to Rosebery (No. 28 Telegraphic), Beijing, 4 June 1886 (rec. 4 June), FO 17/1021. 
21 Rosebery to O’Conor (No. 26 Telegraphic), FO, 24 May 1886, FO 17/1021; O’Conor to 
Rosebery (No. 26 Telegraphic), Beijing, 31 May 1886 (rec. 31 May), FO 17/1021. 
22 Rosebery to O’Conor (No. 30 Telegraphic), FO, 5 June 1886, FO 17/1021. 
23 Parkes to Granville (No. 32), Beijing, 24 Jan 1885 (rec. 24 Mar), FO 17/977; O’Conor 
to Granville (No. 206), Beijing, 3 May 1885 (rec. 30 June), FO 17/980.  Also see RCP 
CAC RCHL 1/5 to 1/12. 
24 Rosebery to O’Conor (No. 28 Telegraphic), FO, 3 June 1886, FO 17/1021; Currie to 
Rosebery (Private), 14 June 1886, RP NLS MS.10132. 
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Anglo-Chinese convention over Burma was signed on 24 July.25 
 
British Withdrawal from Kŏmundo 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, critics of the government decision to place Kŏmundo 
under occupation existed even when the Anglo-Russian war-scare was at its peak.  For 
instance, Dowell raised doubts about the strategic merits of the islands as early as late 
April 1885.  However, his opinion was overruled by the senior officials in the Foreign 
Office and Admiralty, as well as the Cabinet, who believed that the British should retain 
possession of Kŏmundo at least until the Anglo-Russian war-scare subsided.  Even after 
the signing of the Anglo-Russian delineation agreement in September 1885, the Foreign 
Office did not immediately embark on preparations for withdrawal from the islands.  
The Foreign Office could not hammer out a policy on what Britain should do with the 
islands because it faced a wide variety of different recommendations from its diplomats.  
For example, Plunkett argued that the government should purchase the islands as he 
believed that they would serve as a good stopover port for British merchants between the 
treaty ports in East Asia, and argued that this could enhance British trade with Korea.26  
Meanwhile, O’Conor suggested considering the option of handing the islands over to the 
Qing.  He argued that as Korea was too weak to defend itself, Kŏmundo would be under 
                                                   
25 Rosebery to Walsham (No. 311), FO, 16 June 1886; Rosebery to Walsham (No. 317), 
21 June 1886; Rosebery to Walsham (No. 336), FO, 24 June 1886; Walsham to Rosebery 
(No. 325), Beijing, 25 June 1886; Godley to Currie (No. 333), IO, 28 June 1886; Currie 
to Godley (No. 340), FO, 30 June 1886.  All from FO 881/5381.  See also Rosebery to 
Walsham (No. 39 Telegraphic), FO, 8 July 1886; Walsham to Rosebery (No. 51 
Telegraphic), Beijing, 24 July 1886 (rec. 25 July).  Both from FO 17/1021. 
26 Plunkett to Granville (No. 151 Very Confidential), Tokyo, 25 May 1885, rec. 30 June, 
FO 46/330.  Also see Hamilton to the Secretary of the Admiralty (No. 40), Audacious 
(Hong Kong), 7 Dec 1885 (rec. 12 Jan 1886), ADM 1/6810, as this document indicates 
that Hamilton believed Plunkett had maintained this argument until early December. 
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the constant threat of possible Russian control if the islands were returned to that country, 
and continued that it might be better to hand them over to the Chinese; O’Conor added 
that this might also help to win the goodwill of the Qing decision-makers.27 
However, by the autumn of 1885 both O’Conor and Plunkett started to become 
convinced that the British government should withdraw from Kŏmundo as soon as 
possible.  O’Conor observed that Li Hongzhang – who had seemed receptive to the idea 
of taking over the islands from the British in the summer – was no longer interested in 
doing so by late September.28  He therefore started to argue in favour of withdrawal from 
the islands as soon as the Foreign Office had made arrangements that would prevent the 
Russians from occupying any Korean territory after the China Squadron withdrew.29  
Also, Plunkett argued that as the Japanese government saw Korea as a country of vital 
importance for its security, it viewed any third party activity with strong suspicion.30  
Accordingly it was becoming increasingly suspicious towards the British government 
which would not withdraw from Kŏmundo even after the Anglo-Russian war-scare had 
subsided. 31   These arguments were supported by Vice-Admiral Sir Richard Vesey 
Hamilton, who succeeded Dowell as the Commander-in-Chief of the China Squadron in 
November 1885.  He reiterated the argument of Dowell throughout 1886, calling for 
swift withdrawal from the islands from a naval perspective.  He stated that it was 
                                                   
27 O’Conor to Currie (Private), Beijing, 16 July 1885, NOP CAC OCON5/2/2; O’Conor to 
Currie (Private), 16 Sept 1885, NOP CAC OCON4/1/1; O’Conor to Barrington (Private), 
23 Sept 1885, Circulated to Salisbury as well, SP HHA A/38/37. 
28 O’Conor to Barrington (Private), 23 Sept 1885, NOP CAC OCON4/1/1; O’Conor to 
Salisbury (No. 429 Confidential), Beijing, 14 Oct 1885 (rec. 20 Nov), FO 17/985; 
O’Conor to Salisbury (No.457), Beijing, 17 Nov 1885 (rec. 12 Jan 1886), FO 17/986; 
Currie to the Secretary to the Admiralty (Confidential), FO, 8 Dec 1885. FO 405/35; 
Salisbury to O’Conor (No. 59 Telegraphic), FO, 12 Dec 1885, FO 17/987. 
29 Ibid; O’Conor to Currie (Private), Beijing, 8 Feb 1886, NOP CAC OCON4/1/2. 
30 Plunkett to Salisbury (No. 259 Very Confidential), Tokyo, 18 Dec 1885 (rec. 25 Jan 
1886), FO 46/335. 
31 Ibid. 
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extremely difficult to erect fortifications on these islands due to their topography, and 
concluded that Kŏmundo was not suitable for any kind of military base; he added that it 
would not be difficult for his squadron to remove Russian ships even if the latter decided 
to occupy them.32  In order to protect the islands, his fleet had to deploy two or three 
ships permanently around them, which consequently meant that the squadron had to 
reduce the number of warships that could be used to patrol East Asian waters. 33  
Kŏmundo was therefore nothing other than a burden. 
By April 1886 the Foreign Office and Admiralty became convinced by these 
opinions.34  But before withdrawing from Kŏmundo, the senior officials of the Foreign 
Office thought that it was necessary to conclude an international agreement which would 
guarantee that foreign countries would respect the territorial integrity of Korea. 35  
Needless to say, they turned to the Qing over this issue.  They decided to request that 
the Qing should: 
 
 
[P]ropose to Russia and to the other Powers interested, to enter into an international 
arrangement guaranteeing the integrity of Corea (sic).  If this proposal is accepted, H[er] 
M[ajesty]’s Gov[ernmen]t would be ready to become parties to the arrangement, and to retire 
                                                   
32 Hamilton to O’Conor (Private), Audacions (Hong Kong), 24 Nov 1885, RVHP 
CLNMM VHM/3; Hamilton to Mr. O’Connor (Private), Audacious (Hong Kong), 29 Nov 
1885, RVHP CLNMM VHM/3; Hamilton to the Secretary to the Admiralty 
(Confidential), Audacious (Hong Kong), 7 Dec 1885, ADM 1/6810 (circulated to the 
Foreign Office through; The Secretary to the Admiralty to Currie [Confidential], 
Admiralty, 20 Jan 1886 [rec. 21 Jan], FO 405/36); Hamilton to Hood (Private), 
Audacious (Hong Kong), 13 Dec 1885, RVHP CLNMM VHM/3. 
33 Ibid. 
34 The Secretary to the Admiralty to Currie (Confidential), Admiralty, 20 Jan 1886 (rec. 
21 Jan), FO 405/36; O’Conor to Salisbury (Private), Beijing, 4 Feb 1886, NOP CAC 
OCON4/1/2; O’Conor to Currie (Private), Beijing, 12 Apr 1886, NOP CAC OCON5/2/2; 
Memorandum, FO, 14 Apr 1886, ADM 1/6810. 
35 O’Conor to Salisbury (Private), Beijing, 4 Feb 1886, NOP CAC OCON4/1/2; O’Conor 
to Currie (Private), Beijing, 12 Apr 1886, NOP CAC OCON5/2/2; Memorandum, FO, 14 
Apr 1886, ADM 1/6810. 
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at once from Port Hamilton on the understanding that it should be recognised as forming 
part of the guaranteed territory of Corea (sic).36 
 
O’Conor started contacting Li in late-March 1886 to examine whether the latter would be 
interested in inducing all of the foreign powers that had relations with Korea to agree that 
they would respect its territorial integrity, or, if that was not possible, then at least get an 
agreement that Yongheungman – which was widely rumoured to be the harbour that the 
Russians were most interested in annexing – would be turned into a treaty port.37   
It took a while for this negotiation to proceed, as at first, the British government was 
still busy with the Anglo-Chinese negotiations over the suzerainty question of Burma.  
It was only after August, when Li learned that the Korean government had made another 
secret overture to Russia, that he started to make a more determined effort to check the 
expansion of Russian influence.38  This overture was almost identical to the one that 
Möllendorff had made a year before, as the Chosŏn court sent a secret letter to the Russian 
legation in Seoul which offered to cede some territory to St. Petersburg if the latter would 
guarantee military support against any external power that threatened the territorial 
integrity of Korea.39  When this plot was leaked by a Chosŏn minister to the Qing 
                                                   
36 Memorandum, FO, 14 Apr 1886, ADM 1/6810. 
37 O’Conor to Rosebery (No. 109 Confidential), Beijing, 27 Mar 1886 (rec. 17 May), FO 
17/1016; O’Conor to Mr. Brenan (Private), Beijing, 27 Mar 1886, NOP CAC OCON5/1/3; 
O’Conor to Currie (Private), Beijing, 12 Apr 1886, NOP CAC OCON5/2/2; O’Conor to 
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political agent in Seoul, who at this time was Yuan Shikai, he and Li demanded that the 
Chosŏn ministers immediately withdraw the offer; also the Russian Minister Karl Waeber 
was much more cautious than during the previous incident, and strictly abided by the 
instruction of his government not to respond to Korean offers precipitously.  When 
Waeber learned that the plot had been leaked to the Qing, he immediately announced that 
the Russian legation considered the secret correspondence as a letter sent by an 
unauthorised individual and therefore had not taken it seriously. 
Yuan was furious about this incident and suggested to his superior that Kojong should 
be replaced with the Taewon’gŭn.40  Li rejected this proposal, arguing that the unilateral 
removal of the king would provoke a reaction not only from the Chosŏn officials 
themselves but also other countries.  Nonetheless, he realised that some arrangement 
had to be made in order, first, to prevent further Russo-Korean arrangements from 
happening in the future, and second, to create an environment that would make it easier 
for the British to withdraw from Kŏmundo.  In particular, he was aware that the Russians 
saw any British advance in East Asia as threatening their interests.  Therefore, as long 
as the British squadron remained in the islands, they would seek counter-concessions 
from Korea.41 
The negotiations between Li and N. F. Ladyzhenski, the Russian Chargé d’Affaires in 
Beijing, commenced relatively satisfactorily and by the end of October were poised to 
produce a written agreement which would guarantee that the Russian government would 
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41 Sasaki, “1880 Nendai ni okeru Rochō Kankei,” 27-34; Sasaki, “The International 
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not violate the territorial integrity of Korea.42  But then, Li announced that the court in 
Beijing would like to insert a clause that declared that the Russian government would 
approve its suzerainty over Chosŏn.43  As Ladyzhenski naturally rejected this request, 
these two parties failed to produce any written agreement over this issue, although the 
latter did reiterate that his government had no territorial ambitions in Korea.44  When 
the senior officials in Foreign Office heard about these proceedings in early November 
from Sir John Walsham, the new Minister in Beijing, they were thrown into a dilemma, 
but in the end they concluded a month later that they provided a sufficient guarantee from 
the Russian authorities, and thus started to prepare for withdrawal from Kŏmundo.45  By 
the autumn of 1886, British diplomats and naval officers in East Asia were also conscious 
that the prolonged occupation had made the Russians extremely suspicious of Britain, and 
that this might induce them to take measures that would further destabilise the regional 
order.46  The China Squadron completed its withdrawal from the islands on 27 February 
1887.47 
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The Japanese Side of the Story  
and the Consequences for the Anglo-Japanese Relationship 
 
Despite the fact that Itō and Inoue managed to establish the Tianjin Convention as the 
guideline for future Japanese policy towards Chosŏn and Qing, the Kapsin coup had 
induced many Japanese – both within and outside of the government – to look at the 
Chinese with stronger suspicion.  In particular, as indicated in the previous chapter, the 
incident led to an explosion of anti-Qing sentiment among the public.  In November 
1885 the Japanese police caught some political activists who were trying to sneak into 
Korea in an attempt to create another disturbance in that country in the hope that such an 
uprising would eradicate the pro-Qing ministers.48  The events of 1886 did not help to 
improve the Qing image within Japanese eyes.  On 13 August some of the sailors of the 
Beiyang Fleet, who were visiting Nagasaki, had a quarrel with the local people, and this 
ended up in a fight that led to a death on both sides.  This incident provoked another 
anti-Qing outcry in Japan, and many of the media accused the Qing of intending to 
embark on a military expedition as a result of this clash.49 
While the Japanese government ministers and officials rejected such reports as being 
completely groundless, they were themselves frustrated by the Qing officials, who 
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procrastinated over the negotiations for a peaceful resolution of this issue and made the 
talks unnecessarily complicated until a settlement was reached in February 1887. 50  
Neither did they appreciate the fact that the Qing government was reluctant to revise the 
Sino-Japanese treaty of 1871, despite the fact that Japan had been pushing this issue since 
the early-1880s.  By 1886, Japan and Western countries had finally reached a point in 
which they were about to draft a new treaty based on the principle that the Western 
governments would abolish consular jurisdiction in Japan if the Japanese government 
would permit foreign residents access to the interior of that country.51  The Japanese 
decision-makers feared, though, that the Western negotiators might reject abolishing 
consular jurisdiction if the Qing treaties remained intact.  The Japanese government 
therefore placed high importance on this issue, to the extent that they had Shiota Saburō, 
one of the most important Gaimushō officials, who had been heavily involved in the 
negotiations with Western diplomats in Japan over treaty revision, as the Minister to 
Beijing from March 1886.52  Thus, the Japanese could not help but see the Chinese 
counterparts as being unfriendly due to the latter’s apathy over this issue. 
The Kapsin incident also convinced the Japanese decision-makers that they must 
immediately embark on improving the quality of their military.  They had already 
decided to strengthen their armed forces after 1882, but before the outbreak of the coup 
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they were still only at the stage of debating what kind of reforms they should engage in.  
But from 1885 onwards they sent orders abroad to acquire warships, and the army also 
began reforming its training methods in the Prussian style, under the instruction of Jakob 
Meckel.53  As the Japanese started military expansion in response to the Kapsin incident, 
the ministers and military officials placed much emphasis on improving their military 
manoeuvrability overseas, and on being prepared should a war against the Qing would 
break out.54  It was also in 1886 that members of the Army General Staff twice visited 
northeast China in order to understand the landscape better and gain information about 
the current state of the Qing military.55  A report about these tours was submitted in 
February 1887, and the author, Ogawa Mataji, offered his opinion on the most efficient 
way to march on Beijing – for the first time in its history, the IJA drew up something that 
could be called as a war-plan against an external power. 56   Also, as the efficient 
communications between Qing officials in China and Korea had contributed to the speedy 
manoeuvring of the Chinese military during the Kapsin coup, the Gaimushō felt the need 
to improve its own communications, and urged the Chosŏn court to permit the building 
of a telegraph line connecting Pusan and Seoul.57  When the Japanese learned that Qing 
had started to extend its telegraph from Uiju – a Korean town near the Sino-Korean border 
– to Seoul, contrary to what the Chosŏn ministers had told them, they raised a complaint 
and insisted that similar concessions should be given to the Japanese as well.58  Over 
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this issue, the Japanese decision-makers were clearly concerned that the Qing might gain 
an overwhelming strategic advantage over Japan and carve back the Japanese foothold in 
Korea even further if they did not make counter-efforts. 
However, despite all of these events, the Japanese ministers and Gaimushō continued 
to formulate their policy towards East Asia along the lines of the Tianjin Convention.  
As indicated in the previous chapter, Itō and Inoue had in early 1885 managed to minimise 
the influence of the hardliners and had negotiated with a strong determination to avoid 
war.  In 1886, the political activists outside of the government still remained relatively 
powerless, and their plot to create a new disturbance in Korea was quickly suppressed by 
the police.  Also, despite being frustrated by the way in which the Qing officials 
negotiated over the Nagasaki incident, the Japanese government did not see any reason 
to change its previous stance towards the Qing, and kept to this line even in the face of 
the public outcry.59  It also promised Xu that it would censor newspapers that circulated 
“groundless and intolerable slanders” about the Qing.60  The Japanese remained patient 
towards the Chosŏn as well, despite the fact that they were frustrated by the Korean 
officials over numerous diplomatic issues, such as the issue of the construction of 
telegraph lines between Pusan and Seoul.61  The latter did not embark on construction 
in June 1886 as they had previously promised due to the financial situation of the court 
in Seoul.  Even then, the construction of the line took two years to complete, which was 
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much longer than they had anticipated.  Yet, the Japanese never contemplated the idea 
of resorting to gunboat diplomacy to solve this diplomatic issue as they had done in the 
late-1870s. 
It is also inaccurate to assume that Japanese military expansion was provoked only by 
concern about the Qing.  There is a tendency for historians to see the military build-up 
during this era entirely in the context of these years being a prelude to the First Sino-
Japanese War, but the Japanese government did not perceive the Qing as the only threat 
to their country.62  The recent developments over Kŏmundo had made the Japanese 
concerned that the Anglo-Russian rivalry might have serious consequences for East Asia, 
to the extent that the outbreak of an Anglo-Russian war in the near future might even be 
inevitable.  It would be difficult for the Japanese government to remain neutral in the 
face of such a conflict, and therefore it was faced with the difficult task of choosing with 
which country to align, and consequently which to fight against.63 
There also are some indications that it had also started to become more concerned about 
the actions of the other Great Powers in East Asia. 64   It was already paying close 
attention to the fact that the French had temporarily seized some ports in Taiwan during 
the last stage of the Sino-French War.65  Moreover, the Japanese started to observe the 
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actions of Germany – a country that they had once perceived as a potential partner in the 
struggle for treaty revision – in the Pacific region with stronger suspicion than before.  
There are some reports that indicate that the Gaimushō was disturbed by Germany’s 
recent acquisition of territory in the West Pacific and New Guinea, and they were also 
aware of the fact that one of the two Western firms that had established a foothold in 
Korea – under close cooperation with Li Hongzhang – was a German firm named Meyer 
and Company.66  While it is unlikely that the Japanese decision-makers identified any 
one specific great power as the primary threat, the general international environment in 
East Asia in late 1885 was starting to look increasingly dangerous for the Japanese 
independence, perhaps to the extent that something similar to the recent partition of Africa 
might occur in their neighbourhood as well. 
The Japanese government’s decision to embark on military expansion was therefore 
directed at addressing this general threat – not just the one from the Qing – and to acquire 
bargaining power to the extent that it could at least choose which power to align with 
without being coerced.67  In the eyes of many Japanese, their defensive infrastructure 
seemed grossly inadequate to address these concerns.  They therefore prioritised the 
fortification of the five main ports of Japan and the acquisition of torpedo boats, which 
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were considered as being a defensive weapon at that time.68  There were sizeable number 
of military officers who argued that they should prioritise acquiring ironclads and building 
a strong navy that could match the Beiyang fleet instead of focusing on improving the 
defensive infrastructure.  The ironclad advocates insisted that Japan could never ensure 
its security until it acquired the means of projecting power beyond its borders, but this 
argument was rejected by the government.  The Japanese economy was only just 
emerging from the recession by the end of 1886, and the government could not afford to 
purchase expensive ironclads in large numbers.  Moreover, it was not until 1893 that the 
Navy General Staff became independent from that of the Army, and therefore the 
bargaining power of navy within the Japanese decision-making circle was still relatively 
weak.  In addition, when Itō and Inoue initiated ministerial reform in December 1885, 
they managed to keep the military officials who were calling for the acquisition of 
ironclads out of the new Cabinet as much as possible.  Kuroda Kiyotaka was one of 
those individuals, but he declined to enter the Cabinet; thus Ōyama Iwao was the only 
individual chosen as a minister out of the ironclad advocates.  Within the army, 
moderates, such as Miura Gorō, were placed in senior positions in the General Staff in 
order to restrain the influence of hardliners.  This was not to say that the ministers did 
not understand the arguments of the individuals who called for the acquisition of ironclads, 
but there were budgetary restrictions to military expansion, and certain issues had to be 
prioritised over others in order for it to be financially sustainable in the long-term.  In 
1886, greater naval manoeuvrability off the Asian continent was not on the top of the list 
of priorities. 
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The events that occurred from November 1885 to February 1887 therefore tested the 
determination of Japanese decision-makers to some extent, but they found no reason to 
depart from the spirit of the Tianjin Convention.  If anything, the proceedings of the East 
Asian crises from 1885 to 1887 made the Japanese even more cautious about their actions 
towards Korea and the Qing.  As the Japanese observed the Anglo-Chinese cooperation 
over Korea, they feared that these two countries might have formed an entente cordiale.  
The news about the Anglo-Chinese convention over Burma only enhanced this perception, 
as they felt that the British government had approved the Qing claim of suzerainty over 
its neighbours in order to come on to closer terms with the Chinese.69  The Japanese 
consequently thought that the British would side with the Chinese if a Sino-Japanese war 
broke out. 
 
Closing Remarks on the East Asian Crises,  
and their Effects on the Anglo-Japanese Relationship 
 
The policies that the Japanese and the British chose to adopt during and after the East 
Asian crises were not a complete diversion from their previous stances towards East Asia.  
Both of these countries had begun to recognise even before the outbreak of the Kapsin 
coup that they could not ignore the fact that the Qing Empire was becoming increasingly 
powerful and influential within the region.  At the same time, these crises did mark an 
important phase in the 1880s because they sealed recognition of this fact.  The 
environment after the East Asian crises certainly discouraged the Japanese and British 
decision-makers from making rash military manoeuvres as they had done in December 
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1884 and April 1885 respectively; it also reaffirmed that the Russian decision-makers had 
to be more cautious towards Korea, if they were not already before.  This reading of the 
situation continued to act as the guideline for both the British and Japanese East Asian 
policies for most of the time until the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War in July 
1894. 
These chapters on the East Asian crises have stressed the importance of seeing these 
events in sequence, and have argued that what happened after the signing of the Tianjin 
Convention contributed immensely to the emergence of an international order based upon 
recognition of Qing superiority.70  This, of course, does not mean that the Kapsin coup 
was not as important as the existing literature claims.  That incident was the first of the 
events in this sequence of crises and to some extent contributed to the following episodes.  
Moreover, its peace terms, the Tianjin Convention, provided the basis for avoiding future 
confrontations between the Qing and Japan over Korea.  However, it must be 
remembered that the Tianjin Convention was only an agreement between the local East 
Asian countries, and there was no obligation for the Western great powers to abide by it. 
Thus to understand why all of the governments involved in East Asian affairs recognised 
the Qing as the most influential regional power in East Asia after February 1887 one has 
to look beyond the  Kapsin incident and its immediate consequences. 
The British and Russian governments would not have acknowledged Qing superiority 
in East Asia without the series of diplomatic issues related to the British occupation of 
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Kŏmundo.  This problem induced not only the British themselves but also the Japanese 
and the Russians to respond to the reassertion of Qing power in as conciliatory a manner 
as possible.  The occupation of Kŏmundo was also an issue that encouraged the British 
to act cautiously and patiently during the Anglo-Chinese talks over Burma, despite the 
fact that many of the decision-makers were frustrated by the manner in which the Chinese 
negotiated. 
These incidents also cast a significant degree of influence on how the Japanese 
perceived their diplomatic environment.  The Japanese decision-makers concluded, 
after observing the British occupation of Kŏmundo, that a new imperial competition 
between the European great powers had started in East Asia and under such conditions 
they could not risk a further deterioration of their relationship with the Qing as they could 
not afford dealing with China and an Anglo-Russian war simultaneously.  Without 
question, the Japanese policy-making process was affected by such a perception. 
It must also be said that another reason behind the Chinese ascendance was that Li 
Hongzhang managed to restrain the influence of the hardliners in the Qing decision-
making circle and conduct diplomacy in a cautious manner.  Despite the fact that Li was 
willing to take measures that were more assertive towards Korea than China had 
traditionally attempted as a suzerain in the past, he always restrained himself and his 
colleagues from taking steps that would induce serious reactions from the other 
countries.71  Thus Li rejected Yuan’s suggestion to remove Kojong in the summer of 
1886 because such a measure would be interpreted as a Qing attempt to turn Korea into 
its protectorate, and provoke a reaction.  Britain, Russia and Japan all recognised the 
superiority of the Qing over East Asia, and Li, at least, was willing to avoid taking up the 
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policies advocated by the hardliners, understanding that taking an unprovocative line was 
key to upholding an order that already favoured China. 
As a result of the East Asian crises of 1884-7, both the British and the Japanese 
governments started to adopt a ‘Qing first’ approach towards East Asian affairs by the 
early autumn of 1885.  The fact that the Japanese and the British governments made a 
definite shift to prioritise their relationship with the Qing inevitably restricted the room 
for Anglo-Japanese cooperation.  Of course, this did not mean that they became hostile 
towards each other all of a sudden. Indeed, for the British decision-makers, who were 
concerned about the European encroachments towards their spheres of influences, there 
was no reason to reject the prospect of forming an alliance with as many local countries 
as possible.  There was therefore room for contemplating making overtures to Japan as 
well as the Qing.  However, in the summer of 1885 the latter was seen as being much 
more important, and the Japanese were only ever conceived of as a potential junior partner 
in a much more important Anglo-Chinese alliance.  There were also individuals, such as 
O’Conor, who were pessimistic about the prospect of bringing the Qing and Japan 
together in a trilateral alliance, as they believed that the suspicion between these two 
countries towards each other was still too significant after the Kapsin coup and feared that 
any such move would alienate Beijing.72 
On the Japanese side of the equation the suspicion that an entente cordiale had been 
reached between Britain and the Qing made for caution towards Korea.  It also led to 
some trepidation, as they feared that it might encourage the Qing officials to push their 
interests forward in Korea even further, beyond what had been agreed in the Tianjin 
                                                   
72 O’Conor to Granville (Telegraphic, Secret), Beijing, 20 Apr 1885 (rec. 20 Apr), FO 
17/987; O’Conor to Granville (Private), Beijing, 21 Apr 1885, NOP CAC OCON6/1/2; 
O’Conor to Granville (No. 222 Secret), Beijing, 10 May 1885 (rec. 6 July), FO 17/980. 
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Convention.73  Moreover, some of the bilateral Anglo-Japanese issues did not help to 
alleviate their suspicions towards Britain.  There was a Japanese public outcry against 
the British over an incident on the British cargo ship Normanton, which sank off the coast 
of Wakayama on 22 October 1886.  The Japanese public was particularly upset when 
they heard that the surviving crews were sentenced not guilty at the consular court over 
the charge of abandoning 25 Japanese passengers who all drowned.74 
In addition, it is important to note that, after the situation in Korea had stabilised, the 
priority of Japanese diplomacy shifted from East Asia and moved back once again to the 
question of treaty revision, as the negotiations over this issue resumed in May 1886 in 
Tokyo having come to a halt since the summer of 1882.  Immediately after the 
negotiations recommenced, Plunkett proposed to the German Minister in Japan that they 
submit a joint proposal for a new treaty, as he feared that the Germans and the Japanese 
might otherwise sign a treaty that would grant exclusive privileges to the German 
merchants in Japan. This joint proposal was submitted on 15 June.75  The Japanese 
negotiators resented the fact that the Germans had agreed to cooperate with the British 
over the question of treaty revision, but as this overture was initiated by Plunkett, they 
directed their criticism at the British. Moreover, they still saw Britain as the most reluctant 
to revise the treaties.76  This alienated the Japanese decision-makers, especially as they 
had come to realise during the recent regional crises the degree to which the unequal 
                                                   
73 See footnote 69 of this chapter. 
74 NGM, vol. 19, pp. 319-332; Fukuzawa to Shinjōji Temple (Private), 14 Nov 1886, 
FYZ, vol. 18, pp 62-3; Inoue to Itō (Private), 19 Nov 1886, IHKM, vol. 1, pp. 210; 
Fukuzawa to Nagai (Private), 21 Nov 1886, FYZ, vol. 18, pp. 66-7. 
75 Inoue to Itō (Private), 19 June 1886, IHKM, vol. 1, pp. 204-5; Plunkett to Rosebery 
(No. 104 Ext 8), Tokyo, 24 June 1886 (rec. 6 Aug), FO 46/345. 
76 Inoue to Itō (Private), 5 Mar 1886, IHKM, vol. 1, pp. 201; Inoue to Itō (Private), 19 
June 1886, IHKM, vol. 1, pp. 204-5; Inoue to Kawase (機密第四二四號), 3 Aug 1886, 
NGM, vol. 19, pp. 78-80; Inoue to Shinagawa (機密), 3 Aug 1886, NGM, vol. 19, pp. 83-
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treaties compromised their national security.77
                                                   
77 Inoue Kowashi to Itō (Private), 18 Dec 1886, IKDS, vol. 4, pp. 100-1. 
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Chapter 5 – The Post-Crises Order in East Asia, March 1887-July 1892 
 
After the East Asian crises from December 1884 to February 1887, the governments 
involved in regional affairs started to formulate their policy in the clear recognition that 
the Qing had emerged as the most influential power.  They were also now aware that it 
would be very difficult to preserve their interests in this region if they put themselves at 
odds with the Chinese, and for that purpose chose to bite their tongue as much as possible 
towards the Qing claim of suzerainty over its neighbouring kingdoms, including Korea.  
This chapter will show that the British and the Japanese governments continued to pursue 
their respective policies towards East Asia on these lines in the period from March 1887 
to July 1892. 
This period was not necessarily free from trouble, but nonetheless the governments 
involved in Korean affairs showed a continued determination to settle the problems that 
did arise through peaceful diplomacy.  This was possible because the governments of 
Britain, Russia and Japan now appeared quite happy to accept Qing superiority in East 
Asia if that would stabilise the regional order.  Stability had, after all, been the ultimate 
objective of the British East Asian policy since the early-1880s if not earlier.  And 
although Japan had, on occasion, undertaken policies that were opportunistic, it 
nonetheless also agreed that stability was important.  The Tianjin Convention had 
created a framework for avoiding any future repeat of the Sino-Japanese confrontation in 
December 1884 even if any further domestic disturbance in Korea necessitated the Qing 
and the Japanese governments launching a military intervention.  The relative lack of 
major events perhaps is the reason behind the shortage of secondary literature in this 
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period, which makes it difficult to pick out disputed arguments or themes.1 
Yet, it is also important to remember that the Western and the Japanese governments 
were frustrated on many occasions by how the Qing government acted in Korea and East 
Asia.  Despite the fact that these events did not lead the British and the Japanese 
governments to revise their ‘Qing first’ approach to the East Asian affairs, the Sino-
Japanese relationship did not improve beyond the level of a mere rapprochement.  Also, 
despite the fact that many Japanese decision-makers believed that Britain and China had 
entered a relationship of entente cordiale after 1887, British frustration towards the Qing 
prevented the evolution of any such arrangement.  As the Western and Japanese 
governments started to exhibit a stronger determination to bite their tongue against the 
Qing claim of suzerainty, the dual character of East Asian order – in which the 
Westphalian principle and traditional suzerain-vassal framework coexisted – became 
more obvious than before.  This also meant that the governments became more aware of 
the difficulties caused by the coexistence of these two principles, which were theoretically 
contradictory with each other, and this recognition led to new frustrations.  This point 
should also be emphasised, in order to think about the origins of the First Sino-Japanese 
War, which broke out in July 1894. 
 
Japanese Policy towards Korea, and Underlying Perception 
 
In Japan, there were three changes of administration within the five years between March 
                                                   
1 For Japanese policy towards Korea in this period, see Conroy, The Japanese Seizure 
of Korea, ch. 4.  For Chinese policy, see Larsen, Tradition, Treaties and Trade, chs. 4-6.  
For Korean affairs during this period, see Kim and Kim, Korea and the Politics of 
Imperialism, ch. 4; Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, vol. 4; Okamoto, Zokkoku to Jishu no 
Aida, chs. 5-9. 
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1887 and July 1892, but government policy towards Korea remained quite consistent, and 
refrained from adopting any initiative that seriously diverted from the spirit of the Tianjin 
Convention.  Such was the case even in the period when Kuroda – a minister who Itō 
and Inoue had identified as an advocate of a hard-line policy throughout the 1880s – 
became the Prime Minister from April 1888 to October 1889.  Kuroda’s relative 
moderation is also interesting considering that he was aided as Foreign Minister by 
Ōkuma, who had recouped his political influence by associating himself with the Jiyū 
Minken Undō.  This party had often called for more active intervention in Korea in order 
to drive out Qing influence and to initiate reforms in that country.  However, once 
Kuroda and Ōkuma took control of the administration they distanced themselves from 
taking this course, and instead closely followed the policies taken by the preceding Itō 
administration, in which Inoue had served as the Foreign Minister.  Ōkuma 
contemplated the idea of recommending Charles LeGendre – his private advisor, who was 
of the opinion that the Chosŏn must become independent from Qing – as an advisor to 
the court in Seoul, but that was as much as he did, and he stopped pushing this issue well 
before it aroused the suspicion of the Qing and Chosŏn courts.2 
Some of the ministers in the first Yamagata administration, which succeeded Kuroda’s 
from December 1889, also made suggestions for taking new initiatives towards Korea, 
but they too were not overly determined to push their agenda.  For example, Prime 
Minister Yamagata Aritomo himself advocated the idea that Korea should be 
internationally recognised as a permanently neutralised nation-state, just as Inoue 
Kowashi had earlier in the 1880s.3  Aoki Shūzō, who acted as the Foreign Minister, 
                                                   
2 Ōsawa, “Tenshin Jōyaku Taisei no Keisei to Hōkai (2),” 129-135.  LeGendre was a 
French-born American who was hired by the Gaimushō from 1875 to 1878, but chose to 
stay in Japan even after he resigned from his role in the government. 
3 Memorandum by Yamagata, Mar 1890, YAI, pp. 196-200/IKDS, vol. 6, pp. 204-
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developed the idea of Yamagata and Inoue into a broader proposal for an alliance.  Aoki 
argued that the Japanese government should identify Russia as the primary threat to its 
interests in East Asia, and accordingly create an anti-Russian coalition with the Qing, 
Britain and Germany.4  Within this scheme, he placed the foremost importance on Sino-
Japanese cooperation, which was deemed necessary not only to check the Russian 
expansion but also to pave the way for these two governments to initiate reforms in 
Korea.5  While neither of these policies could be considered as being aggressive, they 
nonetheless were measures to either persuade the Western nations to recognise Korea as 
an independent nation and thus detach it from Qing suzerainty, or improve the Japanese 
foothold in the peninsula by establishing a multilateral alliance.  These were measures 
that did not necessarily abide by the Tianjin Convention, the de facto Japanese recognition 
of the superiority of Qing influence in Korea, and this perhaps was the reason why the 
Western nations did not take these proposals too seriously.6  Neither did the Japanese 
themselves push them too far. 
Instead, all of the measures that Japan took towards Korea were made within the 
framework of the Tianjin Convention.  The senior officials of the Gaimushō became 
somewhat more active in promoting commerce and investment in Korea than in the early-
1880s, perhaps because it was seen as a useful means by which to restore their foothold 
                                                   
211/KSKKT MuMKM 69-2.  This measure was discussed on some occasions by 
diplomats in East Asia throughout the decade.  See Inoue to Yamagata (Private), 23 
Sept 1882, YAKM, vol. 1, pp. 184-5; Plunkett to Granville (No. 32 Secret), Tokyo, 24 
Jan 1885, (rec. 7 Mar), FO 46/327; Enomoto to Inoue (機密第十二號の内), Beijing, 6 May 
1885 (rec. 22 May), NGM, vol. 18, pp. 317; Hatano to Inoue (機密第五拾二號), Tianjin, 
25 Aug 1885 (rec. 12 Sept), NGM, vol. 18, pp. 386-8; Hatano to Inoue (機密第五十八號), 
Tianjin, 7 Sept 1885 (rec. 21 Sept), NGM, vol. 18, pp. 388-390. 
4 Memorandum by Aoki, 15 May 1890, NGM, vol. 23, pp. 538-543/KSKKT MuMKM 67-
1.  For Inoue Kowashi’s suggestions, see chapter 2. 
5 Ibid.  Memorandum by Yamagata, Mar 1890, YAI, pp. 196-200/IKDS, vol. 6, pp. 204-
211/KSKKT MuMKM 69-2. 
6 Ōsawa, “Tenshin Jōyaku Taisei no Keisei to Hōkai (2),” 151-2. 
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in Korea, which had shrunk as a result of the Kapsin incident, and if possible place some 
check on Qing influence without infringing upon the spirit of the Tianjin Convention.  
While the Japanese government had been encouraging overseas investment and trade as 
a measure to create a ‘Wealthy Nation, Strong Military’ already by the 1870s, they 
nonetheless placed an even stronger emphasis than before on encouraging large-scale 
entrepreneurs to invest in Korea by the late-1880s.7  For example, the Japanese legation 
in the Chosŏn court reported in April 1887 that an entrepreneur called Umaki Kenzō was 
interested in investing in a mining company that the court in Seoul had recently 
established, and asked the Gaimushō to give him support so that the Chosŏn ministers 
would grant such a right.8  The negotiations took some time to materialise, as the Chosŏn 
officials were very reluctant to hand such rights to foreigners, but in the end the Korean 
company agreed to hire Umaki as a member of its board.9 
Over commercial issues, the Japanese decision-makers often became assertive towards 
Korea.  Aside from the issues over mining rights, it continued to press the Chosŏn 
officials to permit Japanese to engage in fishing off the island of Cheju, as the latter had 
                                                   
7 NGM, vol. 19, pp. 383-395; vol. 21, pp. 311-2, 320-6; Machida to Aoki (機密信第四號), 
Hankou, 11 Feb 1889 (rec. 22 Feb), NGM, vol. 22, pp. 583-4; Kondō to Asada (機密第六
十八號), Seoul, 14 Oct 1889 (rec 24 Oct), NGM, vol. 22, pp. 440-3; Okabe to Marks (送第
七六號), 3 enclosures, Gaimushō, 27 Dec 1890, NGM, vol. 23, pp. 359-371; NGM, vol. 
22, pp. 571-583; Okabe to Marks (送第七六號), Gaimushō, 27 Dec 1890, NGM, vol. 23, 
pp. 359-360; Nihashi to Okabe (第三十二號), Vladivostok, 25 Apr 1891, NGM, vol. 24, 
pp. 354-5; Hayashi to Okabe (公信第六五號), Inch’ŏn, 13 May 1891 (rec. 20 May), NGM, 
vol. 24, pp. 360-1; Nakagawa to Hayashi (機密第三號), Pusan, 11 Mar 1892, NGM, vol. 
25, pp. 448-9; Enomoto to Nakagawa (機密送第二八七號), 15 Apr 1892, NGM, vol. 25, 
pp. 451-2.  Hunter and Sugiyama, “Anglo-Japanese Economic Relations in Historical 
Perspective, 1600-2000,” 7-35; Kimura, “Meijiki Chōsen Shinshutsu Nihonjin nit suite”; 
Shinya Sugiyama, Nihon Keizaishi – Kinsei-Gendai, (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2012), 
section II. 
8 Takahira to Inoue (機密第四拾五號), Seoul, 18 Apr 1887 (rec. 28 Apr), NGM, vol. 20, 
pp. 241-3. 
9 NGM, vol. 20, pp. 234-271; vol. 21, pp. 225-269.  Takahira to Inoue (機密第七十三號) 
Seoul, 21 June 1887 (rec. 1 July), NGM, vol. 20, 258-9; Kondō to Itō (機密第一號), Seoul, 
7 Jan 1888 (rec. 18 Jan), NGM, vol. 21, pp. 225-6. 
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agreed in 1884 that the Treaty of Kanghwa did grant the Japanese such rights.  The 
enforcement of this stipulation was, though, delayed until 1893, due to the fact that the 
local residents – who the Chosŏn officials described as being very violent and xenophobic 
– refused to allow any fishing in the vicinity of the island and attacked any Japanese who 
visited the area.10  In the mid-1880s the Gaimushō acted in a conciliatory manner to the 
Chosŏn court over the Cheju issue, as the latter permitted the Japanese to engage in 
fishing in areas adjacent to Inch’ŏn in return for the postponement, but as the Korean 
authorities continued to request further delays, the Japanese senior officials became more 
suspicious, and more assertive in demanding the opening of the island.11 
A dispute over a Chosŏn embargo of rice export in 1887 was another issue that took 
time to solve, and frustrated both the Japanese diplomats and the Gaimushō officials.  
The issue arose when the Chosŏn court announced to the Japanese legation in Seoul on 
11 October 1889 that there was a famine in Hamgyŏng province – a region adjacent to 
Wŏnsan – and therefore a need to embargo rice exports from 23 November for the purpose 
of relieving the victims.12  The Treaty of Kanghwa did not deny the rights of the Chosŏn 
court to impose an embargo if this was notified a month before, but it became a problem 
when the latter sent a dispatch to the Japanese legation indicating that they would like to 
impose the embargo immediately, and introduced it on 7 November despite a Japanese 
protest.13  The Gaimushō decided to demand reparations, as there were many Japanese 
                                                   
10 NGM, vol. 17, pp. 377-385; vol. 20, pp. 296-328; vol. 22, pp. 370-380; NGM, vol. 23, 
pp. 258-307; vol. 24, pp. 272-303; vol. 25, pp. 370-398.  Also see Aoki to Murota 
(Unnumbered), 2 enclosures, Gaimushō, 15 Dec 1887, NGM, vol. 20, pp. 324-6; Kondō 
to Ōkuma (發第一九〇號), Seoul, 12 June 1888 (23 June), NGM, vol. 21, pp. 358-9; Aoki 
to Kondō (Unnumbered), Gaimushō, 3 Dec 1889, NGM, vol. 22, pp. 424. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Hisamizu to Aoki (Private), Wŏnsan, 23 Nov 1889, KSKKT MuMKM 72-1; The 
Report on the Korean Rice Embargo Incident, written in 1893 (date and author 
unknown), KSKKT IKM 673-1/KSKKT MuMKM 72-2. 
13 Ibid; NGM, vol. 22, pp. 396-424; vol. 23, pp. 209-258; vol. 25, pp. 293-370; vol. 26, pp. 
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merchants who had borrowed money and arrived at the Korean treaty ports in the belief 
that they could purchase rice until 23 November.  The negotiations over the amount of 
compensation to be paid dragged on until 1893.14 
On some occasions, the Japanese also did not hesitate to raise their complaints over 
commercial issues in Korea with the Qing government.  Whenever it seemed as if the 
Qing claim of suzerainty was infringing upon commercial rights that were guaranteed by 
the treaties that the Chosŏn had signed with foreign countries, they made determined 
objections in order to protect their economic foothold.  From the mid-1880s, Japanese 
diplomats in Korea frequently reported that many of the Chinese merchants were 
engaging in commercial activities in areas which were not designated as treaty ports, such 
as P’yŏngyang and Mokp’o.15  The diplomats in East Asia insisted persistently to the 
courts in Seoul and Beijing, with the approval of the Gaimushō, that they should end 
practices that were not permitted in the treaties.16 
It should be reemphasised that these initiatives were not intended to challenge the post-
1887 East Asian order.  While the Japanese government was not indifferent towards 
strengthening its foothold in Korea, it did so through measures that did not infringe upon 
the Sino-Korean suzerainty question.  Besides, the measures that it took in Korea did 
                                                   
272-412; KSKKT IKM 673; KSKKT MuMKM 72. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Enomoto to Inoue (官甲第二〇號), 7 Aug 1886, NGM, vol. 19, pp. 372-3; Inoue to 
Takahira (送第五一七號), 4 Sept 1886, NGM, vol. 19, pp. 373; Sugimura to Inoue (機密
第百七十四號), Seoul, 6 Dec 1886 (rec. 26 Dec), NGM, pp. 319; Watanabe to Aoki (機密第
十七號), Wŏnsan, 22 Aug 1888 (rec. 5 Sept), NGM, vol. 21, pp. 326-9; Hayashi to Okabe 
(機密第二二號), Inch’ŏn, 13 Nov 1890 (rec. 1 Dec), NGM, vol. 23, pp. 336-8; Aoki to 
Kondō (機密 送第三七號), 23 Jan 1891, NGM, vol. 24, pp. 222-3. 
16 Watanabe to Aoki (機密第十七號), Wŏnsan, 22 Aug 1888 (rec. 5 Sept), NGM, vol. 21, 
pp. 326-9; Kondō to Asada (機密第六十八號), Seoul, 14 Oct 1889 (rec. 24 Oct), NGM, vol. 
22, pp. 440-3. Kondō to Asada (機密第四十七號), Seoul, 4 Aug 1889 (14 Aug), NGM, vol. 
22, pp. 381-2; Aoki to Yamada (送第三九號), 14 Mar 1890, NGM, vol. 23, pp. 513; Matsui 
to Aoki (機密第三十號), Seoul, 27 Mar 1891 (rec. 4 Apr), NGM, vol. 24, pp. 243-6. 
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not lead to any drastic improvement of the Japanese foothold.  After Umaki was 
accepted as a board member of the Chosŏn mining company, Furukawa Ichibē, who 
owned several mines in Japan, invested 30,000 yen in this company, but chose to 
withdraw from the venture shortly after.17  Korea remained an unattractive destination 
of investment for Japanese large-scale entrepreneurs, and as a result, trade in Korea 
continued to be carried out by small-scale merchants with limited amounts of capital. 
However, the difficulties that the Japanese government experienced with the Qing and 
Chosŏn over commercial issues were enough to make the Japanese frustrated.  They 
were already feeling quite vulnerable towards the Chinese, who had a much stronger 
commercial foothold in Korea.  In addition, the Gaimushō officials considered their 
merchants in Korea as being far too incompetent compared to those from China and the 
West.18  The Japanese government were also frustrated because they recognised by late-
1888 that the negotiations over the revision of the Sino-Japanese treaty might be 
postponed indefinitely because of Qing procrastination, and their resentment was 
particularly strong as they had placed strong importance on this issue.19 
Many of the Japanese were critical of the Qing also because they saw the latter as 
having a bad influence on the Chosŏn officials by perpetuating obsolete traditions and 
impeding the progress of Korean modernisation.  The East Asian crises were pivotal in 
the sense that they made more Japanese perceive Korea as a backward country that needed 
to make more determined efforts to modernise itself, just as Meiji Japan had been doing 
                                                   
17 Kimura, “Meijiki Chōsen Shinshutsu Nihonjin ni tsuite,” 457. 
18 Takahashi to Inoue and Yoshida (秘密第拾六號), New York, 8 Sept 1883, NGM, vol. 
16, pp. 678-681; Takahira to Yoshida (Private), 13 June (1885 or 1886), YKKM, vol. 2, 
pp. 217-8; Watanabe to Aoki (機密第十七號), Wŏnsan, 22 Aug 1888 (rec. 5 Sept), NGM, 
vol. 21, pp. 326-9; Kondō to Asada (機密第六十八號), Seoul, 14 Oct 1889 (rec 24 Oct), 
NGM, vol. 22, pp. 440-3. 
19 NGM, vol. 20, pp. 123-181; vol. 21, pp. 46-112. 
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for the past twenty years.  This image was further reinforced as Japanese decision-
makers experienced difficulty over Korea’s demand for the extradition of Kim Ok-kyun 
and Park Yŏng-hyo, who had escaped to Japan after the Kapsin coup.  The Japanese 
government rejected this request, arguing that it was against the principle of international 
law to hand over political prisoners who had fled from their own country.20   After 
learning this, the Chosŏn regime chose to take matters in its own hands by sending 
assassins to Japan, which was interpreted by the Japanese – both within and outside of 
the government – as a grave breach of international law, and as an extremely uncivilised 
way of handling a criminal case.21  Resentment was particularly strong outside of the 
government, as Kim was perceived among the Japanese public as a tragic figure who had 
failed in his attempt to put his country towards the right path of progress.22   This 
environment induced many Japanese political activists to feel that their government 
should drive the Qing out of Korea through military intervention and exert more direct 
influence on Chosŏn politics in order to initiate domestic reforms.  While the Japanese 
ministers and senior officials of the Gaimushō showed no interest in adopting such 
policies, they nonetheless did share, to some extent, the sense of frustration which lay 
behind these calls. 
They also saw the Qing authorities with a good degree of suspicion because the latter 
had started to make more determined efforts to increase their influence in Korea, not only 
                                                   
20 Takahira to Inoue (機密第二號), Seoul, 3 Jan 1886 (rec. 20 Jan); Kurino to Inoue 
(Unnumbered), 5 enclosures, Gaimushō, 4 Jan 1886, both from NGM, vol. 19, pp. 521-
536. 
21 NGM, vol. 19, pp. 534-586; vol. 20, pp. 329-332, 584-6. 
22 Inukai to Ōkuma (Private), 14 July 1886, ŌSKM (MSV), vol. 1, pp. 238-245/ŌSKM 
(NSKV), vol. 5, pp. 97-120; Iwata to Ōkuma (Private), 20 Aug 1887, ŌSKM (NSKV), vol. 
5, pp. 127-8.  Also see Okayamaken Kyōdo Bunka Zaidan (The Trust for Okayama 
Prefecture Local Culture) ed, Shinpen Inukai Bokudō Shokanshū (Papers of Inukai 
Bokudō, New Edition), (Okayama: Okayamaken Kyōdo Bunka Zaidan, 1992). 
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commercially but also politically.  Many historians have already pointed out the degree 
of vigour that Yuan showed in promoting Qing power in Korea from the mid-1880s.23  
Yuan acted as the protector of the Chinese merchants in Korea as his predecessor Chen 
Shutang had, but did so with greater zeal.  Yuan showed a determination even to protect 
those who were engaging in illegal commercial activities – such as trading in cities which 
were not designated as treaty ports and smuggling products which were not permitted to 
be exported from Korea.  Yuan argued that the Chosŏn officials did not have the right to 
punish the Chinese merchants as the latter were protected by extraterritoriality.24  He 
was much more high-handed than Li towards the Chosŏn officials.  Indeed, Yuan was 
the individual who recommended that Li remove Kojong from the throne when he learned 
about the second Russo-Korean intrigue of the summer of 1886.  Even after the East 
Asian crises, he continued to argue to Li that the Qing should impose stronger control 
over its vassal.25   In addition, according to the Japanese diplomats in Korea, Yuan 
actively pressed the Chosŏn ministers to avoid giving the Japanese commercial privileges 
as much as possible, while urging them to grant concessions to the Qing.26  Japanese 
diplomats and residents in Korea could not help but see this with frustration, particularly 
because Chinese trade in Korea was expanding at such a rapid pace that it was set to 
overtake that of the Japanese by the mid-1890s.27 
                                                   
23 Larsen, Tradition, Treaty and Trade, chs. 5 and 7; Lew, “Yuen Shih-k’ai’s Residency 
and the Korean Enlightenment Movement”; Swartout, Mandarins, Gunboats, and 
Power Politics, ch. 4. 
24 Larsen, Tradition, Treaty and Trade, chs. 5 and 7. 
25 Okamoto, Zokkoku to Jishu no Aida, 368-9. 
26 Takahira to Inoue (機密第六十六號), Seoul, 13 June 1887 (rec. 21 June), NGM, vol. 
20, pp. 281-2; Takahira to Inoue (機密第八十二號), Seoul, 4 July 1887, NGM, vol. 20, pp. 
263-4; Kajiyama to Aoki (機密第百六號), 1 enclosure, Seoul, 9 Sept 1890 (rec. 17 Sept), 
NGM, vol. 23, pp. 206-7; Memorandum (probably submitted by Japanese Minister in 
China, Ōtori Keisuke), August 1891, KSKKT MuMKM 67-6-2.  Also see Larsen, 
Tradition, Treaty and Trade, chs. 5 and 7. 
27 Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 194-6. 
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Li was much more cautious than Yuan, and often reminded his agent in Seoul to refrain 
from taking overly assertive actions which could be interpreted as a Qing attempt to 
establish a protectorate over Korea, as he was aware that this would provoke an adverse 
reaction from the other countries.28  In the end, Yuan did not take any action that was 
directly against the instructions of his superior.  However, although Li was more 
cautious than Yuan and ministers in the court of Beijing, he did not assume that the Qing 
should merely act as a benevolent suzerain.  After all, Li played a vital role in 
encouraging merchants to go to Korea, as he felt that the best way to increase Qing 
influence in Korea within the post-1887 framework was by strengthening its commercial 
presence in the country. 29   Also, when the Chosŏn court sent Pak Chong-yang in 
November 1887 to the United States as the first Korean Minister to that country, the 
Zongli Yamen demanded that Pak visit the Qing legation in Washington before submitting 
his credentials to the State Department.30  When Pak failed to act upon this instruction, 
the Qing court demanded his immediate recall, and in the end Pak left the United States 
in November 1888.31  What was worse was that the Chosŏn Minister to Europe, who left 
Seoul after this incident, was detained at Hong Kong where he stopped over en route to 
his destination for about a year before being sent back to Korea.32  Such an assertion of 
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power by the Qing led to a strong reaction from the Chosŏn court, as it felt that the 
suzerain was breaching its autonomy.  Owen Denny, an American advisor to the Chosŏn 
court, wrote a pamphlet which argued that, considering the fact that the Chinese empire 
traditionally did not intervene in the domestic and diplomatic policy-making process of 
its vassals, the degree of control that the Qing had recently been imposing towards the 
Chosŏn could not be justified.33  In this pamphlet, he also publicised the overbearing 
attitude of Yuan.  Many observers from the Western countries also frowned upon the 
Qing actions in Korea, even if they chose not to raise vocal objections.34 
Meanwhile, the strategic importance of Korea continued to grow within the eyes of the 
Japanese military officials, as the international environment started to look even more 
dangerous in the late 1880s than earlier in the decade.  In a memorandum that Yamagata 
drew up in January 1888 and submitted to the cabinet in 1890, he pointed out that; 
 
The tension between Britain and Russia has become so great to the extent that it seems 
possible that they can cause a great disturbance in the Orient.  The Canadian Pacific 
Railroad and the Siberian Railroad would enable them to send troops to the Orient much 
quicker than before, and thus it is likely that a war will be fierce if it would break out in the 
future.  In addition, the opening of the Panama Canal will connect the Atlantic and the 
Pacific Oceans, and provide an alternative channel to connect Europe and the Orient.  Our 
country cannot remain indifferent about this situation, and must make every effort to 
strengthen our military capability as quickly as possible.35 
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Moreover, in the famous speech that Yamagata made at the inaugural session of the 
National Diet on 25 November 1890 – which was based upon the memoranda that he had 
submitted – he argued that in order to protect Japan’s borders it must also secure what he 
called “the line of vital national interest.”36  This is often cited by historians as the 
moment when the Japanese started to address the need to be capable of strengthening their 
strategic foothold in Korea in order to address what they considered as an increasing 
threat coming from the Qing.37  Some who disagree with this argument point out that 
the Japanese were instead identifying Russia as their primary enemy.38  However, it is 
more accurate to depict the period between the Kapsin incident and the outbreak of the 
Sino-Japanese war as a time when the Japanese government perceived in general that the 
international environment in East Asia was becoming more dangerous rather than 
identifying one specific enemy. 
Nonetheless, this environment induced the ministers and military officials to develop 
the military into a force that was capable not only of defending the country’s borders but 
also for launching an expedition into neighbouring regions.  In May 1888, the IJA 
abolished the chindai system and reorganised the military into six divisions.39  It adopted 
the Prussian training curriculum which emphasised mobility and speed as being essential 
for success in overseas operations.40  Also, as Japan came out of the recession which had 
started in late 1881 at the end of 1886, the development of essential infrastructure sped 
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up in the subsequent years.  By the end of 1891 the fortifications of its major ports had 
been completed.41  Additionally, by the late-1880s more entrepreneurs started to invest 
in railroad construction, and the military officials exerted some influence over which lines 
should be prioritised; they were quite vocal about this issue as they perceived the railways 
as being vital for the swift mobilisation and transportation of soldiers.42   
As indicated in the previous chapter, there were many individuals who had already 
strongly advocated that the government should acquire ironclads by the mid-1880s, 
insisting that Japan could never ensure its security until it acquired the means to project 
power beyond its borders.43  While many Japanese officials were aware that the financial 
situation rendered it impossible to acquire expensive warships in large quantities, this did 
not mean that they rejected the logic behind this argument.  Accordingly in 1888, the 
Japanese government approved the acquisition of three heavy cruisers; these still were 
qualitatively inferior to the two ironclads that the Beiyang Fleet had possessed, but the 
Japanese decision-makers had now started to take clear, decisive steps to acquire the 
warships necessary to form fighting squadrons. 44   Once the government financial 
situation improved, the government approved an increase in the naval budget from 1889.  
In September 1890 it signed off on a seven-year plan for naval expansion that was 
submitted by Kabayama Sukenori, the Minister of Navy, which called for a budget of 
about 70 million yen altogether to add 70,000 tons of warships to the IJN.45  Despite the 
fact that there was strong pressure from the Diet to reduce the national budget in order to 
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lower the heavy tax burden, the political parties did not disagree with Yamagata about the 
need to acquire military strength and overseas manoeuvrability, and his speech did not 
lead to any sort of outcry.46 
Of course, it was impossible for the military reforms which had started in the late-
1880s to bear fruit by the summer of 1892.  The naval expansion slowed down 
temporarily when the first Matsukata administration, which succeeded Yamagata, failed 
to satisfy the Diet over the latter’s demands for budgetary cutbacks in December 1891.47  
It also was not until October 1892 that the Japanese military conducted an offensive army-
navy coordinated drill along the lines of an overseas expedition; the military had 
conducted its first army-navy coordinated drill for the first time in the Meiji era in 1890, 
but this was conceived as training for a defensive operation against an external military 
trying to attack the home islands.48  The military power of Japan in the summer of 1892 
was thus still grossly inadequate to fight a war against the Qing on the Asian continent, 
especially considering that many of the Japanese decision-makers continued to think that 
Britain would side with the Qing in such a case.49  However, the Japanese military was 
taking steps so that it could launch an expedition towards the Asian continent, even if it 
was not necessarily specifically addressing the Qing. 
The late 1880s was also a period in which the negotiations over treaty revision started 
to attract strong resentment towards Western countries among the public.  This 
coincided with the revival of the issue of Asian migrant workers in the white settlers’ 
communities in the pan-Pacific region.  While many Gaimushō officials identified part 
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of the problem as arising from the quality of many of the migrant workers, as these 
immigrants often initiated trouble with the local population, the officials also frowned 
upon the racial prejudice that the people of these regions showed to the Japanese, and 
upon the fact that there still were many cases in which these workers were forced to labour 
under very harsh conditions.50  Their concern was further amplified by the fact that the 
governments in these regions had started to approve discriminatory laws designed to 
restrict Chinese immigrants, as they feared that these governments might apply the same 
legislation to the Japanese as well.51 
Within this environment, the idea of forming an entente cordiale with the Qing for the 
sake of the common interest of East Asian peoples started to attract attention from 
political activists outside of the government.  There were many individuals who 
believed that the Japanese, as the first East Asian people to have made a determined effort 
to modernise their nation, should persuade the Qing and Chosŏn to utilise their massive 
resources and wealth more efficiently so that these two countries could cooperate to reach 
an unprecedented level of prosperity.52  This agenda was definitely ethnocentric if not 
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arrogant in seeing the Japanese as more progressive than the Qing, but should not be 
regarded as being completely aggressive. 
Despite all the events that induced many Japanese to see the Qing and Chosŏn 
negatively, the decision-makers were still determined to abide by the Tianjin Convention 
as the guideline for their policy towards East Asia.  However, these events were 
sufficient to prevent the Sino-Japanese relationship from improving beyond the 
rapprochement of 1885.  In addition, even if the Japanese were not identifying the Qing 
as the only menace, they nonetheless saw it as one of the more dangerous threats that 
surrounded them, and thus strived to build a military with a stronger overseas 
manoeuvrability to address their concern.  The events in the period between March 1887 
and July 1892 thus contributed to create an environment in which China and Japan could 
potentially fight a war.  The Japanese military reforms fed by this environment would 
be prepared by the summer of 1894. 
 
British Perceptions of China and Its Effect on Policy towards Korea 
 
From the late-1880s onwards, the Japanese government feared that Britain and Qing had 
entered into an entente cordiale.  While this perception strongly influenced them in 
adopting a cautious policy towards Korea, it must be questioned whether this perception 
was correct.  Before February 1887, the international environment had induced British 
observers, both within and outside of the government, to make a reappraisal of Qing 
power in a relatively positive light, as the latter had apparently experienced some strategic 
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success against the Russians and the French – the two European powers which troubled 
Britain most in this and other quarters of the world.  But even within this environment, 
the British were frustrated on many occasions by the actions the Qing government took 
against them in Asia. 
It is true that there were individuals who considered that the British government should 
take every measure to win the goodwill of the Qing ministers, as it was essential for 
expanding British trade and gaining a valuable ally to protect its interests against possible 
encroachments by the other European empires.  One of those individuals were Sir 
Robert Hart.53  Being a British official working in the Chinese civil service and engaging 
its officials on a day-to-day basis, Hart understood the interests and customs of China 
better than other Britons, and therefore held a pro-Chinese sentiment than many other 
British individuals in East Asia.54  O’Conor, who served as the Chargé d’Affaires in 
Beijing from April 1885 to June 1886, was of the opinion that when the British 
government wanted something from the Chinese, it must do so with a very firm attitude 
– firm to the extent of using threats – but he nonetheless shared Hart’s belief that an 
alliance with Qing would be extremely valuable. 55   However, there were many 
individuals who were equally sceptical even during the years of crises in the mid-1880s.  
In fact, as the crisis in Asia subsided, the environment made a positive reappraisal of the 
Qing more difficult.  The peaceful resolution of the Penjdeh crisis and the annexation of 
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Burma in 1885 and 1886 reduced the tensions between the European great powers at least 
to the extent that an immediate outbreak of war in Asia seemed unlikely.  As a result, 
there emerged an environment which made the British government less desperate to seek 
local allies in East Asia.  This consequently discouraged the British observers from 
seeing the Qing in as positive a light as they had in the former half of the 1880s, especially 
when the relationship between Britain and China was far from easy. 
For example, the Admiralty’s remarks on the Chinese remained very discouraging 
throughout the period from January 1880 to July 1894.  Most British observers held the 
Qing naval service in low esteem, arguing that the state of discipline on its ships was 
lamentable.  Seamen did not wear their uniforms correctly, they loitered on deck when 
they did not have orders, the state of hygiene was very poor, no drills were carried out, 
there were no assemblies except at morning and night, and neither did the officers seem 
to care. 56   The image of the Qing naval service within the eyes of the Admiralty 
deteriorated even further after June 1890, when Captain W. M. Lang, the British naval 
advisor to the Chinese Beiyang Fleet, resigned from his post due to an issue that he had 
experienced with the Qing crews.  He reported that when he had assumed command of 
the fleet in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Ding Ruchang, the Chinese 
junior officers and seamen had refused to obey his orders, and also, that despite his 
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complaint, Li Hongzhang did not think the Qing crews had made any offense. 57  
Accordingly, the Admiralty decided not to send advisors to the Qing navy anymore, and 
even refused to accept Qing naval cadets into the Naval College in Greenwich, and on 
British warships.58  Despite the significant efforts of the Qing authorities and O’Conor 
to remedy the relationship, the Admiralty argued that there was no need to restore the 
relationship with the Qing, who they deemed as not being gentlemen; this attitude was 
not remedied before the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War. 
What made the Admiralty particularly distrust the Qing naval service was that it 
perceived the latter’s attitude as representative of the Chinese tendency to look down on 
Western people and resent the Westernisation of their society.  This perception was 
shared by many British in China, including many merchants and missionaries.  When 
large-scale anti-missionary riots broke out in 1889, the British observers perceived, with 
a sense of lamentation, that there were still many Chinese people who treated the 
Westerners as lesser beings.59  In addition, two of the biggest British firms in China, 
Jardine Matheson and John Swire, raised a complaint about the sale of food intended for 
the relief of victims of the Yellow River flood in 1888 and 1889.  These two companies 
argued that, prior to 1888, the Qing court had lifted the duties on foreign foodstuff 
whenever its empire suffered from any kind of natural disaster for the purpose of victim 
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relief.60  However, this had not happened during the floods of the late 1880s.  Instead, 
the China Merchants Steamship Company was allowed to enjoy the exclusive privilege 
of selling food.61  As a result, the British companies were able to sell far lesser quantities 
of foodstuffs than during the previous disasters.  Upon receiving this complaint, 
O’Conor informed the ministers of the Zongli Yamen that they should refrain from taking 
such a discriminatory attitude against the British merchants, which was against the 
principles of the Anglo-Chinese treaty.62  In the end, O’Conor received a letter with the 
Imperial Sanction from the Qing court to thank the British merchants for the sale of 
foodstuff, but he also noticed that the language of this letter sounded as if the Qing 
emperor was thanking a subordinate rather than the diplomatic representative of an equal 
power.63   
A further problem, which foreign diplomats had already begun to recognise in the mid-
1880s, was that Li sometimes found it difficult to suppress the opinion of the hardliners 
within the decision-making circle.  These individuals had started to approach the young 
emperor more frequently in order to influence him, and by the late-1880s were quite 
successful in turning the emperor into their own political powerbase within the court.64  
The Empress Dowager declared in July 1886 that she would step down as a regent when 
the Guangxu Emperor came of age in the following year. 65   She remained a very 
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influential individual within the court even after, but she no longer was able to act in place 
of the emperor. 
Another source of frustration for the British decision-makers was the delineation of the 
Sino-Burmese boundary.  Talks on this issue commenced soon after the Anglo-Chinese 
agreement on the suzerainty question was signed.  In particular, the British and the Qing 
negotiators clashed over possession of Bhamo in the Upper Irrawaddy basin, and the 
difficult talks that soon ran into a stalemate only worsened the image of the Qing in the 
eyes of many British officials in India and the India Office.66  A year and a half later, the 
Anglo-Chinese relationship became even tenser when the Government of India authorised 
an expedition to incorporate Sikkim into its territory, as the Qing also claimed possession 
of this territory.67  Finally, the British diplomats and senior officials were starting to fear 
by the late-1880s that the French and Chinese governments were contemplating signing 
an agreement that would exclude merchants from countries other than their own from the 
frontier between China and Tonkin.68 
The British also observed Sino-Russian interactions in Central Asia with strong 
suspicion.  As the Qing reincorporated Kashgar, the territory located in the eastern flank 
of the band of khanates in Central Asia, this region came to be perceived by the officials 
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of British India as being increasingly important for the defence of India.  Thus, the 
British were alarmed in the early-1880s when they heard that Qing had agreed that Russia 
could trade some goods without duty with the result that commercial interaction between 
Russian Central Asia and Kashgar grew.69  There was a British trade representative who 
was permitted to reside on a permanent basis in Kashgar, but his information was often 
inaccurate and therefore India wished to have agents and a diplomatic establishment that 
could watch Russian activities in the region more closely.70 
However, despite the efforts of the Governments of Britain and India, the dominant 
position that the Russians established in this region in terms of trade remained unmoved, 
and the Qing proved very hesitant about approving the establishment of the British 
consulate.71  There also were reports that raiders from a Central Asian region called 
Hunza – a khanate where the Russians were intriguing very actively in the 1880s – were 
disrupting British trade across Himalayas, and that the Qing officials were deliberately 
turning a blind eye to this.72  Walsham nonetheless continued to negotiate patiently with 
the Chinese government over not only Central Asia but also the Sino-Burmese border and 
was rather optimistic about the prospect of success, but unfortunately, he could not 
accomplish anything before his departure.73 
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Thus, a series of issues that developed in the late-1880s and the early-1890s made many 
Britons in the East Asian policy-making circle question whether they should regard the 
Qing as their natural ally.  There also were many individuals such as Sir Richard Vesey 
Hamilton, the Commander-in-Chief of the British China Squadron from 1884 to 1888, 
who feared that if the British government gave any sign that they would like to come to 
closer terms with the Qing, then it would make the Chinese more likely to become 
aggressive in the region rather than restraining their power, and this might cause 
unnecessary disturbances. 74   Yet, these developments did not lead the British 
government to revise their policy towards East Asia and Korea.  Even if the British 
decision-makers were frustrated by the Qing on many occasions, they were unanimous in 
acknowledging that the latter had greater influence over East Asia than any other country, 
and that they still needed the political and military cooperation of such a power to 
maintain order within the region.75 
Besides, if the British image of Qing was not necessarily positive, the British 
perception towards the Chosŏn officials was much worse.  When British individuals 
started to enter Korea after the opening of diplomatic relations in the early-1880s, British 
diplomats and naval officers started to send reports about the Korean people and their 
regime.  Many of them were surprised by the courteous and friendly reception they 
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received during their visits, but also lamented the level of poverty that these likeable 
people had to endure.76  They cited the oppression of the Chosŏn court as the reason, 
and argued that it imposed strict restrictions on the commercial activities of the people 
and monopolised all goods or resources that were profitable.77  What seemed worse, was 
that from the British perspective, the Chosŏn officials seemed to be more interested in 
using the money they gained through those monopolised goods to advance the political 
interests of themselves and their cliques and indulging in factional strives. 78   Such 
opinion was shared by the agents of Jardine Matheson, who were stationed in Korea to 
explore the country’s commercial potential. 79   By the late-1880s, British observers 
started to use negative words to describe the characteristics of not only the Chosŏn 
decision-makers but also the Korean people in general.  During this period, they 
described the Koreans as being innocent people who could be hospitable and curious but 
were also easily deceived.80  Words such as “indigence, laziness, and squalor” became 
used more frequently in the early-1890s to describe them.81  Meanwhile, the British 
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officials continued to describe the Chosŏn officials as corrupt and despotic, and feared 
that their rule might result in the Korean populace expressing anger towards the 
government in a very violent manner.82 
J. Y. Wong argues that the British decision-makers in the late-nineteenth century were 
economic Machiavellians, who pursued their interests without making any moral 
judgement about what kind of consequences their actions might bring to the local 
population, and were willing to do so as long as no other power could coerce them to act 
otherwise; Wong argues that the idea that free trade was moral, which was the 
predominant philosophy within Victorian Britain, was a blatant declaration of such a 
spirit.83  Indeed, the vices that the British opium trade brought to the Chinese society 
from the mid-nineteenth century onwards have already been pointed out by numerous 
historians, and this dissertation does not deny that realistic calculation was a very 
important factor in the British East Asian policy-making process. 84   However, it 
disagrees with historians who argue that the British were amoral – it would rather argue 
that they were ethnocentric.  Most British observers saw the Chosŏn government as a 
regime which prevented its own people from engaging freely in commerce in order to 
improve their material condition, and consequently saw it acting as an immoral despot 
who deserved very little sympathy.  Neither did Korea offer much commercial potential.  
The merchant company John Swire and Sons chose not to start a business in Korea, while 
Jardine Matheson closed its office in Seoul as early as 1884; both firms were convinced 
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that they could not make any profit in this country.85 
Under such conditions, the British became extremely apathetic about the Chosŏn 
dynasty, and thus their eyes focused instead on the repercussions of the international 
struggle for supremacy over the peninsula.  As the strategic position had developed in 
such a way that relying on an external power, China, to stabilise the domestic and 
international environment of Korea was better than trusting the court in Seoul, they were 
quite happy with the status quo.  And as long as the Chinese influence provided regional 
stability, the British felt no need to raise vocal opposition against its claim of traditional 
suzerainty, which was one of the most important sources of the Qing prestige.  For the 
same reason the British decision-makers felt no particular need to challenge the dual 
structure that characterised the international order in East Asia.  Although the Anglo-
Chinese relationship was far from being as cordial as the Japanese assumed, there was no 
reason for the British government to change the policy it had pursued during and 
immediately after the East Asian crises. 
 
The Anglo-Japanese Relationship, March 1887-July 1892 
 
The British and the Japanese governments had thus both recognized that Qing influence 
in East Asia had strengthened in the early-1880s, and after 1887 they acknowledged that 
the Chinese had emerged as the most powerful regional power in East Asia.  An 
international environment thus existed in which they had to prioritise upholding their own 
respective good relationships with the Qing, for the sake of retaining their interests in the 
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region.  This inevitably meant that the British and Japanese governments devoted much 
less attention on relations with each other.  Besides, the Anglo-Japanese relationship 
continued to be strained as a result of the continued difficulty over the treaty revision.  
The negotiations over this matter became more difficult particularly for the Japanese 
government, because this issue started to catch public attention. 
By the late-1880s, the political awareness of the Japanese people was developing to the 
extent that there was a steady growth of nationalism.  It continued to grow as the date 
for the promulgation of the constitution and the opening of Diet approached, and created 
a political force that was potentially strong enough to topple an administration.  By 
around 1887, political activists outside of the government also started criticising the 
government’s modernisation project as a mindless imitation of the West, conducted under 
the blind assumption that things originating from the West were inherently progressive.86  
These individuals often raised their opposition in a violent manner.  Mori Arinori, who 
at this time was serving as the Minister of Education, was one of the unfortunate victims, 
as he was assassinated on 11 February 1889.87 
In this environment, the fact that the Japanese nation-state could not exercise its judicial 
rights over foreigners started to be perceived as a grave injustice by many Japanese, and 
they began to feel that the complete abolition of consular jurisdiction was necessary.  
Consequently, the proposal for a revised treaty submitted by Inoue in 1887 was 
considered by many individuals within the government to be unsatisfactory.  In the 
negotiations that Inoue had held with the Western representatives, he had promised that 
if the latter would agree to abolish consular jurisdiction the Japanese government would; 
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first, use Western judges instead of Japanese for criminal cases involving Westerners in 
Japan; second, not sentence the foreigners to the death penalty, and prepare separate 
prisons for foreigners; and third, show the Western governments the complete draft of 
Japanese legal codes before the terms of the revised treaty would be put into effect.88  
Gustave Boissonade, the French legal advisor for the Japanese government, raised his 
vocal opposition against this from May 1887 onward, arguing that such a compromise 
was a fundamental contradiction of the spirit of constitutionalism.89  Inoue Kowashi, 
who was heavily involved in the process of drawing up the constitution and modern legal 
codes, agreed with Boissonade. 90   Already by early-1880s, Japanese ministers and 
senior officials were using the pronouns such as ‘India,’ ‘Egypt’ or ‘Turkey’ as examples 
of non-Western countries that had permitted the Westerners to establish a foothold and 
had then gradually being subjugated by the West.91  After the recent East Asian crisis, 
the Japanese decision-makers become more aware of the threat that the unequal treaties 
posed to the security of their country, and started to feel the need for the unconditional 
abolition of consular jurisdiction in order to avoid the fate that the above three non-
Western countries had fallen into.92  When Tani Tateki, the Minister of Agriculture and 
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Commerce, raised his opposition against Inoue’s proposal in early-July, it caught the 
attention of the media and led to a popular outcry.93  Facing harsh criticism from both 
within and outside of the government, Inoue had to postpone the negotiations later in that 
month, and he resigned in September.94  When, later in the decade, Ōkuma resumed the 
negotiations for treaty revision without making any fundamental amendments to Inoue’s 
draft, he was badly wounded by a political activist who attempted to assassinate him on 
18 October 1889.95 
As a result, when Aoki, the next Foreign Minister, resumed the negotiations for treaty 
revision he had to request the withdrawal of all three of the compromises that Inoue had 
made.96  He also had to request that the Japanese government be allowed to impose some 
restrictions on foreigner’s rights to invest and own property in the interior, as there was 
strong opposition against permitting the latter to engage in commercial activities on 
completely equal terms with Japanese nationals even after the abolition of consular 
jurisdiction.97  While it is true that the Meiji government was not free from opposition 
in the 1870s, what they confronted in that decade were rebellions launched by former 
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samurais who were interested in retaining the privileges that they had enjoyed in the 
Tokugawa era, and the decision-makers, determined to create a modern nation-state in 
which every Japanese felt a sense of belonging regardless of their social backgrounds, 
could take a very firm attitude against them.  The Meiji government also at that time had 
a clear strategic superiority over the rural population and the early Jiyū Minken Undō 
activists, and therefore could suppress uprisings with relative ease.  However, it was 
precisely because these decision-makers were determined to create a Japanese nation-
state that they could not ignore the nationalism that emerged in the late-1880s.  Despite 
the fact that on many occasions the government forcefully suppressed these political 
activists, who they often branded as extremists, it sometimes had to compromise or else 
endure criticism, and when they did so there were often consequences for diplomacy. 
The growing sense of nationalism also had the effect of amplifying the lingering fear 
of Western imperialism.  This exploded when Tsarevich Nicholas of Russia – who would 
later become Nicholas II – visited Japan in May 1891.  Upon hearing the news, many 
jingoistic newspapers reported without foundation that he was coming to Japan for a tour 
of inspection to gain information necessary for a future military expedition, and in the 
days prior to his arrival the Russian legation received several threats from individuals 
who believed this.98  Aoki gave a verbal guarantee to Dmitri Schevich, the Russian 
Minister in Japan, that any assault against a foreign prince would be punished as high 
treason under the new Japanese civil code, in which a convict would be sentenced to the 
death penalty.99  Unfortunately, Tsuda Sanzō, a policeman who was guarding the parade 
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of Tsarevich in the Japanese town of Ōtsu, believed the reports in the media and chose to 
attack Nicholas on 11 May.  Aoki then realised that the guarantee was precocious.  
Despite the government’s pressing for Tsuda to be sentenced for high treason, as they 
believed that the execution of this fanatic would bring a satisfactory ending to the incident, 
Kojima Korekata, the chief judge, sentenced him to indefinite imprisonment, as he 
interpreted that high treason could be applied only to cases when the Japanese imperial 
family had been attacked.100  While Nicholas managed to escape without being killed 
and the Russian government acted upon this incident with prudence and restraint – never 
seriously contemplating the idea of demanding reparations or preparing for a war of 
revenge as the Japanese feared – Aoki had to resign for putting the government into such 
an embarrassing position in the eyes of the Russian Minister with his precocious 
guarantee.101  It also triggered the resignation of three other veteran ministers from the 
first Matsukata administration, which was inaugurated just five days before the incident, 
and led to another postponement of the negotiations over treaty revision. 102   Many 
Japanese officials heard Kojima’s sentence with resentment, but they were also aware that 
Japanese constitutionalism would be in jeopardy if the government made any attempt to 
overturn the decision.103 
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The first Matsukata administration was unstable right from the beginning.  It was 
perhaps because the ministers were fully aware of its weakness that they did not start 
negotiations over treaty revision during this period of time, and instead chose to nominate 
Itō, Kuroda, Inoue Kowashi and Terashima Munenori to a committee to prepare a new 
draft of the revised treaties.104  What was worse was that, as many of the ministers 
anticipated, the Diet made strong attacks against the government, criticising it for 
continuing military expansion and not cutting unnecessary spending.105  It also vetoed 
the government’s final proposal for the Japanese legal codes, as the members thought that 
the draft did not adequately reflect the Japanese tradition of how they maintained order 
in society.106  The government could not reconcile all of the pressure from the Diet, and 
in the end declared its dissolution on 25 December 1891.107  In the following general 
election on 15 February 1892, the Ministry of Interior mobilised the police to intervene 
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in the election, leading to clashes between them and voters across the country, killing 25 
and injuring many more.108  Such action only weakened the government even further.  
Constitutionalism and the rule of law had been adopted to create a framework in which 
every Japanese could participate in society as equally and freely as possible by providing 
rules by which everyone must abide.  But what the government officials quickly realised 
was that even within that framework it was not easy to draw a line between extremism 
and the freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. 
It goes without saying that many British observers in Japan frowned upon such 
developments.  Already in 1874, Parkes had reported that the domestic opposition 
against the Japanese government was quite sizeable, and that they often criticised the 
government for failing to adopt aggressive expansionist policies in the neighbouring 
regions; he argued that it was this group that had ultimately succeeded in pushing the 
government to launch an expedition to Taiwan.109  Throughout the period from 1880 to 
1894, he and his successors in Tokyo feared that the Japanese government would be 
forced to take a similar course, this time towards Korea. 110   After observing three 
Japanese foreign ministers being forced to resign due to violent public opposition against 
the government, Hugh Fraser, the Minister in Tokyo from 1889 to 1894, sent a report 
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which contained very critical comments about the Japanese on 13 January 1890. 
 
[Japan] contains a population of from thirty to forty millions of people of a distinctly warlike 
characters.  Although they have had little to do with foreign wars, I suppose no land on the 
globe has… so long or so barbarous a record of civil war to its history.  …[O]ne cannot 
rely very confidently upon the common sense of the Japanese.  They are an attractive 
people on the whole, and have many good quantities, but they are eminently shortsighted, 
fierce, vain-glorious, and excitable, and there is always danger of their committing a “coup 
de tête,” doing childish wrongs… in serious affairs.111 
 
Fraser reported that the problem was that the Japanese newspapers produced ignorant and 
violent articles which advocated reckless foreign adventures, and that the audience was 
not a small minority.  Fraser described the Japanese as a very warlike people, with a 
history marred by never-ending domestic conflicts; the Japanese military had 
concentrated the nation’s resources with astonishing efficiency after the Meiji Restoration, 
but there was a tendency for these people to call for war out of short-sighted passion rather 
than rational calculation and common sense.112  Additionally, British merchants were 
frequently complained that the Japanese did not abide by Western commercial ethics, such 
as respecting the trademarks of the products that they imported, and not only the 
diplomats but also the officials in the Foreign Office were somewhat receptive to these 
complaints.113 
                                                   
111 Fraser to Salisbury (No. 10), Tokyo, 13 Jan 1890, rec. 20 Feb, FO 46/398. 
112 Fraser had continuously sent reports arguing in similar direction until he returned 
to London for a temporary leave in 1892.  Refer to FO 46/398-400, 405-8, 416-9.  For 
specific examples, see; Fraser to Salisbury (No. 59 Very Confidential), Tokyo, 11 June 
1891, rec. 9 July, FO 46/407; Fraser to Salisbury (No. 6), Tokyo, 26 Jan 1892, rec. 5 
Mar, FO 46/417. 
113 Plunkett to Salisbury (No. 66), Tokyo, 16 Mar 1887, rec. 22 Apr, FO 46/366; 
Salisbury to Plunkett (No. 49), FO, 18 May 1887, FO 46/364; Salisbury to Trench (No. 
24), FO, 6 Oct 1888, FO 46/378; Trench to Salisbury (No. 95), Tokyo, 17 Dec 1888, rec. 
25 Jan 1889, FO 46/380; Fraser to Salisbury (No. 12), Tokyo, 6 Feb 1892, rec. 10 Mar, 
FO 46/417; De Bunsen to Salisbury (No. 65), Tokyo, 8 July 1892, rec. 17 Aug, FO 
213 
 
However, it would be incorrect to assume that the British perceptions toward the 
Japanese were always negative.  It is true that there were individuals such as Salisbury, 
who served as the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary in years from 1888 to 1892, 
who believed that the Japanese could not improve their judicial system to the level of that 
of the Western nations.  For this reason, he at first vetoed the suggestions of the 
diplomats in Japan and the senior officials of the Foreign Office who were supportive of 
abolishing consular jurisdiction. 114   Salisbury finally yielded to the opinion of his 
diplomats and senior officials in October 1889, but that was not because he was finally 
convinced that the Japanese could modernise like the Western countries; it was because 
he had learned that the American and German governments were ready to abolish 
consular jurisdiction, and that therefore Britain could seriously jeopardise its relationship 
with Japan if it did not do likewise.115  Still, the number of individuals who argued along 
the same lines as Salisbury was definitely decreasing in London.  Despite all the negative 
reports that Fraser sent about the Japanese, he never advocated that the British 
government should refuse negotiations with the Japanese over treaty revision as Parkes 
once had done.  While the Foreign Office occasionally received reports that foreigners 
had been assaulted by the Japanese, such incidents occurred much less frequently than 
they did in China, and also the scale of these incidents was nowhere near the anti-foreign 
or anti-missionary riots in China.  Most of the private letters that Cecil Spring-Rice and 
Maurice de Bunsen, who served as junior members of the legation in Japan, sent during 
the early 1890s indicate that they were relatively idle unless they were dealing with the 
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115 Salisbury to Fraser (No. 46 Telegraphic), FO, 7 Oct 1889, FO 46/388. 
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negotiations over treaty revision – thus indicating that things were somewhat quiet, 
despite this being an eventful period for Japanese domestic politics.116 
Additionally, when the naval officers compared the Qing and Japanese navies, they 
were often more impressed by the latter than the former.  After comparing the state of 
military modernisation, Hamilton went as far to argue that if Britain were going to form 
an alliance with Qing, then “we must be prepared for the obloquy we should incur from 
the barbarities which they would undoubtedly perpetrate.  The Japanese would be far 
more useful allies, and their statesmen, Naval, and Military Officials and their Naval and 
Military systems are far more in unison with our own than are the Chinese.”117  The 
senior officials of the Admiralty and the China Squadron were impressed by the Japanese, 
who were very efficient in using modern weapons and had adopted Western ways of 
command and administration, drawing a sharp contrast with their very disparaging 
remarks on the Qing naval service.118 
The Anglo-Japanese relationship was thus not easy, but there were many incentives for 
the Japanese to uphold these ties at least to the extent that they would not become hostile.  
The bottom line was that the Japanese decision-makers were well aware of the risk if the 
relationship did become hostile, as they, just as with most of their contemporaries 
throughout the world, realised that Britain possessed the strongest navy.  When Ōkuma 
advocated telling the British that Japan might unilaterally abrogate the existing Anglo-
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Japanese treaty if the latter could not agree with the Japanese proposal for revision, most 
of the decision-makers immediately dismissed the idea as it might give Britain a casus 
belli.119 
The same could be said for British perceptions towards Japan.  Some individuals held 
more positive sentiments towards Japan, whereas others were somewhat more 
negative.120  British society too was not monolithic.  It was not completely antipathetic 
towards Japan, and decision-makers were aware of the difficulties that an administration 
must be prepared for if the Anglo-Japanese relationship turned hostile.  When the senior 
officials of the Foreign Office heard that the Japanese government might be 
contemplating the idea of unilateral abrogation, they had to confront a harsh reality.  If 
the British decision-makers wished to be firm against such a declaration, they had to risk 
war against Japan, a country which had made a determined effort to strengthen its military 
at least to the extent that it could not be as easily defeated now as it had been in the 1860s.  
Since any campaign would become a tremendous burden for the Treasury, and probably 
lead to a Parliamentary outcry this was not a comfortable prospect.  While the British 
decision-makers felt no problem in prioritising the Qing, it is difficult to assume that the 
consideration over the relationship with Japan did not play some role in making the 
British government cautious about inclining any further towards the Qing. 
 
Closing Remarks of the Chapter 
 
As Okamoto argues, there were numerous events in this period which made the Japanese 
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frustrated towards the Qing, and many of them occurred around the borderline between 
the realms of Chinese and Japanese influence in Korea.  As the Qing regime claimed 
suzerainty over the Chosŏn regime, there was a possibility that it might interpret that as 
the right to intervene in Korean decision-making in general, including the bilateral issues 
between Korea and countries other than China.  Moreover, the Japanese were frustrated 
by Yuan, who often pressed the Chosŏn ministers to refrain from giving commercial 
concessions to the Japanese, while retaining or expanding the Qing’s privileges, thus 
arousing the suspicion of Japan’ diplomats in Korea.  The British also did not appreciate 
these assertions by the Qing officials, and experienced many difficulties in other parts of 
East Asia. 
The historians of modern East Asian history have satisfactorily shed light on the fact 
that the events between March 1887 and July 1892 created a significant degree of friction 
between the Western and the Japanese governments and the Qing.  These researchers 
contend that the main source of tension was the friction between the two different 
principles for conducting international relations – the Westphalian principles and the 
traditional suzerain-vassal framework – which characterised the international 
environment that existed in East Asia at that time.121  Okamoto Takashi argues that this 
dual structure became more apparent from the mid-1880s onwards because the East Asian 
crises could only be settled by acknowledging Qing superiority, in other words accepting 
that the Qing decision-makers placed strong importance on upholding its position as the 
traditional suzerain. 122   But the long-term coexistence of these two orders was – 
according to Okamoto – impossible, as they were theoretically contradictory.  Moreover, 
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the short-term regional stability in East Asia that rested upon recognition of their 
coexistence had the ironical effect of making decision-makers recognise this 
incompatibility.  Okamoto concludes that Mutsu Munemitsu, the Japanese Foreign 
Minister at the time of the First Sino-Japanese War, made the decision to go to war against 
China in June 1894 because it seemed an ideal opportunity to put an end to the dual 
structure that had continued to frustrate the Japanese and threatened their foothold in 
Korea.123 
However, as Takahashi Hidenao had argued, the long-term factors should not be 
overemphasised.  In the 1980s, Takahashi convincingly argued against the line of 
argument forwarded by many of the historians focusing on Japan’s East Asian policy, who 
insist that the Japanese government went to war with the Qing in the summer of 1894 to 
remove what it perceived as the biggest obstacle to fulfil their long-term ambition to 
colonise Korea124  Takahashi argued that while there were many individuals who called 
for an assertive policy towards Korea, the ones that mattered the most within the Japanese 
decision-making circle kept their distance for much of the time before 1894. 125  
Accordingly Takahashi has called Mutsu’s diplomacy from July 1894 onwards a radical 
departure from previous policies towards Korea, rather than something induced by 
international environment or long-term factors.  He has argued that this arose because, 
for the first time in the history of Meiji Japan, the political parties in Japan became so 
powerful that the government felt it had to distract their attention through an external war 
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in order not to have the government brought down by domestic pressure.126 
The evidence cited here suggests, indeed, that most of the decision-makers of the 
governments involved in East Asian affairs – not only the Japanese but also the Western 
governments – were fully aware of the dual structure of the East Asian regional order, 
and were willing to retain it as a status quo.  There is no stronger indication that they 
placed emphasis on the order and stability of the region than the fact that none of them 
chose to adopt policies that fundamentally departed from the spirit of the post-1887 
regional order, despite experiencing difficulties.  There is also no evidence that indicates 
that the key decision-makers in Britain and Japan thought that the post-1887 regional 
order was so contradictory that it was destined to fall, at least in the period from March 
1887 to July 1892. 
In the summer of 1892, there were many possibilities for the future of East Asia.  As 
Okamoto has indicated, war was one of the options, but it must also be said that a bilateral 
Sino-Japanese conflict over Korea was not the only way in which it could have broken 
out.  Despite the fact that the British government was extremely reluctant to fight a war 
in East Asia, they nonetheless had fought three conflicts with the Qing and Japan in the 
mid-nineteenth century, and as long as its primary interest within the region was trade, 
there still was the possibility of another conflagration should a commercial dispute with 
an East Asian country escalate into something very serious.  There also was the 
possibility that a Sino-Japanese war over Korea might become a much broader conflict, 
as these two countries were in dispute over other regions, such as Ryukyu, as well.  
Finally, while there were many factors which prevented the British decision-makers from 
seeing Qing as their natural ally, they nonetheless were unanimous that it was still the 
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most influential country in East Asia.  There was thus a very good chance of the British 
siding with the Qing if a Sino-Japanese war broke out.  Indeed, it was because the 
Japanese decision-makers believed that there might be an Anglo-Chinese entente cordiale 
that the Japanese were very cautious in dealing with their neighbours. 
War, though, was not the only possible future for East Asia in the summer of 1892.  
The decision-makers of the governments involved in East Asian affairs were not holding 
themselves back from starting a war only because the state of their military was unready, 
or the international environment did not suit starting a campaign.  There always were 
different opinions on what course they should take in terms of their policies towards 
Korea.  It may be that the influence of the diplomatic hardliners was strengthening 
particularly within Beijing and Tokyo, but the policy-making processes of the countries 
involved in Korean affairs, including the Qing and Japan, were still driven by the 
individuals who thought that peace and stability in Korea suited their interests; even the 
Qing, which was inclined to strengthen its influence in Korea as much as possible, was 
cautious not to pursue any policy that would induce a serious reaction from the other 
countries.  In order to understand why it was a bilateral Sino-Japanese war over Korea 
that broke out in July 1894, one must look carefully into how events developed 
immediately before the outbreak of the war.
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Chapter 6 – The Road to the First Sino-Japanese War, August 1892-July 1894 
 
Despite the fact that the First Sino-Japanese War was a significant event for modern East 
Asian history, it has received relatively little attention from Western scholars.  There is 
a long article by T. F. Tsiang in English on the origins of the conflict, but, as the author 
admitted, it was written in the 1930s with very limited access to archival materials.1  S. 
C. M. Paine has written a very well researched book, but it focuses more on public opinion 
towards the war.2  There also are some works that deal with the events that occurred 
during the war, but the books of Hilary Conroy and George Alexander Lensen remain the 
only two accounts that provide a detailed analysis of the politics and diplomacy which 
resulted in triggering the conflict.3  Although the focus of this dissertation is on the 
Anglo-Japanese relationship in the period before the outbreak of war, it is necessary to 
provide a more detailed overview of the Sino-Japanese crisis over Korea in the summer 
of 1894 than can be seen in the existing English-language literature, as this helps us to 
understand the environment in which the British and Japanese formed their policies 
towards each other and what effect their relationship had on the region. 
One must rely on the secondary sources written in Japanese to supplement the shortage 
of works in English.  Among the latter, Shinobu Seizaburō has argued that in the crucial 
days before the outbreak of war, the government and the military were both conducting 
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diplomacy on their own, and that it was this that drove the nation towards war against the 
Qing.4  Fujimura Michio had taken this argument further and argued that it was the 
Japanese military – dominated by individuals who had advocated on assertive policy 
towards Korea from the early days of Meiji era – that managed to take control of the 
policy-making process, and in the end directed the government to start a war against the 
Qing.5  These arguments have now been revised by historians from the subsequent 
generation, as they have presented ample evidence that suggests that the military was 
willing to accept the leadership of the government.6  Both Conroy and Hiyama Yukio 
have offered an alternative narrative that stresses the contingency in Japanese diplomacy.  
They state that the Japanese government started sending troops to Korea before it had 
hammered out a specific policy, and dealt with the crisis in an ad hoc manner until it led 
to the outbreak of war.7  However, Takahashi Hidenao has countered this argument by 
pointing out that the government decision-makers did have a clear vision of their policy.8  
In doing so, he has followed the argument forwarded by Lensen, Nakatsuka Akira and 
Pak Chong-gŭn, which concludes that Mutsu Munemitsu, who served as the Foreign 
Minister during this crisis, convinced his government to deal with this issue in an assertive 
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manner, and that this inevitably strained its relationship with the Qing and Chosŏn courts, 
with the result that in the end the negotiations broke down.9 
The current debate in Japan focuses on the question of why Mutsu decided to deal with 
the crisis in such a firm manner, as there is no primary source that adequately explains his 
thinking.  A debate surrounds this issue also because his diplomacy stands out as being 
considerably adventurous for a foreign minister of the Japanese government, which had 
hitherto been generally cautious in its policy towards East Asia.  As most of the works 
on the origins of the First Sino-Japanese War have been written by historians who focus 
on the Japanese imperial or foreign policy-making process, many of them have tended to 
stress the importance of the domestic factors.10  In particular, recent works on the origins 
of the war have been heavily influenced by the book by Takahashi, which argues that in 
June 1894 it was the situation within Japanese domestic politics which created the 
environment that led the government to launch a war against the Qing over the question 
of Korea.11  In particular, Takahashi has pointed to the fact that the anti-governmental 
political parties managed to pass a vote of no-confidence in the Lower House, and that in 
the end the government had no other option but to dissolve the House on 31 May 1894.  
As the relationship between the government and the Diet was already quite tense, Mutsu 
convinced his colleagues in the cabinet to solve this situation by directing public attention 
abroad.  Within the historiography of Japanese imperialism and diplomacy in the late-
nineteenth century, Mutsu is often depicted as a minister who was inclined to start a war 
from the time the Kabo rebellion escalated in late May, as he deemed it necessary to divert 
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10 See footnotes 4 to 8.  In English, Lensen also made such an argument.  See his 
Balance of Intrigue, vol. 1, 126. 
11 Takahashi, Nisshin Sensō eno Michi, part 2. 
223 
 
domestic dissatisfaction towards the government abroad.  Researchers from this 
background, including Takahashi, have argued that in order to accomplish this objective, 
he took measures to remove every obstacle that lay in front of his government to start a 
war.12 
There are fewer works that focus on the actual diplomacy between the East Asian 
countries, and as a result there has not been enough attention paid to the fact that the Qing 
and the Chosŏn decision-makers were far from being static, passive or powerless actors 
in this story. 13   However, Zokkoku to Jishu no Aida (In Between Autonomy and 
Protectorate) by Okamoto Takashi, published in 2004, has played an important role in 
filling this gap, as it offers a detailed narrative of the Qing policy towards Korea before 
the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War. 14   His work presents evidence which 
suggests that there were also international factors that induced the Japanese to take a firm 
line of policy against the Qing in the summer of 1894, and that the Chinese were trying 
to expand their influence in Korea during the Kabo rebellion.  This dissertation will also 
argue that while it is undeniable that Mutsu conducted diplomacy in an unprecedentedly 
firm manner, it is questionable whether he was did so in the strong conviction that there 
was no other way for the Japanese government. 
In order to understand the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War, it is also important 
to look at why it was only a bilateral conflict – in other words, to examine why the Western 
countries did not intervene.  Again, there is very little literature on this aspect of war 
origins.  Works by Sasaki Yō and Kobayashi Takao are about the only exceptions, but 
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they do not necessarily offer accurate depictions of British policy in the summer of 1894 
because their works are based solely on the Foreign Office records.15  What they both 
fail to explain is the reason why Lord Rosebery and Lord Kimberley, who served 
respectively as the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary during the crisis, made a 
conscious decision to remain neutral, despite the fact that many of the British officials in 
East Asia were advising them that Britain should act together either with the Chinese or 
other Western countries in order to press the Japanese to stop acting in a provocative 
manner.  In order to explain the rationale behind the decision of Rosebery and Kimberley 
in the summer of 1894, it is necessary to utilise the private papers of the individuals who 
served as Cabinet ministers in the summer of 1894, which were not consulted in the works 
by Sasaki and Kobayashi. 
In order to explain the aforementioned points, this chapter will be divided into three 
sections.  The first section will follow the events that occurred in the period from August 
1892 to April 1894, to provide a general context to what had happened during the crisis 
which immediately preceded the First Sino-Japanese War.  In the second section, this 
chapter will follow the crisis over Korea from May 1894 until it resulted in triggering the 
war in late July.  Finally, the third section will focus specifically on the Anglo-Japanese 
relationship in the month between late June and late July, when the Sino-Japanese 
negotiation over Korea started to break down despite the British mediation.  This 
coincided with when the final negotiation over the treaty revision between the British and 
Japanese governments had begun; they succeeded in signing the new treaty on 16 July.  
While the British government dealt with the crisis over Korea and the treaty revision as 
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two separate issues, the Japanese side considered that they were linked.  As treaty 
revision was the most important diplomatic issue which the Japanese decision-makers 
tried to achieve since the 1850s, they took every precaution not to pursue any line of 
policy that might antagonise the British government at the very last stage of the 
negotiations.  This perception strongly influenced how they dealt with the crisis over 
Korea.  They therefore guaranteed London throughout July that they would limit their 
military operations in Korea and refrain from taking any measures that could disturb 
British commerce on the China coast.  Such guarantees were enough to convince 
Rosebery and Kimberley – who were much more reluctant to intervene into the Korean 
affairs than their diplomats in East Asia – that their country should remain neutral over 
this issue, and at the same time the Japanese government managed to accomplish treaty 
revision.  And thus the First Sino-Japanese War broke out as a bilateral conflict. 
 
Prologue to the Sino-Japanese War: August 1892-April 1894 
 
Both Britain and Japan experienced a change of administration in August 1892.  In 
Britain, Gladstone formed a government for the fourth and the last time in his political 
career.  In Japan, the first Matsukata administration, which had been fragile from the 
very beginning, finally collapsed.  Many of the individuals within the Japanese decision-
making circle turned to Itō Hirobumi to remedy the internal disunity within the 
government, and he agreed to become the Prime Minister if all of the major Meiji 
oligarchs would join his administration.  Some of the big names such as Yamagata and 
Kuroda hesitated to come under the premiership of their political rival, but in the end they 
all agreed as they shared the perception that the government was in crisis, and the second 
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Itō administration was inaugurated on 8 August.16  After remedying the disintegration 
of the government, the administration managed to pass the budget with only minor 
revisions at the fourth session of the Diet, which commenced from 29 November and 
closed on 28 February 1893. 
Meanwhile, from late 1892 the Japanese-Korean relationship started to become 
increasingly tense because of the difficulty over the rice embargo incident.17  While the 
Chosŏn court had agreed in early 1892 that it was responsible for the loss of money that 
Japanese merchants had suffered over this issue, the two parties disagreed over the 
amount of the indemnity.  The Korean negotiators told Kajiyama Teisuke, the Japanese 
Minister to Seoul, that they could pay about 48,000 to 60,000 yen while the Japanese 
government demanded 140,000 yen.18  In August 1892, Kajiyama argued that not only 
was the Chosŏn court in a dire financial situation, it was also becoming increasingly 
incapable of sustaining domestic order within the kingdom, and that it was incapable of 
preventing provincial governors from introducing embargoes in a manner that was not 
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permitted in the treaty.19  He suggested that since the Chosŏn government could not 
muster the full amount, Japan should close the case by accepting the amount of 
reparations that it could pay.20 
Enomoto Takeaki, Mutsu’s predecessor, was not as generous.  He instructed Kajiyama 
just before he left office that the Japanese government believed that the Chosŏn decision-
makers were insincere over this issue. The former had negotiated patiently for three years 
and yet the latter proposed an indemnity that did not even fulfil half the amount that the 
Japanese demanded.21  After Kajiyama’s efforts to convince his government to adopt a 
more conciliatory attitude had failed, Mutsu concluded that he should send Hara Takashi, 
the head of the Bureau of Commerce in Gaimushō, to conduct a detailed investigation 
into this issue before deciding on what to do.22  On 9 November, Hara wrote that the 
Japanese government should allow the Chosŏn ministers to make its own investigation 
within a fixed period and conduct negotiations based upon its result.23  However, if the 
Chosŏn presented an amount that was unacceptable, then the Japanese government should 
consider recalling its Minister in Seoul, and if such measures were still inadequate to 
break the deadlock, then the Japanese government should consider resorting to gunboat 
diplomacy.24  Although Hara emphasised that the latter should be regarded as a last 
resort, the Gaimushō started contemplating military intervention in Korea for the first 
time since the Kapsin incident.25 
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24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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In late-December, the government appointed a member of the Jiyūtō named Ōishi 
Masami as the new Minister to Seoul. 26   While this might have been a necessary 
manoeuvre to gain support from one of the most powerful parties in the Diet, his 
appointment made the negotiations over the rice embargo even more complicated.  He 
had no previous training or experience as a diplomat, and also was a member of a party 
which had been urging the government to adopt a more assertive policy towards Korea 
from the 1880s.  He was uncompromising and inflexible about the demands, and had no 
understanding of diplomatic manners and rituals.27  His attitude at the negotiating table 
frustrated the Chosŏn negotiators as it was perceived as being arrogant and insulting.28  
The negotiations deteriorated to the extent that Itō and Mutsu had to ask Li and Yuan to 
persuade the Korean government to accept the Japanese demands.29  Even after this, the 
Chosŏn decision-makers were reluctant about complying, as the Japanese government 
demanded about 110,000 yen in total, a much larger sum than the former had argued that 
they could pay. It was only after the Japanese government sent an ultimatum that the 
Chosŏn court finally complied on 19 May.30 
Throughout this process, Ōishi pressed his superiors in Tokyo to be firm over this issue, 
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28 Ibid. 
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but the Japanese ministers and senior officials of the Gaimushō were very reluctant to 
take such a course.31  They were also cautious about infringing upon the spirit of the 
Tianjin Convention even if they needed to be somewhat firm over this issue.  Thus, their 
policy kept to the line taken hitherto.  However, the incident left the impression that the 
court in Seoul was much weaker than previously assumed; many Japanese officials 
thought that the incident occurred because the central government was unable to prevent 
provincial officials from imposing an unilateral embargo.32  The fact that it could not 
prevent the outbreak of the first Tonghak rebellion, which broke out in April 1893, did 
not help to improve that image.33 
In addition, both the Japanese diplomats and decision-makers were becoming 
increasingly suspicious of the Qing.  As indicated in the previous chapter, Yuan was 
determined than Li to take more assertive measures to strengthen the Qing’s position in 
Korea.  Okamoto convincingly argues that Yuan thought that the best way to work 
within the framework of Li’s instruction was to ensure that the Japanese and the Koreans 
remained on bad terms, as he thought that the Chosŏn decision-makers would then have 
no option but to turn to the Qing.  For this purpose he encouraged the Korean ministers 
to remain firm against the Japanese demands. 34   After the difficulty over the rice 
embargo incident, the Japanese diplomats in Korea became more or less convinced that 
Yuan was engaged in unfriendly manoeuvres despite acting in a friendly manner on the 
surface.35  By May 1893, many of the officials in the Gaimushō too were becoming 
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receptive to this argument, and started to worry that Li was turning a blind eye to what 
Yuan was doing.36 
Nonetheless, the situation in Korea became calmer after May.  As the Japanese 
government had stabilised the domestic political situation in the fourth Diet, they 
accordingly decided to reopen the negotiations for treaty revision and submitted the draft 
of a new treaty to the British government before any other Western country in July 1893.37  
Mutsu appointed Aoki, who by this time was serving as the Minister to Germany, as his 
negotiator. 38   The draft that the Japanese government submitted to the British 
counterpart was roughly the same as the one that Aoki had drawn up when he had served 
as Foreign Minister; the unconditional abolition of British consular jurisdiction, in return 
for a Japanese commitment to permit British residents in Japan to travel, reside and 
engage in commercial activities freely within its jurisdiction, although with some 
restrictions.39  As the question of treaty revision had already become an important issue 
within Japanese domestic politics, it inevitably caught the public eye when the 
government reopened the negotiations.  Influenced by strong distrust towards foreigners, 
many political activists argued against signing any new treaty that would allow foreigners 
access to the Japanese interior, and thought that retention of the unequal treaties was a 
better option.40   
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Anti-foreign sentiment had already become a problem in Japan by the late-1880s, but 
a new Anglo-Japanese diplomatic difficulty arose on 30 November 1892 due to a collision 
between the Japanese warship Chishima and the Ravenna, a steamer owned by the 
Peninsular and Oriental Navigation Company (P&O).  This provided a fresh source of 
anti-foreign excitement for the Japanese public.  Both the Japanese government and the 
P&O held each other responsible for the collision, and in the first trial the Yokohama 
consular court ruled that the latter was the guilty party.  However, when the Yokohama 
consular court rejected the full amount of compensation that the Japanese government 
demanded, the latter decided to appeal to the British Supreme Court in Shanghai, which 
then proceeded to overturn the sentence at Yokohama and held the Chishima responsible 
for the incident. 41   As a result, the Japanese government was criticized by anti-
governmental parties in the fifth Diet, which convened on 28 November 1893, for failing 
to hold the British company accountable. 42   In addition, two weeks prior to the 
convening of the Diet, Archdeacon Alexander Croft Shaw, the chaplain of the British 
legation, was attacked by a Japanese mob.  This incident made the British diplomats in 
Tokyo fear that anti-foreign sentiment was growing.43 
Whereas the administration had taken a relatively conciliatory attitude in dealing with 
the Diet in the fourth session, the decision-makers chose to be firm during the next session.  
They immediately arrested the mob that had attacked Shaw, and ordered the dissolution 
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of the Lower House on 31 December when it submitted a bill that criticised treaty 
revision.44  Both Itō and Mutsu were aware that the British diplomats in Japan had been 
reporting about the anti-foreign movement, which was arousing deep concern among the 
senior officials of Foreign Office.  These reports had created uncertainty among the 
senior officials of the Foreign Office about whether they should agree to abolish 
extraterritoriality.  They also feared that the Itō administration might not be strong 
enough to stave off the pressure from the Diet.45  Aoki reported to the Gaimushō that if 
the Japanese government wanted to succeed in the negotiations then it had to gain the 
confidence of the British by making it clear that the current administration had no interest 
in yielding to the opinions of the anti-foreign political activists.46 
The Japanese government’s determination was duly reported by Maurice de Bunsen, 
who at this time was serving as the Chargé d’Affaires to Japan.  On 12 January 1894, he 
reported to the Foreign Office that, “IF (sic) treaty revision is not to be indefinitely 
postponed, I consider advantage great of negotiating with the present gov[ernmen]t, 
which is strong and friendly.”47  While there was no likelihood that the agitation from 
the supporters of anti-foreign policies would end in the near future, the current 
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government had been much firmer against such agitation than its predecessors.  As the 
current administration was much more stable than its forebears, he recommended that the 
British government should negotiate, although they should wait until discovering the 
outcome of the upcoming election in March.  After receiving this telegram, Francis 
Bertie, the Assistant Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, complied. 
 
If we refuse to negotiate or leave unanswered the Japanese proposals, a strong anti-English 
movement encouraged by the Japanese Government may ensue.  [T]he exigencies of party 
warfare may drive whatever Government in power into a denunciation [of the existing 
Anglo-Japanese treaty], leaving us with no trade advantages….  In such case, we are not 
locally in a position to enforce our existing Treaty rights.  The Japanese have a navy nearly 
as strong as that of China.  Their coast defences are nearly finished, and will be formidable, 
and their army consists of 70,000 well-armed and well-drilled troops.  The great object 
which Japan and China have in common, and which is also an English interest, is to keep 
Russia out of Corea (sic)….48 
 
Under such conditions, Bertie argued, the wisest thing for the Foreign Office to do was 
to proceed with the negotiations while there was a stable administration that was also 
willing to take a firm stance against the anti-foreign agitators.  Sir Thomas Sanderson 
and the Earl of Rosebery, the Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Affairs and the 
Foreign Secretary, concurred.49 
Another fact that was somewhat more encouraging for them was that the political 
parties opposed to treaty revision failed to win a majority within the Lower House in the 
general election held on 1 March 1894.  The party that won the largest number of seats 
was the Jiyūtō, which secured 120 out of 300.  The Jiyūtō and Kaishintō were the two 
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parties in the Lower House that had played a leading role in the anti-governmental 
campaign since the 1880s, but the Jiyūtō was starting to soften its attitude against the 
government from late 1892 onwards as the administration had begun to make some 
political compromises with its leaders.  However, the political environment was still far 
from being safe for the administration.  Despite holding more seats than any other party, 
the Jiyūtō was still 30 seats short of a majority.  In addition, although the Jiyūtō chose 
to support the government over treaty revision, the relationship between the party and the 
government was far from being easy, as the former was still of the opinion that it must 
make serious efforts to reduce taxation.  As the domestic political situation remained 
unpredictable, the ideal outcome was that the new Anglo-Japanese treaty should be signed 
before the opening of the sixth session of the Diet, but the negotiations over the details of 
the new treaty took much longer. 
It was under these conditions that another Korea-related incident broke out.50  In early 
1894, the Japanese diplomats in Asia sent several reports warning that the Chosŏn 
ministers might have sent agents to Japan to assassinate Kim Ok-kyun and Pak Yŏng-hyo, 
who were living as political exiles in Japan.51  The Japanese government reiterated the 
stance that it had taken over this issue from 1885, that it had to fulfil its obligations under 
international law to protect any political exiles within its jurisdiction.52  The agents with 
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the credentials to assassinate the exiles were arrested in Japan in early March. 53  
However, on 24 March, Kim boarded a ship bound for Shanghai, and was assassinated 
four days later in that city by a Chosŏn agent named Hong Chong-u.54  After the incident 
was investigated by the treaty-port police, the Chosŏn authority pressed the local 
authority to hand over Kim’s body.55  The Japanese government feared that the Chosŏn 
government might display the corpse in public in order to humiliate the traitor, and made 
strenuous protests against any such move not to do so, but once the handover took place 
the body of Kim was amputated into four pieces which were displayed in public on 15 
April.56 
Several historians have argued that Kim’s assassination was the incident that made 
Japanese sentiment – both inside and outside of the government – become decisively 
hostile towards the Chosŏn and the Qing.57  Indeed, the incident did lead to a massive 
public outcry.  The press were critical that the Chosŏn officials had blatantly humiliated 
Japan by hunting down a political exile and by doing so had disrespected the sovereignty 
of their country.58  Moreover the manner in which the dead body of Kim was exposed in 
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public was perceived as being utterly barbaric.59  Additionally, as Kim had been lured 
to and killed in Shanghai, the Japanese press looked suspiciously towards the Qing 
officials, thinking that they had cooperated with the Chosŏn authorities.60  This sense 
was shared by individuals within the government, and in late-April, Nakagawa Tsunejirō, 
the Consul in Hong Kong, argued that the Gaimushō should stop assuming that Li was 
inclined to take a conciliatory attitude towards Japan.61  This incident took the public 
attention away from the treaty revision talks and made the position of the Japanese 
government even more difficult. 
Of course, as Conroy has argued, it was the Japanese perception towards the Qing and 
Chosŏn that shifted as a result of the assassination of Kim, not the policy, and the senior 
officials of Gaimushō dealt with this issue with restraint.62  However, it is important to 
note that this series of incidents occurred in rapid succession, and consequently resulted 
in some Japanese decision-makers seeing their East Asian neighbours with much stronger 
suspicion than before.  From the domestic political perspectives, the second Itō 
administration was relatively successful in strengthening its foothold vis-à-vis the Diet, 
but it was clear that more hardships awaited them in the future, and no minister could be 
certain about the fate of the administration. 
The British government observed the affairs in Korea before May 1894 relatively 
passively.  Its diplomats in East Asia reported about the Japanese-Korean difficulty over 
the rice embargo and about the first Tonghak uprising, but there are no indications that 
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the Foreign Office felt the need to respond.63  The Foreign Office under Rosebery’s 
ministership continued to pursue East Asian policy along the lines that the British 
government had taken from 1887.  It operated under the perception that the Qing was 
the most influential country in the region, and thus made efforts to avoid upsetting its 
decision-makers.  For this purpose, the British officials in London and the diplomats in 
East Asia continued to bite their tongue over the Qing claim of suzerainty over their 
neighbouring kingdoms. 
At the same time, East Asian policy after August 1892 was also a continuation of the 
one by the previous administration in the sense that the British decision-makers did not 
necessarily see the Qing under a positive light.  In September 1892, Nicholas O’Conor 
replaced Walsham as the Minister in Beijing.  Compared to his passive predecessor, 
O’Conor was known for his forthright negotiating style, and was actually successful in 
gaining some concessions from the Qing not only over trade but also over border disputes 
on the Burmese and Central Asian frontiers.64  When the British government faced new 
diplomatic difficulties with Russia in the Pamir region in Central Asia and with France 
over Siam, Rosebery did not contemplate the idea of forming an alliance with the Qing 
as the British government once had in 1885.65  Also, while the British relationship with 
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Japan was not always easy, the relationship was definitely not hostile, and the British 
decision-makers were cautious about taking measures that might make their Japanese 
counterparts feel marginalised.  As the British thought that the Japanese were not in a 
good relationship with the Qing, they were reluctant to pursue the goodwill of Qing 
decision-makers beyond a certain point. 
Just before East Asia headed into crisis, Gladstone resigned the premiership, and was 
succeeded by Rosebery on 2 March 1894.  While the vacant seat of the Foreign 
Secretary was handed over to Kimberley, Rosebery continued to cast a significant degree 
of influence over the foreign policy-making process even after he became Prime 
Minister.66  However, Kimberley did matter in the decision-making process.  After all, 
he had served as the Secretary of State for India in the past, and had been in office when 
the Anglo-Chinese convention over Burma was signed.  The difficult negotiations over 
this issue had left Kimberley with a bad impression of the Qing, and he continued to see 
their activities in Central Asian and Burmese frontier with strong suspicion after he had 
returned to office in August 1892.67  Such an individual was the minister responsible for 
the Foreign Office during the Sino-Japanese crisis. 
 
The Road to the Sino-Japanese War, May-July 1894 
 
The direct cause of the Sino-Japanese crisis of June and July 1894 was the Kabo peasant 
rebellion.68  The rebellion began in February as a revolt against the provincial governor 
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in Chŏlla province, but by April had spread across the southern part of the Korean 
peninsula.69  After the local provincial forces were defeated in early May, the court in 
Seoul decided to dispatch its troops, but the rebels fought with determination in late May, 
and gained some success in a battle at Chŏnju.  Following this, the court in Seoul came 
to the conclusion that they should request the Qing to send troops.  The Qing informed 
the Japanese that they would send troops to Korea, as obliged by the Tianjin Convention, 
and dispatched them on 8 June.70  Upon receiving this correspondence, the Japanese 
government immediately replied that it too would send troops.71  The Sino-Japanese 
relationship became inevitably tense as the troops of both countries landed in Korea. 
As already mentioned, much of the existing literature on the origins of the First Sino-
Japanese War, particularly that coming from the historians who focus on the Japanese 
diplomatic and imperial policy-making process, argues that Mutsu took this sudden crisis 
as an opportunity to spark a war in order to satisfy public opinion and solve the Korean 
problem.  However, considering how the Japanese had perceived events in Korea over 
the past two years, it is not surprising that they felt the need for action as they feared that 
otherwise the Qing might use this incident to expand its influence.  Indeed, preparations 
for military action were quickly made in case the situation escalated.  As early as 22 
May, when the Gaimushō and the army general staff started to receive alarming reports 
about the rebellion, Itō authorised the IJA to mobilise a brigade.  Japan was thus well 
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placed to dispatch troops by the time the Qing decided to do so a week later.72  On 9 
June, about 4,000 soldiers were sent to Korea, which was quite a large number for the 
protection of treaty ports; the Qing expeditionary force had only 1,500 troops despite the 
fact that they were being sent to suppress a rebellion.73  Moreover, the Japanese general 
staff decided a week before to start general mobilisation of the entire service in case more 
troops had to be dispatched in the near future.  On 5 June they declared the 
establishment of a general headquarters, as it was impossible to mobilise that amount of 
troops without putting the entire service on a war footing.74 
The situation in Korea made the Japanese decision-makers feel the necessity to make 
determined efforts to retain their interest in that country.  However, at this stage they 
were only reacting to the crisis developing in Korea rather than initiating anything.    
Despite the fact that the media was already reporting about the rebellion in late April, it 
was not until the last week of May that they started mobilising their troops.75  In addition, 
the Gaimushō instructed Ōtori Keisuke, the Minister to the Chosŏn who had left Tokyo 
on 5 June, to return to the legation after a short leave of absence with 300 marines and 20 
policemen but to be very cautious after he returned to his post in Seoul.76  As he left for 
Korea before the Qing informed Japan that it would dispatch troops, Mutsu had instructed 
Ōtori that the Japanese government would send troops if the situation in Korea 
deteriorated in the future, but that “the objective of the Japanese government would be to 
                                                   
72 Sugimura to Mutsu (機密第六十三號本四二), Seoul, 22 May 1894 (rec. 28 May), 
NGM, vol. 27-2, pp. 152-3.  Saitō, Nisshin Sensō no Gunji Senryaku, 52; Takahashi, 
Nisshin Sensō eno Michi, 323-4. 
73 Army General Staff to Nozu (Telegraphic 暗号第二号), 5 June 1894, BKS, 大本営-日
清戦役電報綴-M27-1-113 (JACAR C06060666100). 
74 Ibid; Saitō, Nisshin Sensō no Gunji Senryaku, 54-5. 
75 Saitō, Nisshin Sensō no Gunji Senryaku, 52. 
76 Mutsu to Ōtori (機密送第十九號), 4 June 1894, NGM, vol. 27-2, pp. 160-2. 
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protect the Japanese legation and residents in Korea.”77  Mutsu authorised Ōtori to use 
his own discretion in dealing with the situation, but also told him to “be very careful not 
to cause any unnecessary troubles with the Qing army in Korea.”78  Until the second 
week of June, the Japanese decision-makers were not intending to be assertive for other 
purposes. 
It was only after the Japanese government had dispatched the brigade that the 
instructions from Tokyo to Seoul started to become more assertive.  The Ninth Brigade 
of the IJA, under the command of the Fifth Division, arrived in Korea on 11 June, but by 
that time the army of the Chosŏn court had managed to recoup its strategic foothold and 
driven the rebels out from Chŏnju.79  Faced with these new conditions in Korea, the 
Japanese diplomats in East Asia asked for fresh instructions on what to do from this point 
on.80  Mutsu now replied that as there were a large number of Japanese troops in Korea, 
they should not fail to seize this opportunity to demand that the Chosŏn authorities engage 
in domestic reform, as Sugimura Fukashi, a veteran diplomat who by this time had served 
in Korea for quite a long time and was acting as Chargé d’Affaires until Ōtori returned, 
had argued in late-May.81  Mutsu contended that the root cause of the rebellion was the 
degree of poverty that the ordinary Korean people had to endure as a result of its 
                                                   
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 For the arrival of the Japanese brigade, see Ōtori to Mutsu (Unnumbered, 
Telegraphic), Seoul, 12 June 1894 (rec. 13 June), NGM, vol. 27-2, pp. 186-7.  
Tabohashi, Kindai Nissen Kankei no Kenkyū, vol. 2, pp. 261-4. 
80 Komura to Mutsu (Unnumbered, Telegraphic), Beijing, 10 June 1894 (rec. 10 June); 
Ōtori to Mutsu (Unnumbered, Telegraphic), Seoul, 11 June 1894 (rec. 11 June); Ōtori to 
Mutsu (Unnumbered, Telegraphic), Seoul, 11 June (rec. 12 June), all from NGM, vol. 
27-2, pp. 179-185. 
81 Mutsu to Komura (Unnumbered, Telegraphic), 11 June 1894, NGM, vol. 27-2, pp. 
183; Mutsu to Ōtori (内訓), 11 June 1894, KSKKT MuMKM 75-11.  For Sugimura’s 
argument, see Sugimura to Mutsu (機密第六十三號本四二), Seoul, 22 May 1894 (rec. 28 
May), NGM, vol.27-2, pp. 152-3. 
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exploitation by, and the corruption of, the officials and ministers.  Even if the Chosŏn 
court managed to suppress the rebellion, it would not be able to bring about long-term 
stability unless it engaged in thorough reform.  He also felt that it might be worth 
demanding concessions in regard to railroads and telegraphs and the opening of other 
treaty ports, but at any rate the Japanese government should not withdraw its troops until 
the regime had given satisfactory replies to the request for reform.  Mutsu proposed at 
the cabinet meeting on 15 June that; 
 
While the outcome of the recent disturbance in Korea remains somewhat uncertain, it seems 
as if the Korean government is about to suppress the rebels.  Yet, …it is unlikely that the 
Korean government can provide long term domestic stability in that country.  And if 
another rebellion would break out, then it would be inevitable for both the Qing and the 
Japanese governments to dispatch troops, which could lead to further destabilisation of the 
international environment in East Asia.  In order to maintain peace in East Asia, I propose 
to the cabinet that the following two actions are necessary.  First, we should cooperate with 
the Qing to suppress the rebellion in a thorough manner.  Second, after the suppression, 
Qing and Japan should establish a joint committee that would be responsible for reforming 
the Korean finance, governance and military.  …Until the negotiation with the Qing 
government over this issue would come to a satisfactory end, [the Japanese government] 
should not withdraw its troops.  If the Qing government rejects our proposal, then the 
Imperial Japanese government must carry the proposal out on its own.82 
 
This proposal was approved on the spot, and communicated immediately to the court in 
Beijing.  Also the Japanese government took the opportunity to dispatch another 3,600 
troops to Korea.83 
                                                   
82 Memorandum on the Cabinet Decision on the Korean Question, 15 June, NGM, vol. 
27-2, pp. 206-7/ KSKKT MuMKM 74-4. 
83 For the communication of the proposal, see Mutsu and Wang, 16 June 1894, KSKKT 
MuMKM 74-5.  For dispatch of troops, see Yamane to the General Headquarters 
(Unnumbered, Telegraphic), Ujina, 15 June 1894 (rec. 15 June), BKS, 大本営-日清戦役
電報綴-M27-3-115.  The first 600 troops arrived at Inch’ŏn on 19 June, and the 
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Historians have debated the reason behind Mutsu’s zeal in pushing his agenda, and also 
over why the others within the Japanese decision-making circle were agreeable to taking 
this course, which clearly intended to alter the post-1887 order quite drastically.  As 
already noted, a number of scholars of Japanese imperialism and diplomacy have tended 
to emphasise the importance of domestic politics at this point.  They correctly point out 
that around the time when the Chosŏn central army was experiencing a temporary setback 
against the rebels in the last week of May, the anti-governmental parties of the Lower 
House had managed to bring the non-party members of the chamber on to their side.  
With their support, they passed a bill of no-confidence towards the government.84  The 
government therefore had no other option but to dissolve the Diet on 31 May.85   
This development happened at a most untimely moment; it was on the same day that 
the Gaimushō informed its ministers in Washington, Paris, Berlin and St. Petersburg that 
they should initiate negotiations over treaty revision with their host countries as the talks 
with Britain had made decisive progress.86  It would not be surprising if a nightmare 
scenario – the negotiations having to be adjourned indefinitely again as a result of 
domestic pressure right at the time when they were starting to make progress – crossed 
the minds of the decision-makers.  There was therefore a very good reason for the 
                                                   
remaining 3,000 landed on Pusan and Wŏnsan the next day.  See Ōtori to Mutsu 
(Unnumbered, Telegraphic), 19 June 1894 (rec. 21 June), NGM, vol. 27-2, pp. 219; Ōtori 
to Mutsu (Unnumbered, Telegraphic), Seoul, 20 June 1894 (rec. 21 June), NGM, vol. 
27-2, pp. 224; Ōtori and Mutsu (Unnumbered, Telegraphic), Seoul, 20 June 1894 (rec. 
21 June), NGM, vol. 27-2, pp. 224-5. 
84 Sasaki, Hanbatsu Seifu to Rikken Seiji, 380. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Mutsu to Tateno (送第一九號), 22 May 1894, NGM, vol. 27-1, pp. 160-1; Mutsu to 
Aoki (送第一二號), 31 May 1894, NGM, vol. 27-1, pp. 129-130; Mutsu to Nishi (送第十二
號), 31 May 1894, NGM, vol. 27-1, pp. 221-2; Mutsu to Sone (送第十四號), 31 May 1894, 
NGM, vol. 27-1, pp. 331-2. Mutsu to Yamagata (Private), 17 May 1894, YAKM, vol. 3, 
pp. 268-9.  In this document, Mutsu wrote that Aoki telegraphed two days ago that 
there has been major progress in the negotiations with Britain. 
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Japanese government to become much more sensitive towards public opinion in the first 
two weeks of June than it had been in late-May, and there were, of course, many 
individuals within the anti-governmental parties and the press who supported an assertive 
policy towards Korea.87 
On the other hand, scholars of modern East Asian history stress the significance of the 
international environment that surrounded Japan.  For example, Okamoto cites many 
documents which indicate that when Yuan received the official request for military 
support from the court in Seoul, he perceived this as an opportunity to further strengthen 
the suzerain-vassal relationship by making Chosŏn agree that it would entrust its suzerain 
with responsibility for the security of the kingdom.88  When Yuan contacted Sugimura, 
he received the impression that the Japanese were more passive than he had expected, and 
that they were not in a position to quickly organise an expedition because of the 
tumultuous domestic situation.89  Li trusted his report, and in the end approved Yuan 
taking the steps he thought were necessary. 90   Okamoto argues therefore that the 
Japanese decision-makers were reacting against the policy that the Qing decision-makers 
were pursuing in Korea.  The problem with this argument is that there are very few 
documents that shed light on how the Japanese diplomats perceived the Qing actions in 
Korea during the first two weeks of June, how their opinions were communicated to 
Gaimushō, and how they influenced the latter.91  However, there are sources which 
                                                   
87 Itō to Mutsu (Private), 2 June 1894, YAKM, vol. 1, pp. 120; Itō Miyoji to Itō (Private), 
7 June 1894, IHKM, vol. 2, pp. 289-290. 
88 Okamoto, Zokkoku to Jishu no Aida, 380-2. 
89 Okamoto, Ri Kōshō, 174. 
90 Ibid. 
91 There is a memoir by Sugimura, but the problem with this source is that it was 
written post-facto and thus from the benefit of the hindsight.  See Fukashi Sugimura, 
Meiji Nijū Shichihachinen Zaikan Kushinroku (Records of Hardships in Korea, 1894-
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245 
 
indicate that the Japanese diplomats in East Asia were keeping a close eye on the actions 
of the Qing decision-makers, which is not surprising considering the suspicion that the 
Japanese diplomats had towards Yuan.92 
In a semi-official document that Mutsu sent to Ōtori on 11 June he raised several 
reasons why he thought the Japanese government needed to take a robust stance against 
the Qing and Chosŏn. 
 
[If the Japanese troops would withdraw its troops] without firing a single shot in Korea, then 
only the Qing would be credited for contributing to the suppression of the Tonghaks.  …If 
that would be the case, then the domestic opposition would not be satisfied, and it would 
encourage them to make up groundless accusations to attack the government….  [In 
addition], is it not a good idea to initiate diplomatic negotiations [with the Qing and the 
Chosŏn] over the Korean question?  In order to be successful in negotiations over Korea, 
[the Japanese government must] be firm….  Now that we have mobilised a large number 
of troops, it does not make sense to withdraw them without making use of them.  According 
to the telegraph received yesterday, the Qing government was rather shocked to see us 
dispatch troops as quickly as we did… and is proposing that both the Qing and Japan should 
withdraw their troops as quickly as possible.  However, [if the Qing officials in Korea 
contacted Ōtori over this issue, then] you should inform them that you cannot authorise 
withdrawal of troops without the permission of the government.93 
                                                   
assassination of Queen Min in December 1895 – a conspiracy with which he was 
involved – but none on May to July 1894.  See Sugimurakun Nikki (Diary of Mr. 
Sugimura), which is part of the Sunaga Collection, kept at the Sanoshi Kyōdo 
Hakubutsukan (Sano Local Museum), Sano city, Tochigi prefecture.  It has been 
published as Shingo Fukushima, “Jingo Kōshin Minhi Jiken Kanren no ‘Sugimurakun 
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92 Ōkoshi to Mutsu (Unnumbered, Telegraphic), Shanghai, 8 June 1894 (rec. 8 June); 
Ōkoshi to Mutsu (機密第三十二號), Shanghai, 8 June 1894 (rec. 14 June), both from 
NGM, vol. 27-2, pp. 171-6. 
93 Mutsu to Ōtori (内訓), 11 June 1894, KSKKT MuMKM 75-11. 
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In this document, Mutsu clearly expressed his concern about the domestic political 
situation, but he also indicated that he believed in the need for a counter-manoeuvre 
against the Qing in Korea.  Both the domestic and international factors thus contributed 
to making the Japanese adopt a firm policy. 
Takahashi, who has conducted the most extensive research of the available primary 
sources relating to Japanese decision-making, has argued that after 15 June Mutsu 
conducted diplomacy with the intention of breaking up the negotiations and starting a 
war.94  Indeed, as the proposal that he submitted to the cabinet that day demanded that 
the Chinese regard Japan as their partner in dealing with the current disorder in Korea, it 
is not surprising to see that the Qing decision-makers were reluctant to accept it.95  In 
addition, when Japanese government learned from its diplomats that the Qing was starting 
to mobilise its troops and send reinforcements to Korea, it responded by dispatching 
another 2,000 troops.96  The Japanese government was determined to strengthen its 
foothold while it enjoyed the strategic upper hand in Korea, and also made military 
preparations so that it could send reinforcements to retain that advantage even if the Qing 
sent in more troops. 
                                                   
94 Takahashi, Nisshin Sensō eno Michi, 358.  His argument follows the line that 
Nakatsuka and Pak had forwarded before him.  See Nakatsuka, Nisshin Sensō no 
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At the same time, it should also be emphasised that the Qing decision-makers were as 
unyielding as their Japanese counterparts over their interests in Korea.  What the 
proposal of 15 June called for was only a joint Sino-Japanese intervention and the 
supervision of reform.  While the Japanese authorities told their Qing counterparts on 
several occasions that they had never officially approved of the Qing claim of suzerainty 
over the Chosŏn dynasty, they carefully avoided mentioning about that issue on this 
occasion.97  Of course, acceptance of such terms would still be a setback for the Qing, 
but it should also be remembered that as the Japanese had responded quite effectively 
against the initial Qing opportunism towards Korea in early June, the latter was in an 
inferior strategic position.  If the Chinese wanted to get out of this situation peacefully, 
then it was therefore necessary for the Chinese to make some concessions, just as the 
Japanese had had to do when their adventurism had failed in 1885.  Considering this fact, 
the Japanese proposal was so harsh as to make it inevitable that the Qing decision-makers 
would reject it. 
Okamoto, Tabohashi and Kirk Larsen all present evidence that Li was not willing to 
risk war against Japan over this issue, as he was very aware of the weakness of his 
military. 98   However, by this time the influence of the hardliners within the Qing 
decision-making circle was becoming too strong for Li to ignore.99  On 22 June, Wang 
Fengzao, the Qing Minister in Tokyo, communicated that his government did not feel the 
                                                   
97 For the Japanese denial of Chinese suzerainty over Korea, see Mutsu to Wang (送第
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need to take the course that the Japanese had suggested.100  He argued that what they 
should focus on at this stage was making an arrangement that would allow the Qing and 
Japan to withdraw their troops as soon as possible; as the Korean rebels were now 
defeated, there was no source of instability in Korea aside from the foreign troops.  
While the Qing court agreed that there was a need for reform in Korea, it argued that any 
such venture should be initiated spontaneously by the Chosŏn decision-makers 
themselves rather than being induced by a foreign military presence. 
It was only after receiving this correspondence that Mutsu started to take a firmer 
attitude towards Korea.  Mutsu immediately replied that his government regretted the 
fact that the Qing did not agree with the line of policy he had suggested.  In his official 
response, he stated that since the Japanese government placed strong importance on the 
stability of Korea, it could not withdraw its troops before being confident that the rebels 
had been completely wiped out and that the Chosŏn decision-makers would embark on 
reform, and that if the Qing officials were not willing to work with the Japanese then there 
was no other option but for the latter to do this on its own.101  The Japanese government 
submitted a proposal for unilateral Korean reforms, which called for the thorough 
modernisation of the court’s political, financial and military institutions, the tackling of 
corruption, and a formal declaration of independence from Qing suzerainty, and this draft 
was submitted to the Korean government on 3 July.102 
It is worth noting that the Gaimushō started drawing up this draft only after the Qing 
officially rejected the Japanese proposal of 15 June.103  The fact that there is no evidence 
                                                   
100 Wang to Mutsu, Chinese Legation in Japan, 22 June 1894, NGM, vol. 27-2, pp. 234-
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101 Mutsu to Wang (親展送第四二號), 22 June 1894, NGM, vol. 27-2, pp. 235-7. 
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which suggests that Mutsu was taking any specific manoeuvres to prevent foreign 
intervention until late June reinforces the view that the Foreign Minister was much more 
reactive than many historians have argued.104  Also related to this, one can say that, 
considering how the Japanese had perceived the Russians and the British throughout the 
years before the summer of 1894, it is likely that Mutsu would have been concerned that 
the former might be tempted to expand its influence towards Korea, and that the latter 
might form an anti-Japanese alliance with the Qing if a war broke out.  Consequently, 
one would have expected Mutsu to have taken determined steps to prevent Britain and 
Russia from intervening if he was the Machiavellian genius that Takahashi portrays.  Yet, 
the only communication that he made to the Foreign Office to defend his government’s 
stance over this issue was made on 16 June.105  This came not on his own initiative but 
as a response to Aoki who was warning already by the second week of June that the 
British government was concerned about the situation in Korea. 106   In this 
communication, Mutsu argued that his government considered it necessary to keep its 
troops in Korea until the rebels were completely wiped out and that it wanted to see 
thorough reforms in Korea to eradicate the source of long-term instability in that country.  
The lack of evidence which suggests that the Foreign Minister contemplated taking any 
measures beyond this would seem to indicate that he was not as proactive as many of the 
historians of Japanese diplomacy and imperialism argue. 
Indeed, the communication that Mutsu made to the Foreign Office was inadequate to 
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prevent foreign intervention.  After the breakdown of the Sino-Japanese negotiations on 
22 June, both the British and Russian governments started to show stronger concern over 
this issue. 107   Faced with this pressure, Mutsu agreed on 3 July that the Japanese 
government would reopen negotiations over the withdrawal of troops if the Qing 
decision-makers would agree to establish a joint Sino-Japanese committee for Korean 
reform, and guarantee that these two countries would enjoy equal political and economic 
opportunities in Korea.108  In addition, the proposal stated that if the Qing government 
agreed to these conditions, then the Japanese would not raise the issue of the suzerain-
vassal relationship between the Qing and Chosŏn at the negotiating table. 109   The 
Japanese were clearly asking for more concessions from the Qing in early July than they 
had on 15 June.  However, even if Mutsu’s real intention was to start a war, he was still 
driving towards that direction carefully.  The Japanese proposal indicated that they were 
still prepared to be considerate towards the Qing claim of suzerainty at the negotiating 
table, and thus there still was room for an agreement that would allow the Qing decision-
makers to save face.  The Japanese government also did not send more troops while it 
awaited the response from its Qing counterpart.110 
It should also be noted that the Foreign Office regarded the Japanese conditions as 
being “a reasonable proposal, which China should accept,” perhaps because the British 
diplomats and decision-makers thought that it was inevitable for the Japanese to make 
additional demands as they were being asked to return to the negotiating table after the 
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Qing rejection of the initial Japanese proposal.111  Therefore, when the Qing court – still 
heavily influenced by the hardliners – rejected the second Japanese proposal on 9 July, 
Western observers started to think that the Chinese were as determined to resort to war as 
the Japanese.112  The Western countries made their decisions not to get overly involved 
in the crisis by the third week of July. 
By this time, even Itō, who continued to hold some hope for a peaceful resolution to 
the crisis, was aware that it was becoming difficult to avoid war.113  On 10 July Mutsu 
started demanding that the Chosŏn court accept the proposal for domestic reform.114  By 
this time, Li had dispatched reinforcements to Korea.115  As Li had not given up on the 
prospect of peaceful resolution, he was reluctant to send a large number of troops to Korea, 
fearing that such an action might increase Sino-Japanese tensions to the point of no return, 
and argued to the hardliners that he could not take such an action because he lacked 
sufficient funds.116  However, the hardliners responded by handing him 3 million taels 
and also managed to convince the emperor to authorise Li to prepare for war.117  In this 
environment, Li had no other option but to send reinforcements on 18 July.118  But the 
IJA, which had already ordered the general mobilisation, responded by sending an even 
larger number of troops.119  On the very next day, the military ordered the Ninth Brigade 
                                                   
111 Kimberley to O’Conor (No. 48 Telegraphic), FO, 6 July 1894, FO 17/1202. 
112 O’Conor to Kimberley (No. 38 Telegraphic), Beijing, 9 July 1894 (rec. 9 July), FO 
17/1204; O’Conor to his wife (Private), Beijing, 10 July 1894, NOP CAC OCON/3/3/3. 
113 Takahashi, Nisshin Sensō eno Michi, 434-5. 
114 Ibid, 424-5; NGM, vol. 27-1, pp. 592-9. 
115 Okamoto, Ri Kōshō, 178. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 General Headquarters to Ōshima (Telegraphic), 18 July 1894, BKS, 大本営-日清戦
役電報綴-M27-2-114 (JACAR C06060705700); Shiba to Terauchi (Telegraphic), Pusan, 
18 July 1894 (rec. 18 July), BKS, 大本営-日清戦役電報綴-M27-5-117 (JACAR 
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and the navy on the alert.120 
On 18 July, the Chosŏn ministers rejected the Japanese proposal for domestic reform.121  
Ralph Paget, the British Chargé d’Affaires in Japan, contacted the Gaimushō to 
communicate that the Qing government was now prepared to accept most of the terms of 
the proposal of 3 July if that would lead to a peaceful resolution.122  Mutsu immediately 
replied that, since the Japanese government had already made efforts to initiate reform in 
Korea after the Qing’s initial rejection, it could not agree to a proposal that would put the 
situation in Korea back to how it was in early-July.123  If the Qing decision-makers 
wished the Japanese to return to the negotiating table, then the former must show goodwill 
by promising that it would not only abide by the spirit of the proposal of 3 July but also 
accept the fruits of the reforms which the Japanese had already initiated.124  By also 
demanding the Qing court reply within five days, the Japanese government managed to 
turn the British attempt of mediation into an ultimatum.125  On 20 July, the Japanese 
government also submitted an ultimatum to the Chosŏn court, demanding that the latter 
reconsider its decision to reject the former’s proposals for reform, to reject the entrance 
of Qing army into Korea, and to reply within three days.126 
Three days later, the Chosŏn ministers asked for an extension of the deadline, and in 
reply Ōtori authorised his troops to storm the palace, leading to the establishment of a 
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new government under the premiership of the Taewon’gŭn at gunpoint.127  The court in 
Beijing did not reply to the Japanese ultimatum, and on 25 July the IJN torpedoed a 
Chinese-chartered ship, the Kowshing, transporting Qing troops to Korea, which was 
owned by the British and operated by Western crews.128  On land, the Ninth Brigade 
engaged with the Qing troops in Asan on 28 July.  The latter was defeated within a day 
as it was badly isolated due to the fact that the IJN denied it any reinforcements.129  By 
the time the Qing and Japan formally declared war on each other on 1 August, a Sino-
Japanese conflict was well under way on the ground, and the Qing troops were quickly 
forced to withdraw from the southern part of Korea.130 
 
The Sino-Japanese Crisis, Treaty Revision  
and the Anglo-Japanese Relationship after late June 1894 
 
Until late June, the British government remained relatively idle over the Sino-Japanese 
crisis, as much of the attention of the British officials in East Asia, especially the officers 
in the China Squadron, was directed towards the contemporary Franco-Siamese 
confrontation.131  However, after the breakdown of the Sino-Japanese negotiations, both 
the decision-makers in London and diplomats in East Asia started to show stronger 
concern over this issue.132  Their primary fear was that the Russian government might 
                                                   
127 Ōtori to Mutsu (Telegraphic, No. 37), Seoul, 23 July 1894 (rec. 23 July); Ōtori to 
Mutsu (Telegraphic, No. 38), Seoul, 23 July 1894 (rec. 27 July), both from NGM, vol. 
27-1, pp. 617-9. 
128 Howland, “The Sinking of the S. S. Kowshing”; Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryō, 137-8. 
129 Sasaki, Meijijin no Rikiryō, 137. 
130 Wang to Mutsu (機密受第一一二九號), Chinese Legation in Japan, 1 Aug 1894; 
Imperial Declaration of War against China, 1 Aug, both from NGM, vol. 27-2, pp. 264-6. 
131 See the relevant folios in RP NLS, and also ADM 1/7199.  For secondary sources, 
see Martel, Imperial Diplomacy, 125-133. 
132 See documents after 22 June 1894 in FO 17/1204 and FO 46/434.  Also NGM, vol. 
27-2, pp. 272-283. 
254 
 
see the recent disturbances in Korea as an opportunity to expand its influence, and this 
sentiment was duly recognised by the Japanese.133 
The Japanese decision-makers acted most cautiously towards British mediation, and it 
is difficult not to assume that this was because the negotiations over treaty revision were 
about to finish.  Aoki and the senior officials of the Foreign Office managed to draw up 
a final draft of the revised treaty on 31 June; they still had some disagreements over the 
new tariff convention, but they agreed to negotiate this separately after they had signed 
the treaty.134  Aoki warned that in this situation it was important not to act in a manner 
that would change the friendly attitude that the British government had shown thus far.135  
Being fully aware of the suspicions that the British held towards Russia, the Japanese 
government politely rejected the Russian overture when the latter expressed their will to 
mediate this issue, and continued to keep a distance from them throughout the crisis.136  
And on 3 July, Mutsu informed the Foreign Office that the Japanese government was 
prepared to return to the negotiating table if the Qing would agree to the conditions that 
it demanded. 
When O’Conor and the Foreign Office learned with resentment that the Qing decision-
makers had rejected the Japanese offer, the prospect of a peaceful resolution of the crisis 
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became bleaker, and they started to fear that the Russian government might use this 
occasion to take action to expand its influence in Korea.137  Due to this fear, the Foreign 
Office contemplated the idea of making an overture to the governments of the other 
Western nations about a joint intervention in order to prevent the Russians acting 
unilaterally.138  Yet, as the Foreign Office concluded that the Russian government was 
uninterested in intervening in the crisis, they chose not take a decisive step in this 
direction.139  Sasaki Yō argues that the British policy in July was based upon their 
calculation of which country would prevail in any Sino-Japanese struggle, as the outbreak 
of a war became more realistic.  He argues that throughout the month the British 
decision-makers were busy evaluating the military strength of the Qing and Japan, and 
decided to change their East Asian policy which hitherto was had been based upon a pro-
Qing inclination, as they concluded that the Japanese now had the strategic upper hand.140  
They therefore chose not to support the Qing by declaring neutrality, and sought to gain 
Japanese goodwill as they thought that Japan would be a more competent partner to check 
any Russian advance in East Asia.  Certainly, there is a report by the Intelligence 
Divisions of the Admiralty and War Office which clearly argues that the quality of the 
IJN was superior to that of the Beiyang fleet.141 
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However, it is important to note that Vice-Admiral Sir Edmund Fremantle, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the squadron at that time, was reporting to the contrary.  He had 
been much impressed when he visited the naval establishment of the Beiyang Fleet in 
May – just before the Kabo uprising escalated – and had concluded that the quality of the 
Qing officers and seamen was not as poor as was conventionally believed. 142  
Accordingly, he predicted that the Qing would prevail if war broke out, as the Japanese 
did not possess an ironclad.143  He also thought it was unlikely that the Japanese could 
easily break through the Qing land forces, which enjoyed a clear advantage in terms of 
the quantity of resources and troops.  This perception was shared by many Western 
observers in East Asia. 
Meanwhile, Fraser, who had served as the Minister to Tokyo from 1888, had passed 
away suddenly on 4 June.144  De Bunsen and Spring-Rice, who had served in the legation 
for much of the first half of the 1890s, had also left Japan just before the death of the 
Minister, and thus the legation was headed by an inexperienced young diplomat named 
Paget.145  Therefore, O’Conor was by far the most influential diplomat in East Asia in 
the summer of 1894.  Despite being somewhat notorious for his assertive attitude when 
negotiating with the Qing officials, he nonetheless held considerable regard for the 
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potential of the Qing Empire and thus actively advocated in favour of an Anglo-Chinese 
alliance.  In June and July of 1894, the individuals who saw the Qing in more favourable 
light, such as Fremantle and O’Conor, therefore cast a stronger degree influence towards 
the home government than before.  In this environment, it is unlikely that the ministers 
and officials in London could be convinced that the Japanese had the strategic upper hand, 
as Sasaki argues. 
Taking account of the above point, Kobayashi Takao has offered a counterargument to 
Sasaki by pointing out that the British government sought to prevent the outbreak of war 
by seeking a cooperative relationship with the Qing in order to put pressure on the 
Japanese, so that the latter would not provoke any disorder in East Asia that the Russians 
might find it convenient to exploit.146  He concludes that the British decision-makers 
chose to remain neutral over this issue only reluctantly, because of the fact that the 
Japanese managed to parry the British manoeuvres and also because the Qing court was 
less than willing itself to take a conciliatory attitude over this issue.147  Without question, 
O’Conor continued to make efforts to hammer out an agenda to prevent the outbreak of 
war even after mid-July.148  Moreover, the Japanese decision-makers and diplomats in 
East Asia certainly received the impression that the British government was acting in a 
manner that was supportive to the Qing and unfriendly to Japan after observing the 
attitude of the British diplomats.  Christopher Gardner, the British Chargé d’Affaires in 
Korea, reported on several cases during the crisis that the Japanese military personnel 
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were intimidating or inflicting physical harm on the treaty-port population and 
diplomats. 149   One case that particularly shocked the Japanese decision-makers 
happened on 14 July, when Aoki visited the Foreign Office to sign the final draft of the 
new Anglo-Japanese treaty that both governments had finally agreed upon.  The senior 
officials of the Foreign Office informed Aoki that unfortunately they had received a report 
from Gardner that Ōtori had requested the Korean government to dismiss Lieutenant 
Callwell, the British naval advisor to that country, and that they could not sign the new 
treaty if the Japanese had acted in a manner so unfriendly to the British.150  This overture 
made Aoki fear that his government’s policy over the course of the Sino-Japanese crisis 
was alienating the British decision-makers, who sympathised with the Qing to the extent 
that they might withhold the signing of the new treaty at the last minute, in the hope that 
the Japanese government would readjust its policy.151 
However, Kobayashi’s argument fails to take account of the fact that the key 
individuals in the British decision-making circle were much less willing to intervene in 
the crisis than the diplomats in East Asia.  Mutsu immediately replied to Aoki that Ōtori 
confidently denied that he had requested the dismissal of Callwell, and upon receiving 
this reply the British government agreed to sign the treaty. 152   Aoki also took this 
opportunity to complain that the Japanese government could not help but feel that recent 
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actions taken by Gardner had been unfriendly, and after receiving this complaint the 
Foreign Office instructed O’Conor and Gardner to refrain from doing anything that could 
be interpreted as taking sides in the current Sino-Japanese crisis.153  In the memorandum 
that Rosebery wrote on 30 July, he stated that;  
 
In the first place I would observe that we should not be joined apparently by any other Power 
& that while collective action is one thing joint action is a very different affair.  What 
O’Conor wishes us to do is to make an armed demonstration in conjunction with Russia so 
as to prevent war between the two Powers.  I distrust all demonstrations unless you are 
prepared to go all lengths.  It is of course necessary to have recourse to them sometimes, 
but there is always a fear of their either leading you further than you wish, or of their 
becoming ridiculous.  If we thus interfere, we must be prepared to engage in naval action, 
and to justify that proceeding to Parliament.  I think it very doubtful if we could so justify 
it.  …Again I am quite sure that Japan is determined on war.  If then we take action, it 
must be in reality against Japan.  Would this be politic on our part?  In my opinion it 
would not.  We should weaken and alienate a Power of great magnitude in those seas, and 
which is a bulwark against Russia.  It is quite true that China and Japan may weaken 
themselves by war, but that will not, I suspect, be a very violent process.  …It seems to me 
then… that we have used our best exertions to maintain peace, we should not do more than 
we have done.154 
 
While this note was written at a time when the military engagement between Qing and 
Japan had already begun, the opinions voiced in these documents resonate well with the 
line of policy that the British government had pursued hitherto.  It was uncertain whether 
the other Western nations would respond favourably to a British call for a joint 
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intervention into the crisis.155  Besides, by mid-July both the Qing and the Japanese 
decision-makers seemed inclined to go to war, and in order to prevent these two countries 
from taking such a course, only a firm military demonstration would suffice.  The British 
ministers and senior officials of the Foreign Office had made their decisions throughout 
the Victorian era in the clear awareness that military expeditions were expensive, 
unpredictable and associated with the risk of Parliamentary outcry.  Such risks might be 
justifiable in order to protect interests in vital regions, but were clearly less so in East 
Asia where the British stake was seen as being much smaller.  It was natural for the 
British decision-makers to be even more reluctant from taking such course, when they 
were becoming reasonably confident that the Russians were not interested in taking this 
opportunity to expand, at least for the time being.  In such an environment, if the 
Japanese were willing to provoke a war and the Qing were determined to respond in an 
equally firm manner, then there was nothing that the British government could do. 
This stance was consistent with the line of policy that the British government had taken 
up to this point.  At the same time, considering the fact that the opinion of British 
officials in East Asia was dominated by those who held sympathy for the Qing cause over 
the Sino-Japanese crisis, it should not be assumed that the personality of the ministers in 
London did not have any influence on the decision-making process.  As argued in 
previous parts of this dissertation, Rosebery and Kimberley – the latter in particular – 
were quite frustrated towards the Qing decision-makers because of their experiences over 
the Burmese and Pamir questions.  The ministers of the previous Conservative 
administration did not show the same degree of frustration towards the Chinese as the 
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Liberals did.  Salisbury and Viscount Cross, the Secretary of State for India from 1887 
to 1892, were much less actively involved in the delineation of Sino-Burmese border than 
Kimberley had been, and while they did show concern over the Pamir question, their 
attention was directed more towards the Russian actions in Central Asia than the 
Qing’s.156  Also there are several documents which suggest that Kimberley held a higher 
opinion of Japan than most of his subordinates in the Foreign Office.  For example, on 
28 June the Foreign Office was preparing a telegram which initially intended to instruct 
Paget to inform the Japanese that “Japan could not expect our sympathy” if a war would 
break out as a result of the line of policy that the Japanese had pursued over the past 
month, but the draft was rewritten by Kimberley into a softer tone, mentioning that “it 
cannot be for the interest of Japan” to be involved in a war against the Qing.157 
In addition, the Japanese decision-makers avoided taking any action that might make 
the British seriously upset.  When the government ministers and the military officers in 
the General Headquarters started drawing up a war plan from 21 June, Kawakami Sōroku, 
the Deputy Head of the Army General Staff, argued that they must attempt to land their 
troops on the coast of the Capital District, and march them up all the way to Beijing in 
order to deliver a quick and decisive blow to the Qing.158  However, Mutsu, as well as 
the other government ministers, vetoed this suggestion.  The main reason behind this 
was that they did not think it was possible to land the troops in an area where so many 
Qing troops and warships were concentrated, but it is difficult not to think that Mutsu 
considered the possibility that the Western countries might intervene if Japan conducted 
a military operation directly against China.  Such an action could fundamentally 
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destabilise the domestic order and disturb trade, or in the worst case could provoke the 
Russians to make an advance towards northern China; the British decision-makers wanted 
to see neither of these happening.  In the last week of July, the British government made 
it clear that it did not want the Japanese to make any military manoeuvre that would 
disturb the trade on the Chinese coast, and in particular in Shanghai, and the Japanese 
complied with this request.159  The archival materials relating to British firms in East 
Asia indicate that their merchants did not show a particularly strong interest or concern 
over the situation in Korea.160  There was no strong reason for the British merchants to 
be too upset about the situation in Korea, as long as their business in the Chinese treaty 
ports would not be disturbed. 
 
Throughout the Sino-Japanese crisis, the Japanese government was influenced by the 
political environment – both domestic and international – to negotiate with its Qing and 
the Chosŏn counterparts in a very firm manner.  The Japanese government continued to 
dispatch a large number of troops to Korea from early-June 1894, and were determined 
to enforce its demands to the extent that it was were prepared to go to war if it could not 
get what it wanted.  It was confronted by the Qing, whose decision-making circle was 
becoming increasingly dominated by hardliners, and who were therefore equally 
unwilling to back down over their interests in Korea. 
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During the crisis, the British and the Japanese governments conducted diplomacy under 
the conviction that it was in their best interests to avoid taking any measure that could be 
interpreted as being unfriendly by their counterparts.  For the Japanese decision-makers 
to be successful in the struggle against Qing over Korea, they were aware that they had 
to avoid any Western governments siding with the Chinese.  The Japanese were 
particularly sensitive about the British, as they perceived that the latter had started to 
adopt a pro-Qing line of policy after 1887, and also because they were in the midst of 
important negotiations over treaty revision until mid-July.  In reality, the Japanese 
decision-makers were overestimating the degree of sympathy that the British counterparts 
had towards the Qing.  British ministers did not feel any particular need to support the 
Qing case over this issue.  However, this perception did make the Japanese cautious, and 
therefore they refrained from taking any measures that might be interpreted as being 
seriously injurious to British interests.  By the last week of July, British press started to 
report about the situation in Korea, but it was too late for the press to urge the British 
government to take strong measures to intervene in the Sino-Japanese crisis.161   In 
addition, as the first report on the Kowshing incident reached London on 28 July, this 
issue seriously affected the Anglo-Japanese relationship from August – as the Japanese 
sunk a vessel that was flying the British flag – but it could not particularly in the period 
before.162  Considering these points, it is not very surprising to see that the British 
decision-makers in London chose not to be involved in this incident.  And thus, the First 
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Sino-Japanese War broke out as a bilateral war between the two local powers in East Asia.
265 
 
Conclusion 
 
The objective of this dissertation has been to address several conventional 
misunderstandings about East Asian history and Korean affairs before the First Sino-
Japanese War in the years from 1876 to 1894.  These years are often perceived as a 
period of moratorium before the Qing dynasty of China, which had been in a state of 
continuous decline after its defeat in the Opium War, finally fell prey to Western and 
Japanese imperialism at the turn of the century.  Kim Key-hiuk has depicted the Korean 
affairs within this framework.  He has described the Qing as the benevolent suzerain of 
the Chosŏn dynasty which tried in vain to protect Korea from an expansionist Japan.1 
This argument has been repudiated by a number of historians, such as Banno Masataka, 
Okamoto Takashi and Kirk Larsen, who offer more a nuanced analysis of Chinese policy 
towards Korea. 2   Their works convincingly suggest that the Chinese were not as 
powerless as Kim has argued.  From the late-1870s onwards, the Qing authorities started 
to make a conscious effort to strengthen their empire’s influence in East Asia by utilising 
the suzerain-vassal relationship that had existed between the Chinese empire and the 
neighbouring kingdoms for centuries.  To accomplish this objective, they relied on 
military mobilisation and the making of unequal treaties with their traditional vassals – 
the exact same means that the Western nations and Japan utilised to strengthen their 
foothold in East Asia.  It goes without saying that such actions were not always 
appreciated by those at the receiving end, such as the Chosŏn.3   Far from being a 
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benevolent suzerain of East Asian kingdoms, the Qing was no less imperialist than the 
other nations in Korea. 
Looking at the British and Japanese policies towards Korea in the twenty years before 
the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War, greatly reinforces the argument put forward 
by these revisionist historians.  This dissertation has revealed that both of these 
governments recognised that the Qing had re-emerged as a very influential actor in East 
Asian affairs in these years.  The Chinese influence continued to grow throughout the 
1880s, and clearly became the most influential regional power in the region after the East 
Asian crises in the middle of the decade.  After 1887, these two governments started to 
formulate their East Asian policies in the clear recognition that it would be very difficult 
to uphold their interests if they lost the goodwill of the Chinese.  As they also understood 
that the Qing decision-makers were starting to place a significant degree of importance 
on upholding their prestige as the traditional suzerain of East Asia, the British and the 
Japanese acknowledged the need to bite their tongues as much as possible, especially after 
the East Asian crises.  As a consequence, there emerged a unique international 
environment in East Asia, in which Westphalian principles and the traditional East Asian 
order coexisted.  The governments involved in the East Asian affairs conducted 
diplomacy within this structure until the First Sino-Japanese War. 
The argument posed by Kim Key-hiuk is also based upon the assumption that Japan 
was a powerful regional power which attempted to push forward its interest in East Asia 
in a Machiavellian manner from the very early stages of Meiji era.  This argument is in 
accord with those Japanese historians who produced their works on Japanese imperialism 
before 1980. 4   Even the historians who have criticised Kim for understating the 
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imperialist tendency of the Qing policy towards Korea in the 1880s have not seriously 
questioned the conventional wisdom that the Japanese were inclined to conquer Korea at 
the first appropriate opportunity.5  There are only are a handful of historians, such as 
Hillary Conroy, Peter Duus, Tabohashi Kiyoshi and Takahashi Hidenao, who have 
pointed out that the Japanese government did not possess either the power or will to push 
such an aggressive foreign policy. 6   However, after conducting a research on the 
Japanese primary sources, this dissertation has concluded that the line of argument 
forwarded by these few researchers is more convincing. 
Of course, the Japanese government did not hesitate to advance its interests in Korea 
through gunboat diplomacy and unequal treaties when they could, and such behaviour 
provoked strong suspicion from the Qing and the Chosŏn.  The rowdy conduct of the 
Japanese merchants in Korean treaty ports was also resented by the local population.  It 
is therefore understandable that these two countries formulated their policies upon the 
belief that Japan was a potential threat to their interest and security.  But still, the 
Chinese and the Koreans in the late-nineteenth century overestimated the aggressiveness 
of the Japanese government, and historians must detach themselves from such perceptions 
if they wish to accurately understand the motives behind the actions taken by the Japanese 
government.  In the years before 1894, the Japanese decision-makers were clearly aware 
that they possessed only a limited amount of power that could be projected abroad.  The 
                                                   
Kenkyū; Iriye, “Japan’s Drive to Great Power Status”; Pak, Nisshin Sensō to Chōsen; 
Peng, “Kōshin Jihen o Meguru Inoue Gaimukyō to Furansu Kōshi tono Kōshō”; Peng, 
Meiji Shoki Nikkanshin Kankei no Kenkyū; Shibahara, Nihon Kindaika no 
Sekaishiteki Ichi; Shibahara, “Taigaikan to Nashonarizumu”; Tōyama, Tōyama Shigeki 
Chosakushū, Dai 1 shū: Meiji Ishin; Tsuda, “1880 nendai ni okeru Nihon Seifu no 
Higashi Ajia Seisaku Tenkai to Rekkyō”; Yamabe, Nihon no Kankoku Heigō, 2nd ed. 
5 Deuchler, The Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoy; Larsen, Tradition, 
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Kindai Nissen Kankei no Kenkyū, 2 vols.; Takahashi, Nisshin Sensō eno Michi. 
268 
 
Japanese also harboured strong concerns about the great powers, as a result of their having 
been at the receiving end of gunboat diplomacy in the 1850s and 1860s, and thought that 
their country might still fall prey to Western imperialism unless they remained cautious.  
There were therefore many reasons for the most important decision-makers in Japan, such 
as Itō Hirobumi, to be reluctant about pursuing the diplomatic policy towards Korea that 
the hardliners advocated. 
The Anglo-Japanese relationship in the years from 1876 to 1894 was inevitably 
affected by this international environment, in which both the British and Japanese 
governments had to prioritise their relationship with the Chinese.  Neither the British 
nor Japanese governments considered themselves to be powerful enough to challenge the 
dominant Chinese influence in the region.  As Britain’s primary interest in East Asia was 
trade, the objective of its policy towards this region was to provide stability, so that the 
trading networks that they established through unequal treaties and treaty ports would not 
be disturbed.  The British were therefore quite happy to accept Chinese superiority in 
Korea if their influence as the traditional suzerain could stabilise the regional order.  In 
addition, if they could maintain good relations with the Chinese, then there was potential 
for a military alliance to form with this emerging regional power in East Asia, which 
could be useful to protect their interests from other great powers, such as Russia.  The 
most important Japanese decision-makers could also acquiesce to the Qing, as they 
similarly considered that it was in their best interests if the regional order in East Asia 
remained stable.  And the Japanese also held high hopes that they might be able to form 
an alliance with the Qing and the Chosŏn to resist Western imperialism into East Asia if 
they could improve their relationship with their neighbours.  By the mid-1880s, the 
British government in particular became convinced that the Qing had become much 
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stronger than in the past, to the extent that it would be very difficult to maintain its stake 
in East Asia without upholding the goodwill of the court in Beijing.  The decision-
makers therefore chose to acquiesce to the Chinese efforts to reassert their influence in 
the region through the claim of traditional suzerainty over their neighbouring kingdoms, 
including Korea and Upper Burma.  In this environment, whenever they felt the need to 
form an alliance with East Asian powers to prevent Russian expansion, they naturally 
turned to the Qing instead of Japan. 
Before 1894, there was an environment in which both Britain and Japan had to 
prioritise upholding good relations with the Qing, and this inevitably meant that their 
relations with each other were often sacrificed.  There also were numerous bilateral 
issues that caused frictions between Britain and Japan in the period from 1876 to 1894.  
For example, the issues arising between Japanese migrant workers in the white settlers’ 
societies around the Pacific and the host populations continued to frustrate the Japanese, 
and these incidents negatively influenced their perception towards Britain, as many of 
these labourers worked within the British Commonwealth. 7   Legal issues which 
involved the British in Japan, such as the Normanton and Chishima-Ravenna incidents 
also indicated that the Anglo-Japanese relationship could improve only to a certain extent 
as long as the treaty of 1858 remained intact.  Yet, the progress of the negotiations for 
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treaty revision remained frustratingly slow, and the Japanese identified the British as 
being the most reluctant amongst all the great powers to comply with their demands, 
which inevitably influenced the former to be very suspicious. 
As pointed out in the introduction, many of the works on the Anglo-Japanese relations 
in the late-nineteenth century tend to focus on the cooperative aspects of the relationship, 
which often makes historians assume that the relationship between these two countries at 
this time was relatively cordial.8   This thesis has argued against such conventional 
wisdom by pointing out that the Anglo-Japanese relations before the First Sino-Japanese 
War were not based upon any innate mutual sympathy, admiration or sense of affiliation.  
Instead, the governments of Britain and Japan conducted diplomacy towards each other 
based upon calculations on what would be best for promoting their national interests.  
This is not to say that the Anglo-Japanese relations before the First Sino-Japanese War 
were hostile, and the British and Japanese could cooperate on issues where they shared 
common concerns.  For example, during the Sino-French War, the British government 
requested that the other foreign powers in the Chinese treaty ports, including Japan, join 
together in naval operations to protect the merchant ships of neutral countries, and the 
Japanese government accepted this request.  The British decision-makers also 
contemplated the idea of forming an alliance not only with the Qing but also Japan during 
the Penjdeh crisis, as they thought both of the East Asian empires saw Russia as a major 
threat. 
The bottom line was that British decision-makers and diplomats were aware that as a 
result of Japan’s determined efforts, the Japanese military in 1880 was stronger than it 
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had been in 1863 and 1864 when Britain had successfully waged a military campaign 
against Satsuma and Choshū.  The British officials concluded that it would no longer be 
easy to promote their interests in Japan in a high-handed manner.  They also thought that 
there could be grave consequences if they marginalised the Japanese too much, fearing 
that the latter might choose to come on to better terms with Russia.  It was under this 
calculation that the British concluded in the 1880s that they should comply with the 
Japanese request to negotiate treaty revision, an issue on which the Japanese decision-
makers placed significant importance.  The Japanese, in return, were well aware of the 
risks in case the relationship became hostile, as they, just as most with of their 
contemporaries throughout the world, knew that Britain possessed the strongest navy.  
As a result, despite being frustrated by their counterparts on numerous occasions, the 
British and the Japanese never contemplated the idea of permanently suspending the 
negotiations on treaty revision and finally managed to sign a new treaty in July 1894. 
But still, there were plenty of factors that kept Britain and Japan at a distance.  Ōsawa 
Hiroaki has argued that the Japanese policy towards East Asia after 1887 can be 
characterised as a period when its decision-makers identified Russia as the primary threat 
to Japan’s security and interests in Korea.9  He contends that they tried to address this 
concern by developing a cooperative relationship with the Qing and Britain, and that this 
attempt failed because of the conflicting interests over Korea between the Qing and Japan.  
However, it must be said that his argument is based upon an assumption that the Anglo-
Japanese relationship was relatively cordial.  In reality, the confidence between the 
British and the Japanese was not strong enough to enable such an arrangement to develop. 
The Japanese decision-makers realised that in the 1880s the global competition between 
                                                   
9 See his articles, the latest being “Chōsen Eisei Chūritsuka Kōsō to Nihon Gaikō.” 
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the European nations was becoming more intense, and this recognition concretised after 
the East Asian crises from 1884 to 1887.  The most obvious example of this disturbing 
tendency was the British occupation of Kŏmundo in April 1885, and the brief 
confrontation between British and Russian warships which occurred in the harbour of 
Yokohama few weeks later.  Within this environment, there was no reason why the 
Japanese should assume that Britain was less of a threat to their security than the other 
great powers. 
Moreover, Ōsawa has also overemphasised the Japanese suspicion towards Russia.  
While it is true that the Japanese saw Russia as an expansionist empire, the Russo-
Japanese relationship before 1894 was relatively stable.  The treaty of 1875, which 
delineated the maritime frontier in the northern waters of Japan, provided quite an 
efficient framework for interactions across this border.  The Japanese decision-makers 
also perceived that the Russians were quite sympathetic towards their position over the 
question of treaty revision.  What was most important was that Russia was far from 
being as an aggressive and expansionist power as the British expected, and conducted 
diplomacy in East Asia in a very cautious manner.  This stance was duly accepted by 
most of the individuals within the Japanese government, and thus they were reluctant to 
pursue a line of policy which could induce a serious negative reaction from Russia, such 
as coming onto closer terms with Britain. 
What was also important was that the Anglo-Japanese relationship in this period was 
that it was asymmetrical.  For the Japanese decision-makers, Britain was a great power 
whose influence could not be ignored, whereas for the British their interests in Japan were 
not seen as something very important.  For the British decision-makers, Japan was a 
region which lay in the fringe of East Asia, a region which already was relatively 
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unimportant.  As long as the Japanese government allowed British merchants to access 
its market, then the British government did not have much more to demand from the 
Japanese.  Issues over trade with Japan were not discussed in Parliament as frequently 
as commercial matters in other regions that were deemed more important – such as the 
Middle East, Egypt or India.10  Even for the British firms in East Asia, Japan was 
deemed as being much less important than the other markets in the region.11  Thus, the 
British decision-makers attached no urgency to the issue of treaty revision.  But the 
Japanese perceived the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1858 as something more serious than a 
mere commercial treaty, as it imposed restrictions on the administrative and judicial 
abilities of their government.  This issue also started to catch the attention of the public 
and the press in Japan from the late-1880s.  As it often sparked public outcry, Japanese 
government ministers started to consider it ever more important to conclude the 
negotiations as quickly as possible.  However, senior officials of the Foreign Office 
preferred to take much more time than the Japanese.  Although the British did not intend 
to be unfriendly, this attitude frustrated the latter, especially because three Foreign 
Ministers – Inoue Kaoru, Ōkuma Shigenobu and Aoki Shūzō – had to resign in the face 
of the violent public criticism before they could conclude the negotiations over treaty 
revision.  Yet, it was too risky for the Japanese to contemplate the idea of unilaterally 
denouncing the treaty of 1858, considering the naval strength of Britain. 
Similarly, there was a gap in the degree of importance that the British and the Japanese 
attached to Korea.  For the British, it was a kingdom that mattered even less than Japan.  
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The commercial prospects of Korea seemed extremely bleak, and the ministers and 
officials of the Chosŏn regime drew very little sympathy.  There was nothing for the 
British to lose even if they engaged in de facto recognition of the superiority of Qing in 
Korea, as long as the Chinese wielded enough influence to check Russian expansion and 
uphold stability in Northeast Asia.  However, Korea was considered as being much more 
important by the Japanese, due to its geographical proximity to their country, and 
therefore they could not afford to completely lose their foothold in Korea.  It was also 
because most of the Japanese considered Korea as being important that some individuals 
argued that their government should take firm measures to strengthen their foothold in 
that country.  Although the government officials and ministers were unwilling to follow 
such a policy, it was impossible for them to entirely ignore the hardliners.  But the 
British frowned upon these hardliners who seemed inclined to urge their government to 
engage in military expeditions against the Chosŏn and the Qing, as such actions would 
cause ‘unnecessary’ disturbances in East Asia that could possibly create an opportunity 
for Russia to expand.  These gaps in perception often led the British and the Japanese to 
misunderstand each other’s actions. 
 
The international environment that surrounded the Anglo-Japanese relationship went 
through a significant transformation from the summer of 1894.  Despite the fact that the 
British and Japanese governments chose to bite their tongue as much as possible towards 
the Qing claim of suzerainty over Korea, this did not mean that they were not frustrated 
by the Chinese actions.  As the Japanese government considered Korea was important 
for the national interest, it could not help but feel concerned when the Qing continued to 
expand its influence in that country.  The former feared that the latter was inclined to 
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turn Korea into its exclusive sphere of influence, and therefore thought they must take 
necessary countermeasures to uphold their position.  Even the British, who did not place 
as strong importance on East Asia as the Japanese, eventually became frustrated when the 
Chinese continued their attempts to strengthen their influence in East Asia from the late-
1880s onwards.  The British decision-makers were suspicious that the Chinese might be 
plotting for a secret agreement with the Russians and the French, which could be 
potentially dangerous to the British interest not only in China but also in India.  They 
also thought the Qing negotiators were procrastinating in the negotiations on the 
delineation of the Sino-Burmese border, and this perception inevitably had negative 
effects on Anglo-Chinese relations.  The coexistence of Westphalian principle and 
traditional East Asian international order – two theoretically contradictory concepts – was 
not easy. 
This did not mean that the dual structure that characterised regional order in East Asia 
before 1894 was completely unsustainable.  Despite experiencing numerous diplomatic 
difficulties with the Qing, the governments involved in East Asian affairs still thought it 
was useful for stabilising the regional order, and therefore showed strong determination 
to uphold this structure by conducting diplomacy within this framework.  The problem, 
however, was that the Chosŏn regime could not provide long-term domestic political 
stability for Korea.  When the Kabo rebellion broke out in the spring of 1894, it was 
difficult for both the Qing and Japanese governments to deal with the crisis in the same 
restrained manner as they had in 1882 and 1884.  After experiencing numerous 
difficulties with the Qing over Korea throughout the 1880s, the Japanese government was 
suspicious that the Chinese might take the disturbance in Korea as an opportunity to 
expand their influence in the peninsula and carve back the Japanese foothold even further.  
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Indeed, that was exactly what the Qing government, which could no longer suppress the 
hardliners within the decision-making circle, tried to do in early June of 1894.  But such 
manoeuvre induced a sharp reaction from Japan; it must also be remembered that at this 
time the Japanese government was also facing strong pressure from the domestic political 
opposition, which also were calling for hardline policy.  As neither the Qing nor Japan 
were willing to compromise their interest in Korea, these two powers headed towards war 
from late July. 
The outcome of the war changed the entire dynamics of East Asian regional affairs.  
Japan emerged as the victor, and replaced the Qing as the strongest regional power in East 
Asia.  As the Qing was defeated more quickly and thoroughly than any Western 
observers had expected, decision-makers in the Western countries no longer saw it as the 
most influential regional power in East Asia, and felt no need to respect the Qing claim 
of suzerainty over its traditional vassals after the conflict.  The dual structure which 
characterised East Asian regional order collapsed after 1894-5.  The Western nations 
started to intervene into East Asian affairs in a much more direct manner than they had 
before the war, most notably in April 1895 Russia, Germany and France gave ‘friendly 
advice’ to the Japanese to return some of the fruits of war that they had claimed in the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki to the Qing.  The environment that induced the Western nations 
to scramble for China at around the turn of the century started to be formulated around 
this time. 
It is also worth noting that two weeks prior to the outbreak of the conflict, the new 
Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty was signed, and the biggest thorn in Anglo-Japanese 
relations – the question over treaty revision – was removed.  In addition, after the Triple 
Intervention the Japanese decision-makers started to become more aware of the danger 
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of diplomatic isolation.  This incident was also important in the sense that the 
government in Tokyo now started to see Russia, which initiated the intervention, with 
much stronger suspicion than before.  In contrast, the Japanese impression towards 
Britain improved, as the British government chose not to participate in the Russian call 
for intervention.  The increased Russian commitment into East Asia after the Triple 
Intervention was a concern for the British government as well, and the collapse of the 
Qing prestige meant that Japan stood as the only local power that the British could rely 
upon as a potential partner to check the Russian advance.  As Ian Nish and T. G. Otte 
argue, this still did not mean that an Anglo-Japanese alliance and Russo-Japanese war 
was inevitable, but these developments certainly became more possible than in the years 
before 1894.12  At the very least, it became inevitable for the British and Japanese 
governments to make adjustments to their policies towards each other, as the environment 
that surrounded the Anglo-Japanese relationship had now profoundly changed.
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